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Thesis Abstract 
Traditionally Cato's Letters have been seen as a keynote text in the construction of the civic 
humanist paradigm, a perspective which has come to dominate contemporary understanding 
of the intellectual currents at work in the shaping of eighteenth century Britain and America. 
Within this paradigm the Letters have been viewed as emblematic of a `neo-Harringtonian' 
critique of Court corruption and the `new economic order'. 
However there are significant problems with this interpretation and this thesis argues that the 
attitude of Trenchard and Gordon towards Walpole's ministry was more nuanced than is 
usually suggested; that they were prepared to lend his administration their support when 
occasion demanded. Against the trend to downplay the religious and ideological differences 
between Whigs and Tories, in order to prioritise the Court-Country division, this thesis 
suggests that Trenchard and Gordon's position towards Walpole can best be understood in 
terms of their commitment to traditional Whig principles of freedom of conscience and 
opposition to arbitrary rule, rather than on the basis of a preoccupation with issues of wealth 
and virtue. Contrary to the accepted view that Trenchard and Gordon were opposed to 
commerce and the financial instruments which it generated, and that they viewed a society 
motivated by self-interest as a threat to civic virtue and liberty, this thesis contends that their 
`scientific' political and moral philosophy both naturalised self-interest and redrew it as the 
foundation of liberty. 
In the process of calling into question `Cato's' status as a civic humanist icon, this thesis also 
points to similarities between Trenchard and Gordon's thought and that of Bernard 
Mandeville, who conventionally has been represented as Cato's antithesis. By comparing the 
work of all three writers, and the way in which they were viewed by contemporaries, it is 
argued that in terms of religious, political and moral philosophy there are major points of 
convergence in their ideology. 
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Introduction 
The subjects of this thesis are John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, two political 
writers who came to prominence around 1720. Their fame largely rests on their co- 
authorship of The Independent Whig, a weekly series of anti-clerical papers, and 
more notably Cato's Letters, a series of essays on political and religious subjects 
which appeared, under the signature of `Cato', first in the London Journal and then 
in the British Journal from November 1720 to July 1723 and which, like The 
Independent Whig, were later collected in book form. ' The Independent Whig is 
largely concerned with issues of religion: the relationship between the Church and 
the state, the role of the clergy, freedom of conscience and, particularly, the official 
strictures placed upon dissenters. Both of these publications enjoyed widespread 
popularity, not only in Great Britain but also in France and America throughout the 
eighteenth century, as did Gordon's translations of the histories of Sallust and 
Tacitus and his accompanying pointedly political commentaries, which drew 
parallels with the present and were similar in tone to The Independent Whig and 
Cato's Letters. By 1737 bound volumes of The Independent Whig had gone 
through at least seven editions in Great Britain and two in America and in 1767 it 
appeared in a French translation by Baron d'Holbach under the title L'Espirit du 
'Trenchard and Gordon were the authors of 43 of the 55 numbers of The Independent Whig. In the 
sixth edition of the collected papers Gordon attributed authorship of the individual numbers: 'I 
have, at the End of each Paper, put the initial Letter of the Name of the Gentleman who wrote it. ', 
The Independent Whig: Or, a Defence of Primitive Christianity And our Ecclesiastical 
Establishment Against The Exorbitant Claims and Encroachments of Fanatical and Disaffected 
Clergymen, [T. G., J. T. and A. C. ] (London, 1732). It is generally accepted that the ten numbers of 
The Independent Whig which bear the initial `C' were written by the deist author Anthony Collins. 
It was perhaps on account of the great stir caused by Cato's Letters that Robert Molesworth laid 
claim to a part in their authorship, although Trenchard and Gordon repudiated the attempted 
appropriation. See Spencer Research Library, University of Kansas, MS G23, Trenchard-Simpson 
Correspondence, John Trenchard to William Simpson, 25 October [1721] and 8 November [1721]; 
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clerge. 2 Similarly, Cato's Letters enjoyed a wide circulation. Two partial 
collections appeared in Britain in 1721, followed by complete and then by 
expanded editions in 1724,1731,1733,1737 and 1748 and by a final, corrected 
edition in 1754-5.3 Dutch and French translations of the Letters appeared in 1754 
and 1790 respectively. Gordon's Tacitus also proved equally popular on both sides 
of the Atlantic as well as in France. A French translation of his Sallust appeared in 
1759 and translations of both his Sallust and his Tacitus were published during the 
French Revolution. 
It is unfortunate that Trenchard and Gordon, so much read throughout the 
eighteenth century, should be so misread by historians today. This thesis seeks to 
address that misreading. The methodology it adopts to achieve this aim is an 
examination of their work in three major contexts, that of religion, politics and 
philosophy. It does so because these issues dominated the writings of Trenchard 
and Gordon. The following chapters show that these three aspects of Trenchard 
and Gordon's thought are inter-related and mutually reinforcing. In the process of 
showing this, it will become apparent that the hitherto accepted reading of the 
ideological basis of Trenchard and Gordon's work is invalid. The wider 
significance of this finding is that it calls into question the status of the civic 
humanist paradigm as the supreme vantage point for viewing the eighteenth 
and Cato's Letters Or Essays on Liberty, Civil and Religious, and Other Important Subjects, 2 vols. 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1995), dedication, p. 8. 
2Holbach also used Trenchard's name as a shield when publishing his own fiercely anticlerical Le 
contagion sacree (1768), presumably deciding not to acknowledge as his own a book that might be 
considered blasphemous. 
3One historian has noted: `The popularity and influence of The London Journal increased rapidly in 
the country as well as in London, and comments of the time refer to it more frequently than to any of 
its contemporaries. In London, the demand was said to have been so great on at least one occasion 
that the price was forced up from three halfpence to sixpence and even to a shilling, "a price hardly 
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century. This is because Trenchard and Gordon have been accorded a central role 
by advocates of the civic humanist paradigm in the formation of republican 
ideology in America and Great Britain in the eighteenth century. 
CHAPTER 1 discusses the conventional reading of Trenchard and Gordon as civic 
humanist icons. The small number of dissenting voices, such as Ronald Hamowy, 
Marie McMahon and Michael Zuckert, who have cast doubt on the accepted 
representation of Trenchard and Gordon, are also briefly discussed. Welcome as 
these voices are, however, they present an incomplete account of Trenchard and 
Gordon's thought. Hamowy concentrates almost exclusively on Cato's Letters and 
emphasises their Lockean dimension. McMahon, on the other hand, while 
examining a wider range of Trenchard and Gordon's work, stresses the authors' 
anticlericalism. Zuckert, like Hamowy, concentrates almost entirely on the 
Lockean aspect of Cato's Letters. This thesis differs from previous studies in that, 
as stated above, it integrates the different elements of Trenchard and Gordon's 
thought in order to get closer to understanding the ideas and values the authors 
sought to convey and to understanding how they were read by their British and 
American audiences. To a limited, and not uncritical, extent it is in sympathy with 
the methodological writings of Quentin Skinner. 
CHAPTER 2 questions the validity of the Court-Country dichotomy which forms 
the basis of the civic humanist paradigm. It argues that the Whig/Tory division 
continued to operate as the dominant political axis after 1714 and that Trenchard 
ever given before" for a newspaper [The London Journal, 18 March 1721]', C. B. Realey, 'The 
Journal and its Authors 1720-1723', Bulletin of the University of Kansas, 36 (1935), 1-38, at 32. 
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and Gordon remained Whigs first and foremost. However, as a result of ignoring 
the close relationship played by religion and politics in Trenchard and Gordon's 
work, they have been mistakenly characterised as `Country' opposition writers. 
Both Cato's Letters and other works by Trenchard and Gordon are examined in 
order to show that although critical of the Whig establishment they still rallied to 
its defence in time of crisis; that it still held out the best hope of meeting the 
concerns which most occupied the two writers. This chapter argues that for 
Trenchard and Gordon, and for their contemporaries, the question of political 
sovereignty was still linked inextricably to issues of religious doctrine. Their 
suspicion of High-Church Tories, who they believed to be Jacobite sympathisers, 
makes them unlikely collaborators in a `Country' opposition. The primary 
consideration of both men was to ensure the Protestant succession and a wider 
religious toleration. They were prepared to compromise on other areas of 
principle, such as frequent elections and a standing army, in order to secure these 
ends. The ideological basis of Trenchard and Gordon's thought was not a belief in 
the corrupting power of wealth, which threatened civic virtue, but a fear of the 
encroaching power of the established Church. 
In support of these arguments, chapter 2 draws on manuscript sources - 
Trenchard's personal correspondence, including letters from Gordon - which have 
hitherto gone unnoticed by scholars for the most part. Neither Hamowy nor 
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McMahon seem to have been aware of these papers, which cast Trenchard and 
Gordon in a previously unobserved light. 
CHAPTER 3 argues that Trenchard and Gordon should be seen as predominantly 
in the modem natural law tradition. Ignorance or avoidance of what they had to say 
about human nature has led to them being labelled mistakenly as key figures in 
`neo-Harringtonianism'. Yet their view of virtue was based largely on a 
naturalistic concept of human nature which they derived from the sensationalist 
philosophy of Hobbes and Locke. 5 Essentially, they regarded man as a creature 
ruled by his passions rather than by reason. It was impossible, they argued, to 
expect men to put the public interest before their private interest and the only way 
to persuade them to do so was by showing them, forcibly if necessary, that their 
long-term private interest was best served by sacrificing their immediate desires. 
Their interpretation of virtue in purely instrumental terms, and as a species of self- 
interest, makes it clear that their perspective was modem rather than classical. In a 
complete departure from the standard dicta of civic humanism they insisted that the 
potential for virtue, redefined in their terms, was inherent in commercial man and 
that the basis of his liberty was rooted in his self-interest, which would always limit 
the amount of misgovernment he was willing to endure. 
4The Trenchard-Simpson papers are the only extant personal correspondence of note of Trenchard 
or, indeed, of Gordon. Only Margaret Jacob appears to have noticed the existence, if not the full 
significance, of these papers. She refers to the papers in an endnote in relation to a letter from 
Anthony Collins to William Simpson which is included in the collection. See The Radical 
Enlightenment (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1981), p. 178. 
5The term `sensationalist', employed here and elsewhere in this thesis in relation to both Hobbes and 
Locke, is used advisedly. Whether or not scholars of the history of ideas consider Locke, in 
particular, a sensationalist philosopher, and indeed whether or not Locke would have seen himself in 
such terms, this is how Trenchard and Gordon saw him. They linked Locke with Hobbes and viewed 
both as sensationalist philosophers. Critics of Trenchard and Gordon were of the same opinion and 
damned the authors of Cato's Letters and The Independent Whig by association by ranking them 
with Hobbes and Locke. See chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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Connections with the Dutch Hobbesian republication tradition, particularly with 
the de la Court brothers, are also discussed in this chapter. In addition, it examines 
contemporary attacks on Trenchard and Gordon's materialist philosophy, which 
was perceived to carry political implications, and their categorisation as fellow 
travellers with Hobbes and Spinoza. 
CHAPTER 4 examines the validity of the connection, identified by J. G. A. 
Pocock, Margaret Jacob and others, between neo-Harringtonianism and deism. 
The politics and `deism' of Toland, Tindal and Collins are analysed and it is argued 
that in the case of all these `radicals', radical philosophy did not equate to radical 
politics. It also discusses how Trenchard's form of `deism' differed markedly from 
that of most other freethinkers who were branded with the same label and argues 
that it resembled more closely the thought of Hume. 
At the same time, it places Trenchard and Gordon's work in the wider context of 
the views expressed by their fellow `neo-Harringtonians'. As Trenchard and 
Gordon have been taken as representative of an ideology, neo-Harringtonianism, it 
is necessary to look at others who are said to share that ideology and to compare 
their writings in order to identify whether they do indeed possess a common core of 
beliefs and, if so, what these are. This chapter points up differences in their 
thought which have been obscured by the tendency to place them under a single 
banner. It also, however, argues that the Grecian Inn coterie as a whole did not 
form an opposition to Walpole's ministry and that they were united by a 
commitment to religious toleration and free thought. 
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CHAPTER 5 considers similarities in the thought of `Cato' and Mandeville, who 
in civic humanist iconography are represented in antithetical terms as, respectively, 
saint and sinner and as symbols of the opposition between virtue and commerce. 
Building on arguments put forward in chapter 3, it shows that, like Mandeville, 
Trenchard and Gordon possessed a view of human nature which is fundamentally 
at variance with the civic humanist paradigm and one which situates them in the 
modem natural law tradition of Hobbes and Locke. All three writers believed man 
was wholly selfish and would always, given the opportunity, pursue his private 
interest before that of the public. Consequently, they argued, man had to be 
manipulated or constrained by custom or law to serve the good of society. Placing 
little confidence in man's ability to act according to the dictates of right reason, 
they trusted instead to his unwavering commitment to his own self-interest which, 
when confronted by legal and social strictures, would ensure that it was brought 
home to him that it was in his private interest not to oppose the public good. 6 In 
the eyes of both Trenchard and Gordon and Mandeville, this was true as much for 
governors as for the people and it is this view of human nature, constrained by 
external checks rather than reason, which informed their political pragmatism. 
Similarly, the religious toleration which all three men persistently advocated was 
underwritten by their belief in man's incapacity to be guided by reason and to 
penetrate ultimate truths. It followed that if man could not justifiably lay claim to 
6In most matters, Trenchard and Gordon believed men incapable of being guided by reason, defined 
as calm, unadulterated deliberation, but considered them to be possessed of sense enough to be able 
to judge rightly whether or not they were oppressed by their governors or by Churchmen. What 
passed for reason was merely the checking of one passion by another. See, especially, CL, I, no. 6, 
p. 55 and no. 39, pp. 273-76. On the occasions when Trenchard and Gordon did champion reason it 
was in the context of condemning superstition or the authority claimed by priests. See, for example, 
The Independent Whig, nos. 31,39 and 53, pp. 192,240 and 444. 
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knowledge of God's essence and His will, he held no mandate to persecute others 
for their beliefs, except when they disturbed the civil peace. 
Chapter 5 also argues that similarities in the religious history of England and 
Holland, regarding questions of sovereignty and toleration, shaped the attitudes of 
Trenchard and Gordon and Mandeville in like ways. As a result of the role of the 
Orthodox Calvinist Church in Holland and High Church Anglicanism in England 
they both condemned Church interference in government and were committed to 
religious toleration. 
CHAPTER 6 analyses further the connections between Trenchard and Gordon's 
thought and that of Mandeville. Previously historians have noted the influence of 
the French moralistes in Mandeville's work. This chapter argues that Trenchard 
and Gordon's work shows that they drew on a number of the same sources. Like 
Mandeville, Trenchard and Gordon followed Pascal and other Jansenist writers by 
judging self-love under two separate aspects, the rigoristic and the utilitarian.? In 
accord with the author of The Fable of the Bees, they believed that, carefully 
managed, even men's vices could be turned to good effect and be made to serve the 
public interest. Also like Mandeville, they leaned on arguments presented by St. 
Evremond in favour of political pragmatism and in defence of luxury. All these 
71t needs to be stressed that Trenchard and Gordon's `utilitarianism', like that of Mandeville, was 
based on egoistic psychology. The term `utilitarian' is used here, and elsewhere in this thesis, in its 
loose sense. Applied to Trenchard and Gordon, or indeed to Mandeville, it is obviously 
anachronistic. However, it is a more apt description than to label their thought `Epicurean', which 
seems fraught with greater difficulties. Their thinking can not be termed utilitarian in the strict sense 
of the word since for them utility, or the greatest happiness principle, was not their sole standard for 
judging actions. See chapters 3 and 6 of this thesis. 
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sources, which Trenchard and Gordon shared with Mandeville, were also linked by 
a commitment to religious toleration. 
CHAPTER 7 argues that Trenchard and Gordon valued Tacitus and Machiavelli 
not for what they had to say about civic virtue but for their political pragmatism. In 
the account given by proponents of the civic humanist paradigm, Machiavelli's 
English successors are portrayed as inheritors of an incontestably classical 
republican tradition. Similarly, it is assumed that these men read Tacitus as a moral 
historian and advocate of a republican virtue that was long passed even in his day. 
The impression conveyed is that neo-Harringtonians were ignorant, or dismissive, 
of an alternative Machiavelli or an alternative Tacitus and that these counter 
interpretations played no part in the formulation of their political ideas. Yet 
although Harrington may have consolidated Machiavelli's reputation as a 
republican writer, the obverse image Machiavelli had always presented still 
retained its currency in the early eighteenth century. 8 Both he and Tacitus had long 
been seen as ambiguous republicans. Machiavelli's republican credentials were 
cast in doubt by The Prince and Tacitus' obscurity allowed him to be claimed by 
both defenders of absolute monarchy and their opponents. 
Chapter 7 goes on to argue that Gordon's reading of Tacitus and Machiavelli 
echoed earlier commentaries of Tacitists by those such as Lipsius and, particularly, 
Boccalini. Like them, Gordon was sceptical about the possibility of a modem 
8To assert the complex nature of Machiavelli's republicanism may seem to state the obvious. 
However, the emphasis in recent years on the republican face of Machiavelli has obscured this 
complexity and the complexity of reactions he provoked in his readers. The portrait of Machiavelli 
presented by Felix Raab might be considered outdated by some historians today but it still offers 
valuable insights. In England in the seventeenth century, and on into the eighteenth century, 
Machiavelli's political theory was seen to be many-faceted and was adopted in equal measure by 
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republic founded on civic virtue. While his republicanism, like of that of 
Trenchard, was coloured by Tacitus and Machiavelli, it was not coloured by their 
supposed devotion to the ideal of civic virtue but by their lessons in raison d'etat. 
CHAPTER 8 looks at how Trenchard and Gordon's works were received in 
eighteenth century America. It rejects the idea that a simple analogy can be drawn 
between the supposed classical republicanism of Trenchard and Gordon and that of 
the American Revolutionary generation. It argues that Franklin, Jefferson, John 
Adams and others were no more classical republicans than were Trenchard and 
Gordon. Cato's Letters and The Independent Whig were cited widely in America 
in defence of such traditionally `liberal' causes as freedom of speech and religious 
toleration. The argument that the American colonies should break free from Great 
Britain on the grounds of self-interest, rather than on the grounds of Court 
corruption, was also taken from Cato's Letters. 
The purpose of this chapter is not to attempt an in-depth analysis of the reception 
of Cato's Letters in America. Its limited remit is to question, in the light of textual 
evidence, the notion that Trenchard and Gordon were read by American 
revolutionaries in the terms set by revisionist historians. 
republicans and monarchists. See Felix Raab, The English Face of Machiavelli (London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1965). 
Chapter I 
The Historiographical Background 
In recent years, from about the late 1960s, Cato's Letters has become a keynote 
text in the revisionist interpretation of the ideological origins of the American 
Revolution. Previously, the accepted version had been that Lockean liberalism had 
formed the centrepiece of America's founding ethos. This is the position set out 
for example in Hartz's classic work The Liberal Tradition in America., The 
revisionist school of historians, spearheaded by Bernard Bailyn and Gordon Wood 
and which includes J. G. A. Pocock amongst its leading figures, overturned this 
interpretation and argued that Locke, far from providing a template for the 
American Revolution in The Two Treatises of Government, had exerted only a 
negligible influence on political thought before 1776.2 In the revisionist 
interpretation Lockean liberalism was sidelined and recast as the ideological 
antithesis of Revolutionary political thought. 3 The new orthodoxy for viewing the 
eighteenth century became the civic humanist or civic republican paradigm, which 
has gained wide acceptance largely through the work of Pocock, and which has 
now displaced the traditional liberal reading. In the words of Pocock: `The civic 
'See Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harecourt, Brace & Co., 1955). 
2See Bernard Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopt, 1969); 
Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1969); and J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Chichester: Princeton 
University Press, 1975). 
'Pocock has argued: `The idea of power reverting to the people can, of course, be stated in the 
language of Locke's Second Treatise, but it is overwhelmingly important to realise that the 
predominant language in which it was expressed by eighteenth century radicals was one of virtue, 
corruption, and reform, which is Machiavellian, classical, and Aristotelian, and in which Locke did 
not figure. ', `Virtue and Commerce in the Eighteenth Century', The Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History, 3 (1972), 119-134, at 124. 
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humanist idea is applied as a paradigm in the interpretation of social thought in the 
eighteenth century by particularizing the ways in which it was used as a mode of 
criticism against the Whig oligarchy. '4 The civic humanist paradigm asserts that 
man's personality is essentially political and is fully expressed only in the practice 
of citizenship as an active virtue. To qualify for citizenship the individual must be 
an arms-bearing freeholder of landed property. For without property he must be a 
servant and without a public and civic monopoly of arms his citizenship must be 
corrupted. In Pocock's monumental work, The Machiavellian Moment, he traces a 
civic humanist paradigm of political thought and action from the Renaissance 
revival of Aristotelianism through seventeenth and eighteenth century England to 
the American revolutionary period and beyond. 
Within this paradigm the republican tradition, the tradition of civic virtue, is 
regarded as having provided the values, aspirations and rhetoric of American 
Revolutionary ideology. And in republican historiography Cato's Letters is 
represented as one of the most important vehicles for the transmission of this 
tradition to pre-Revolutionary America. The influence of the Letters is certainly 
undisputed and individual numbers or extracts were reprinted and circulated widely 
and quotations appeared in every newspaper form Boston to Savannah. 5 Copies of 
both the Letters and the Independent Whig were also to be found in American 
college and subscription libraries during the 1760s and 1770s, and private libraries, 
4J. G. A. Pocock, `Cambridge paradigms and Scotch philosophers: a study of the relations between 
the civic humanist and the civil jurisprudential interpretation of eighteenth-century social thought. ', 
Wealth and Virtue, ed. Michael Ignatieff and Istvan Hont (Cambridge: C. U. P., 1983), 235-53, at 
236. 
5See Elizabeth Christine Cook, Literary Influences in Colonial Newspapers (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1912), p. 81. The Philadelphia American Weekly Mercury began reprinting the 
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including that of Thomas Jefferson, also frequently included the work of Trenchard 
and Gordon. In the words of the American historian Clinton Rossiter, `no one can 
spend any time in the newspapers, library inventories, and pamphlets of colonial 
America without realizing that Cato's Letters rather than Locke's Civil 
Government was the most popular, quotable, esteemed source of political ideas in 
the colonial period. '6 
However the primary focus of this thesis is not the relationship of Cato's Letters to 
the historiographical debate concerning America's founding doctrine; its aim is to 
challenge the interpretation of Trenchard and Gordon as classical republicans and 
to question the dominant position ascribed to the civic humanist paradigm in 
Britain. 7 It is the contention of this thesis that Cato's Letters do not fit the civic 
humanist paradigm. Trenchard and Gordon did not enthusiastically endorse the 
republican ideals of citizenship, civic participation and classical virtue which they 
are meant to have conveyed to the American colonists and it is by no means certain 
that they were read in such a way by their British and colonial audiences. ' What is 
problematic with the revisionist reading of Cato's Letters is its selectivity. A 
number of the Letters are highly critical of the South Sea scandal and of Walpole's 
letters in 1722, while they were still running serially in the British press, and New York, Boston and 
South Carolina papers quickly followed suit. 
6Clinton Rossiter, Seedtime of the Republic (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1953), p. 141. 7As indicated in the introduction, however, some space has been given to a discussion of the way in 
which Americans in the eighteenth century may have read Cato's Letters, challenging the prevailing 
assumption that they were read in the terms set by the civic humanist paradigm. See chapter 8. 
8The pseudonym `Cato' was adopted to honour Cato of Utica (95-46 B. C. ) the unbending adversary 
of Julius Caesar and champion of republican liberty. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that 
the name had exclusively 'Country' or Tory connotations. During the first half of the eighteenth 
century it became the nom de plume of writers of both parties who wished to suggest that they too, 
like Cato of Utica, spoke from a spirit of disinterested patriotism. In 1716, as the Jacobite uprising 
raged, 'Cato' was employed in a pamphlet by Jonathan Smedley, chaplain to Lord Sunderland, as an 
advocate for the Whig ministry. Smedley compared William III to Cato and James II to Caesar. A 
few years later, in 1722, the ministerial press put 'Cato' to similar use in the face of another Jacobite 
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attempts to screen influential figures close to Court who were implicated in the 
affair. The criticism is taken out of context by revisionists, however, in order to 
support the civic humanist or `neo-Harringtonian' thesis, which has at its heart the 
conflict between virtue and corruption. `Neo-Harringtonianism' is the term applied 
by Pocock in The Machiavellian Moment and elsewhere in his writings to what he 
describes as the late seventeenth/early eighteenth century manifestation of civic 
humanism. 9 At the core of neo-Harringtonianism is a definition of man as a 
political animal - Aristotle mediated through Machiavelli and Harrington - who 
realised his essential nature through active participation as a citizen. The challenge 
this conception of man faced was the danger posed by commerce, and the financial 
instruments it spawned, which threatened political stability and virtue. '0 
In brief, Pocock argues that neo-Harringtonianism was a reworking of Harrington's 
classical republican doctrine to meet the political reality which confronted radical 
Whigs after the 1688 Revolution and that it was characterised by opposition to 
Court corruption, both political and venal. The main theme of republican theory 
from classical Greece and Rome onwards, Pocock holds, was the problem of the 
instability of political institutions and their susceptibility to a cycle of decay. 
Machiavelli, whose work Harrington had revived, had stressed the role of the 
virtuous citizen in halting this decay. It was the citizen's duty to defend the liberty 
of the state by keeping a rein on governors whose rapacious appetite for power 
would otherwise plunge the republic into tyranny. The primary way in which he 
threat. See Reed Browning, Political and Constitutional Ideas of the Court Whigs (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982), pp. 6-8. 9See, in particular, Machiavellian Moment, chapter 12. 1°See ibid., pp. 406-505. 
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displayed his virtue was through his participation in the citizen militia. Military 
virtue was one with political virtue because both might be presented in terms of the 
same end - the common good of the republic. Harrington viewed a militia as 
essential to ensuring the longevity of a republic but he located the material 
foundation for virtue in the possession of landed property. Only by possessing 
landed property could a man enjoy the independence which was a prerequisite for 
virtue. Both these elements, in the Pocockian analysis, were important in the 
formation of neo-Harringtonianism. Arms and land were seen as the preconditions 
of individual civic and moral autonomy. A third important element was an 
interpretation of history which reconciled the republican ideals of radical Whigs to 
the Revolution Settlement by presenting the limited monarchy established in 1688 
as a return to England's ancient balanced constitution and to a liberty enjoyed and 
safeguarded by a citizenry composed of arms-bearing freeholders. 
The neo-Harringtonian or Country opposition to the Court was based on the belief 
that the balanced constitution of Crown, Lords and Commons was in danger of 
being destroyed by the Crown's attempt to annex greater powers to itself. One of 
the perceived dangers was the growth of a professional or standing army, which 
provoked the standing army controversy in the last few years of William In's reign. 
Trenchard, with his then collaborator Walter Moyle, played a leading role between 
1698 and 1702 on the opposition side of the pamphlet war over standing armies. 
The Court was also attacked for its misuse of patronage, through the distribution of 
offices and pensions, which signalled a movement in power away from the 
Commons and in favour of the Crown. 
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Another feature of the Country platform, Pocock contends, was its opposition to 
the socio-economic changes brought about by the financial revolution that had 
begun in the 1690s. A central contention of Pocock's Machiavellian Moment is 
that the development of the Bank of England and national debt marked a turning 
point in the modem history of English and Scottish political ideology. Neo- 
Harringtonians, he argues, fiercely denounced the transition from a society based 
on landed property, the function of which was to maintain the reality of personal 
autonomy, liberty and virtue, to one defined by the morally and politically 
corrupting influence of mobile property. Public credit, in the form of the national 
debt and the stock exchange, was regarded with suspicion because it appeared to 
represent a shift in power. Harrington's dictum that power followed property was 
generally accepted and it was believed that the institution of credit had handed too 
much power to the monied men of the City. " 
Cato's Letters have generally been characterised as a contribution to the Country 
party's employment of the politics of virtue as a strategy of opposition. The letters 
have been seen by Pocock and others as a scathing critique both of Walpolean 
corruption and of a society in which, in the wake of financial revolution, civic 
virtue had become a devalued commodity. M. M. Goldsmith has argued: `Within 
the prevalent ideology [civic humanism] of early eighteenth-century Britain, as 
John Pocock has shown, there were a number of possible ways of handling the 
relations of land, trade and credit. In all of them "credit" or the "monied interest" 
posed a problem. ' He goes on to maintain: 
"See ibid., chapter 13 and `The Machiavellian Moment Revisited: A Study in History and 
Ideology', The Journal of Modern History, 53 (1981), 49-72, at 64. 
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Many ... believed that liberty could only be preserved and England's decline into moral corruption, despotism and barbarity prevented by 
promoting public and private virtue. This was the position of those 
Country ideologists who deployed the ideas of Machiavelli, Harrington and 
Sidney in castigating the luxury and degeneracy of Augustan England. In 
the mid twenties, Bolingbroke mounted his patriotic opposition to Walpole 
on his `republican' and `Whig' Country ideology. Earlier, squirely and 
parliamentary suspicion of moneyed men had exploded into active hostility 
in the South Sea Bubble crises. Trenchard and Gordon were well prepared 
to show the evils of wealth, luxury and corruption. Many contemporaries 
must have been ready to accept the view that the Bubble was a consequence 
of men's avarice and love of luxury. 
Goldsmith concludes: `[T]he prevalent form of argument in the first four decades 
of the eighteenth century was fixed by the ideology of public virtue, even more 
stridently reiterated by Bolingbroke and by the Opposition to Walpole. ' 12 
Similarly, Isaac Kramnick has insisted that Cato's Letters exhibits `a nostalgic 
conservatism that lashes out at the economic and social order' and that `one of the 
over-riding themes of Cato's Letters is a rejection of the new economic order. '13 
And J. A. W. Gunn has contended that `Cato's theme was corruption - the 
prevailing morality displayed in the business of the South-Sea Bubble, presented 
against a background of the decline of classical commonwealths. ' He goes on to 
argue that Trenchard and Gordon followed Algernon Sidney, and Machiavelli, in 
approving the stem virtues of Sparta and early Rome and in believing that the 
12M. M. Goldsmith, Private Vices, Public Benefits (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 
pp. 132-3. Like most others who subscribe to the civic humanist paradigm, Goldsmith makes the 
mistake of conflating Trenchard and Gordon's criticism of Walpole's handling of the South Sea 
affair with Bolingbroke's all-out opposition to the ministry. Ideological differences between 
Trenchard and Gordon, on one side, and Bolingbroke, on the other, are discussed in chapter 2 of 
this thesis. 
13I. Kramnick, Bolingbroke and his Circle (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 
243,246. On the other hand, Kramnick recognises Trenchard and Gordon's political `liberalism': 
'In accepting Locke's ideas and in his concern for individual rights, Cato is a liberal ... 
[He] is truly 
liberal and progressive, and, in his rigorous espousal of Locke's basic principles, anticipates even 
the liberalism of Mill. ', p. 249. Kramnick's assertion that Trenchard and Gordon display a 
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`safest social climate remained one in which riches were "either totally banished, 
or little regarded. " [Sidney's words]. ' In Gunn's opinion: `Sidney's teaching was 
enshrined in Old-Whig orthodoxy by Trenchard and Gordon and formed a central 
assumption in their denunciation of public morality in the era of the South-Sea 
Bubble. ' 4 
This thesis counters these views and argues that Trenchard and Gordon's criticism 
was not intended to undermine the new structural economic status quo or to add 
voice to opposition calls for the removal of a Whig ministry in order to replace it 
with a Country coalition. 15 Trenchard and Gordon were not really concerned with 
liberty and virtue in the classical sense, they believed it was totally unrealistic 
based on their understanding of human nature. What they set out to defend was 
liberty in its modern, individualistic sense. Undeniably Trenchard and Gordon did 
employ civic humanist rhetoric, or as Gordon puts it to his audience `let us make 
use of the Roman language'. 16 However, when they used the language of civic 
humanism it was as a rhetorical tool and not as an expression of an ideological 
`dualism' in their political writings - political liberalism and economic `conservatism' - is based, as 
argued in this thesis, on a misunderstanding of the target of their criticism. 
14J. A. W. Gunn, Beyond Liberty and Property (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University 
Press, 1983), pp. 19,100. Although Gunn concedes that `[i]n a long succession of papers, the pens 
behind "Cato" insisted that prosperity could not flourish without liberty', he then accuses Trenchard 
and Gordon of `incoherence'. He writes: `Trenchard and Gordon sometimes courted incoherence 
just because they insisted on giving reasons for valuing freedom and public virtue, for the very 
factors that they saw as insecure or impossible without freedom seemed actually to threaten its very 
existence [sic]. ', pp. 100-1. Gunn's complaint, it seems, is that Trenchard and Gordon offered 
prosperity as one of the reasons why liberty should be valued, whilst at the same time they believed 
prosperity was corrupting and that poverty was the foundation of virtue and, in turn, of liberty. 
However, Gunn's accusation is unjust. As it will be shown in later chapters, Trenchard and Gordon 
not only argued that prosperity could not flourish without liberty but that prosperity was the bulwark 
of liberty. This was because, in their view, men could be depended upon to defend their civic 
liberties if they understood that a government which robbed them of those liberties could then, with 
greater ease, rob them of their property and their purses - possessions which were dearer to modem 
man than, say, the right to annual elections. 
15 The question of Trenchard and Gordon's stance on the financial revolution and that of their 
categorisation as `Country' ideologues are discussed in detail in chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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paradigm. This is an important distinction. When Trenchard and Gordon adopted 
the language of civic humanism in their attack on Walpole's administration for its 
mismanagement of the South Sea scandal, they were merely using a vocabulary 
created when the Whigs were in opposition. It does not mean they were 
ideologically opposed to the Whig establishment. The vocabulary of civic 
humanism had originally been deployed by Whigs when attacking Court Tories at 
the end of the seventeenth century. It was an effective, well-used tool for 
criticising an administration of any political colour, as Bolingbroke later 
discovered, because `corruption' and constitutional `balance' could be, and were, 
variously interpreted and it automatically secured for the critic the moral high- 
ground. It is no surprise, therefore, that Trenchard and Gordon should have 
adopted the civic humanist idiom in order to level criticism at the government and, 
equally, that they were able to abandon it with apparent ease when the government 
and nation faced a perceived Jacobite threat. 
As Quentin Skinner has shown in his essay, `The Principles and Practice of 
Opposition: The Case of Bolingbroke versus Walpole', the patriotic rhetoric of 
neo-Harringtonianism provided an established and unassailable vehicle for 
launching an attack on government, without necessarily implying a belief in the 
principles invoked. 17 The point of Skinner's essay is not to take issue with the 
Namierite contention that Bolingbroke's motives were entirely unprincipled and 
self-interested - indeed he assumes that interpretation is correct and that revisionist 
16CL, I, no. 18, p. 131. 
"See Quentin Skinner, `The Principles and Practice of Opposition: The Case of Bolingbroke versus 
Walpole', in Historical Perspectives: Studies in English Thought and Society in Honour of JH- 
Plumb, ed. N. McKendrick, (London, Europa 1994), pp. 93-128. 
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historians are naively mistaken in denying it - but to refute the idea that it follows 
from this that Bolingbroke's professed principles are irrelevant. Skinner argues 
that Bolingbroke adopted these principles because they allowed him to present his 
`general Opposition' not as disloyalty but as patriotism. The aim here is not to 
suggest that the same analysis holds true for Trenchard and Gordon - they were 
critical of but not opposed to Walpole's administration - but to make the more 
obvious point that it is naive to accept that the only reason why a writer, 
particularly a political writer, might invoke particular principles is because they 
form the framework of ideological belief for him. It is a point, however, that is 
obscured if one subscribes to Pocock's methodology of focusing on languages, in 
this case the language of civic humanism. Skinner, although indebted to the 
methodological writings of Pocock, recognises that such an approach can lead one 
in the direction of a potentially misleading characterisation of an author: 
I do feel, however, that if Greenleaf 's stress on traditions or Pocock's on 
languages are treated as methodologies in themselves, they are prone to 
generate at least two difficulties. There is an obvious danger that if we 
merely focus on the relations between the vocabulary used by a given writer 
and the traditions to which he may appear connected by his use of 
vocabulary, we may become insensitive to instances of irony, obliquity, and 
other cases in which the writer may seem to be saying something other than 
what he means. The chief danger, however, is that if we merely concentrate 
on the language of a given writer, we may run the risk of assimilating him 
to a completely alien intellectual tradition, and thus of misunderstanding the 
whole aim of his political works. '8 
These are precisely the dangers that Pocock falls prey to in his analysis of Cato's 
Letters. By concentrating, almost to exclusion, on Trenchard and Gordon's use of 
18Quentin Skinner, `Some problems in the analysis of political thought and action', in Meaning and 
Context, Quentin Skinner and his Critics, ed. James Tully (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1988), pp. 97-118, at p. 106. Skinner, here, is discussing the paradox of Bolingbroke, arch-enemy 
of the Whigs, who in his main political works hijacked a number of radical Whig doctrines. He 
views as mistaken Pocock's characterisation of Bolingbroke as `the most spectacular of the neo- 
Harringtonians'. 
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the vocabulary of neo-Harringtonianism, Pocock misunderstands entirely the 
purpose of their work and assimilates them to a tradition that is alien to their 
beliefs. As Skinner insists, it is not enough to look at an author's use of a set or 
form of words in isolation; a given statement has to be looked at together with an 
author's statements on the same subject elsewhere in the text or in other of his 
texts. Words denoting an idea may be used with varying and quite incompatible 
intentions. There is also the obvious difficulty that literal meanings of key terms 
sometimes change over time. 19 Just as with Defoe's work, that of Trenchard and 
Gordon, replete as it is with irony, can not just be taken at face value 20 They were 
sophisticated in their use of language and keenly aware of the power of language to 
mould opinion. One has, therefore, to ask why they employed the language of 
civic humanism on some occasions and not on others and what this means. In this 
context, Skinner's comments are particularly apposite: 
I am suggesting that what is needed in order to be able to carry the 
argument beyond this rather unsatisfactory point, is not merely to indicate 
the traditions of discourse to which a given writer may be appealing, but 
190f course Pocock realises this himself. He acknowledges that language is not fixed but there 
seems to be a much greater interpenetration of languages than he allows. As David Wootton argues: 
'How are we to describe this interpenetration of languages, this confusion of paradigms? Pocock 
barely tackles this problem because he scarcely notices it: his insistence that Locke is of marginal 
importance depends on his classifying texts which employ mixed languages as uniformly 
republican. ', 'The Republican Tradition: From Commonwealth to Common Sense', in 
Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society, 1649-1776, ed. David Wootton (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1994), pp. 1-41, at p. 18. Obviously, a language can be modified as it 
comes into contact with another language. However in the case of Trenchard and Gordon they were 
not so much modifying the language of civic humanism as rejecting as unrealistic key concepts such 
as public virtue. See, in particular, chapters 3,5 and 6 of this thesis. 
Trenchard and Gordon were particularly aware of the ambiguous nature of language. Trenchard 
observed: `I have often thought, that most of the chiefs under which mankind suffers, and almost all 
their polemick disputes are owing to the abuse of words. If men would define what they mean by the 
sounds which they make use of to express their thoughts, and then keep to those definitions, that is, 
annex always the same ideas to the same sounds, most of the disputes in the word would be at an 
end ... ', CL, II, no. 117, p. 814; also II, nos. 103,104 and 120. 20See Quentin Skinner, `Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas', in Meaning and 
Context, pp. 29-67. 
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also to ask what he may be doing when he appeals to the language of those 
particular traditions. 21 
It is difficult to accept that Trenchard and Gordon believed in civic humanist 
principles because so much of Cato's Letters and their other writings indicates a 
scepticism about the possibility of civic virtue. Therefore, when they employ the 
language of civic humanism it would seem reasonable to assume it is adopted as a 
rhetorical device, the use of which is consistent with their view of the art of 
politics. Whereas it would appear a contradiction in terms to adhere to a civic 
humanist ideology and then to undermine the very idea of civic virtue. The civic 
humanist paradigm only works if one reads Cato's Letters selectively, following 
Pocock and others, but to do so is to mistake rhetoric for ideology and part of the 
paradigm for the whole. A truer picture of Trenchard and Gordon's ideological 
position only emerges when one examines the relationship between their 
philosophical, political and theological thought 22 
They were not alone in their beliefs and this thesis also includes a comparative 
study of Bernard Mandeville's social and political thought which, it is argued, has 
major points of convergence with that of Trenchard and Gordon. These points of 
convergence in ideology, however, have been obscured by the tunnel vision of the 
civic humanist paradigm which divides all into two opposing camps. Although 
Pocock is aware of the risk of adopting the `two buckets fallacy', which regards 
21Quentin Skinner, `Some problems in the analysis of political thought and action', in Meaning and 
Context, pp. 97-118, at p. 107. 
As Skinner has observed: `Any particular belief in which an historian is interested will [therefore] 
be likely to present itself holistically as part of a network of beliefs, a network within which the 
various individual items supply each other with mutual support. ', 'A reply to my critics', in 
Meaning and Context, pp. 231-88, at p. 48. 
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alternative explanations as mutually exclusive, so that to augment one is to detract 
from another, he goes on argue that: 
[W]e are to some extent pushed in that direction by what appears to be a 
marked hiatus or discontinuity between the vocabulary or language of civic 
humanism and that of civic jurisprudence ... The child of 
jurisprudence is 
liberalism, in which the disjunction between individual and sovereign 
remains, no matter how close the two are brought to one another; whereas 
republican virtue pertains immediately to the individual, not as proprietor or 
rights-bearer but as citizen, sharing self-rule among a number of equals 
without the need of any prior translatio'. 23 
It is somewhat surprising, therefore, to find Pocock ready to concede an alternative 
`jurisprudential paradigm', held by eighteenth century Scottish theorists and to 
recognise that this group of men were able to reach an intellectual accommodation 
between the two paradigms. This alternative, `largely Cambridge', paradigm argues 
that Scottish social thought evolved largely outside the maxims and language of the 
civic humanist paradigm, differentiated from English thought by the central 
position it accorded to the study of civil jurisprudence. Scotsmen, it is maintained, 
unlike Englishmen, often studied at Dutch universities and encountered natural law 
as a general organising principle in a tradition shaped by Pufendorf and Barbeyrac. 
And since the study of law has from classical times been associated more closely 
with moral and epistemological philosophy than has the study of civic virtue, it was 
also possible to integrate Cartesian, Lockean, Shaftesburean or Humean theories 
about perceptions, ideas, sympathies and passions into a science of man and 
society. 24 
23'Cambridge paradigms and Scotch philosophers', pp. 248-9. 24Chief proponents of this alternative `Cambridge paradigm' include Duncan Forbes, Quentin 
Skinner and Richard Tuck. See Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1975); Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, 2 vols. 
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The argument for an alternative paradigm that operated only north of the border, 
however, is insubstantial and in part is dependent on a curious circular logic. 
Much of the reasoning behind the idea that the jurisprudential paradigm was 
restricted to Scottish thinkers rests on an acceptance that the civic humanist 
paradigm dominated English thought. Once that hegemony is seen to be an 
illusion, however, it becomes easier to recognise that the jurisprudential paradigm 
was shared by many Englishmen. The suggestion that a parochial education led to 
an inability on the part of the English to adopt an alternative `interpretative matrix' 
is belied by the fact that, whilst they generally may not have attended Dutch 
universities, there was a lively intellectual correspondence between the two 
nations. The republican martyr Algernon Sidney had close ties with the 
Netherlands and although he is associated with the civic humanist tradition his 
thought was also rooted in the natural law tradition. 25 `Commonwealthmen' such 
as John Toland, who abandoned his theological studies at the universities of 
Utrecht and Leiden to pursue a broader education before returning to England, also 
shared Locke's close ties with republican thinkers in the Netherlands. There is 
even a suggestion that Gordon, a Scot, was educated at either the University of 
Aberdeen or St. Andrews and that he submitted a law thesis at Edinburgh in 1716, 
which raises the possibility that he may, therefore, have been schooled in the 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); and Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin 
and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). 
25See Alan Craig Houston, Algernon Sidney and the Republican Heritage in England and American 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), passim; and Jonathan Scott, Algernon Sidney and the 
English Republic, 1623-1677 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 16-17,19,169 
and Algernon Sidney and the Restoration Crisis, 1677-1683 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), p. 352. 
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jurisprudential attitude of mind that is said to have characterised his fellow 
countrymen. 26 
Be that as it may, however, it is evident from a study of Trenchard and Gordon's 
work that they were both steeped in a natural law tradition that encompassed 
Grotius, Pufendorf, Barbeyrac, Selden, Locke and Hobbes and that they utilised 
both civic humanist and classic liberal arguments and seem to have seen no 
contradiction in running the two in tandem. There is undoubtedly an apparent 
incompatibility between the two languages. As Pocock would have it, `the basic 
concept in republican thinking is virtus; the basic concept of all jurisprudence is 
necessarily ius; and there is no known way of representing virtue as a right. '27 
However, because many of the concerns underlying both languages are the same - 
the tension between authority and liberty, social conflict and the corrosive affect of 
power - and because virtue and rights based systems are effectively alternative 
means of resolving these concerns, they are not mutually incomprehensible. 
Indeed, as Quentin Skinner has shown, the civic humanist and jurisprudential 
paradigms have co-existed since the thirteenth century or earlier. 28 It is somewhat 
surprising, therefore, to find eighteenth century Scottish political theorists 
presented, by proponents of the `Cambridge paradigm', as singular in their ability 
to move fluently between the language of civic humanism and that of 
jurisprudence. This ignores the same facility in Trenchard and Gordon and their 
fellow `classical republicans'. Although, for Trenchard and Gordon at least, as 
26See J. M. Bulloch, `Thomas Gordon, The "Independent Whig"', Aberdeen University Library 
Bulletin, 3 (1918), 598-612, at 600. 274 Cambridge paradigms and Scotch philosophers', p. 248. 28 See The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, I, passim. 
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already noted, the language of civic humanism represented a rhetorical tool rather 
than an ideological framework. And if, as it is argued here, they should be read as 
speakers of a language as nuanced as that associated with the Scottish theorists of 
the period, it is a language as spoken by Hume rather than by Hutcheson: a 
language that stressed the centrality of interest and opinion, rather than natural 
sociability, to the construction and maintenance of civil society. 
The language spoken by Trenchard and Gordon, however, was also dominated by 
the idea of natural rights. For despite attempts by revisionists to canonise `Cato' as 
a civic humanist icon, it is apparent that Cato's Letters not only incorporated the 
sensationalist philosophy of Hobbes and Locke but also elements of their political 
philosophy. Trenchard and Gordon made great use of language typical of Lockean 
liberalism and this permeates the Letters from beginning to end. They both 
endorsed enthusiastically the central views put forward by Locke: the equality of 
men in the state of nature; consent as the foundation of government; the right of 
resistance against a monarch who breaks his contract with the people; and the 
reversion of power to the people on the dissolution of government. Yet 
conventionally, within the civic humanist paradigm, Trenchard and Gordon have 
been seen as a counter to Locke. Their praise of the vigilant citizen has been taken 
out of context and set against Locke's supposed unconcern for public virtue and his 
preoccupation with the rights of the individual, including the right to the 
unimpeded pursuit of wealth. 29 However, it is not just that those historians who 
have done more than merely selectively read the Letters have failed to note their 
29See J. G. A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1985), p. 177. 
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Lockean content, indeed it would be almost impossible to do so, but that they have 
chosen to disregard it as irrelevant: 
The skeleton of their political thought [that of Trenchard and Gordon] was 
Lockean - concerned with inalienable rights and the contract theory of 
government - but only the skeleton. The flesh, the substance, the major 
preoccupations and the underlying motivations and mood, were quite 
different, as was, of course, the level of discourse. 30 
Pocock has also contended that `There is no very profound contradiction in the 
occasional presence of Lockean or Hobbesian elements in the vocabulary of John 
Trenchard or Thomas Gordon. The point is, however, a profound contradiction 
does exist between Pocock's civic humanist interpretation and the `significant' 
presence of Lockean and Hobbesian elements in what is for him a keynote text for 
his thesis. To dismiss these elements as `occasional' is not merely a startling 
understatement, it is a misinterpretation. 
Whilst the Lockean presence in Cato's Letters may be inconvenient it can hardly 
be dismissed as largely irrelevant, since it forms the backbone of the Letters and 
therefore is crucial to any attempt to identify their meaning. On the other hand, 
some of the matter used to flesh out Trenchard and Gordon's arguments in defence 
of man's natural rights is rhetorical padding. Its purpose was to add more weight 
to their arguments, as a healthy display of virtue in politics is almost always 
designed to do, but virtue was not crucial, in the view of Trenchard and Gordon, to 
the functioning of political life. However, to concede that Lockean principles are 
30The Origins ofAmerican Politics, p. 41. 31J. G. A. Pocock, `Radical Criticism of the Whig Order in the Age between Revolutions', in The 
Origins of Anglo-American Radicalism, ed. Margaret Jacob and James Jacob (London: George 
Allen & Unwin, 1984), pp. 33-57, at p. 38. 
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central to Cato's Letters would contradict a civic humanist paradigm which insists 
on the elision of Locke and the imposition of a Court-Country dichotomy: 
The ideology of opposition was moral and neo-classicist in its arguments 
and assumptions, and had little if anything to do with the debate between 
Locke and Filmer. 32 
What is richly ironic, however, is that those who wish to deny the significance of 
Locke as a political theorist - whether or not this is in order to refute a Marxist 
analysis which would seize on him as the standard-bearer of a rising bourgeoisie - 
substitute in his place the civic humanist `Cato'. Yet a faithful rendering of Cato's 
Letters shows Trenchard and Gordon to be more `Lockean' than Locke, in as much 
as they are less ambiguous in their endorsement of the principle that the rights of 
the property owning individual are paramount. Less cautious, or pious, than 
Locke, their language and meaning are unobfuscated by theistic scruple, allowing 
them unequivocally to present the individual as effectively a free agent owing 
nothing to society except obedience to just laws, that is those which safeguard his 
person and his property and are the raison d'etre of government. Indeed if one 
wanted a bogy to frighten proponents of the civic humanist interpretation of the 
eighteenth century a more impressive candidate than `Cato' could hardly be found. 
For where Locke proved too tentative for Trenchard and Gordon, they were able to 
draw on Hobbes to supply the materialist base for their political creed 33 
The question of whether or not Trenchard and Gordon were directly influenced by 
Locke's political theory is not of paramount importance here. For whilst it is 
32 Virtue, Commerce, and History, p. 176. 33Their analysis of power followed that of Hobbes and, like Dutch republicans, they co-opted 
Hobbes' arguments to suit their own political views. See chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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generally accepted that Locke's contract and resistance theories were not utilised 
by first generation supporters of the 1688 Revolution, by 1720 principles now 
associated with Locke had become popularised in works such as the anonymous 
Political aphorisms and views at least as radical as those of Locke could be found 
in Sidney's Discourses concerning Government, a number of extended quotes from 
which are found in Cato's Letters. 34 
Yet it is undoubtedly the case that Gordon at least knew both Locke's 
philosophical and political works and it seems inconceivable that Trenchard, an 
habitue of the Grecian Tavern and member of the self-styled `college' of radical 
Whigs who assembled there, would have been a stranger to his texts. In The 
Humourist, Gordon has his fictionalised author recall a dissolute youth spent at 
Oxford, a Tory bastion, and the Pauline conversion he underwent there: 
I lived in this manner for two Years, and then getting acquainted with a 
sensible Fellow of the Constitution-Club, he lent me, and persuaded me to 
read, LOCKE upon Human Understanding, and upon Government, with his 
Letters concerning Toleration. The strong Reason, and invincible Truth, 
which run thro' these Books, made such strange and sudden Impression 
upon me, that I became like one awakened out of a ridiculous and turbulent 
Dream, into the Exercise of his Sense and Understanding; I grew, all of a 
sudden, sober and studious, which rendered me presently suspected to the 
university of ill Principles; besides, the above-mentioned Books were found 
in my Room, which confirmed me an Apostate from the Principles of the 
Place. 35 
It would seem evident, however, that no matter its provenance, the language of 
natural rights is a prominent feature of Cato's Letters. Trenchard and Gordon's 
constant mantra was that government was an institution created solely to protect 
341t has been argued that the Political aphorisms played a significant role in terms of the dissemination of Revolution Principles. See Richard Ashcraft and M. M. Goldsmith, `Locke, 
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and enforce man's inalienable rights, that is, to safeguard his person and property, 
and they repeatedly stressed the limits of government: 
All men are born free; liberty is a gift which they receive from God himself; 
nor can they alienate the same by consent, though possibly they may forfeit 
it by crimes. No man has power over his own life, or to dispose of his own 
religion; and cannot consequently transfer the power of either to any body 
else: Much less can he give away the lives and liberties, religion or acquired 
property of his posterity, who will be born as free as he himself was born, 
and can never be bound by his wicked and ridiculous bargain. 
The right of the magistrate arises only from the right of private men to 
defend themselves, to repel injuries, and to punish those who commit them: 
That right being conveyed by the society to their publick representative, he 
can executive the same no further than the benefit and security of that 
society requires he should. When he exceeds his commission, his acts are 
as extrajudicial as are those of any private officer usurping an unlawful 
authority, that is, they are void; and every man is answerable for the wrong 
which he does. A power to do good can never become a warrant for doing 
evil. 36 
Governments which failed to serve the good of society were illegitimate, Trenchard 
and Gordon argued, and men had not just a right but a duty to offer resistance when 
their natural rights were violated. 7 
Ronald Hamowy has stressed this Lockean element of Cato's Letters. Arguing 
against Pocock, he insists that of all the writings accountable for transmitting and 
Revolution Principles, and the Formation of Whig Ideology', The Historical Journal, 26 (1983), 
773-800. 
35 Thomas Gordon, `An Account of the Author', The Humourist, 2 vols. (London, 1724), I, p. 6. 
36CL, I, no. 59, pp. 406-7. Also: `The entering into political society, is so far from a departure from 
his natural right, that to preserve it was the sole reason why men did so; and mutual protection and 
assistance is the only reasonable purpose of all reasonable societies. To make such protection 
practicable, magistracy was formed, with power to defend the innocent from violence, and to punish 
those that offered it; nor can there be any other pretence for magistracy in the world. In order to this 
good end, the magistrate is entrusted with conducting and applying the united force of the 
community; and with exacting such a share of every man's property, as is necessary to preserve the 
whole, and to defend every man and his property from foreign and domestic injuries. These are the 
boundaries of the power of the magistrate, who deserts his function whenever he breaks them By 
the laws of society, he is more limited and restrained than any man amongst them; since, while they 
are absolutely free in all their actions, which purely concern themselves; all his actions, as a publick 
person, being for the sake of society, must refer to it, and answer the ends of it., ibid., I, no. 62, p. 
427. 
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developing the radical Whig thought of Locke and his contemporaries in the 
Augustan age, Cato's Letters stands as the most important. 38 However, while his 
reading of the Letters appears to capture Trenchard and Gordon's perspective much 
more accurately than does that presented by Pocock, it runs the risk of substituting 
one overweening paradigm for another. Hamowy's aim, it seems, is to reclaim for 
Locke the pre-eminent position he was once accorded in the history of eighteenth 
century political thought: 
Pocock's contention that Locke contributed nothing to the vocabulary of 
orthodox Whig thought during most of the eighteenth century must be re- 
evaluated in light of the Lockean nature of Cato's Letters. Certainly the 
centrality of this work in the Whig canon suggests that radical Whig 
thought played a more substantial role in shaping the political rhetoric of 
the period than has recently been conceded. The approval with which the 
letters were received during the quarter-century after their original 
publication strongly corroborates the view that the Lockean paradigm had 
in fact contributed a major force in eighteenth century politics. 39 
Cato's Letters provides sound ammunition for Hamowy's project but if the text is 
used in this way much of the complexity of Trenchard and Gordon's work is lost 
and historical debate is reduced to a shouting match between the proponents of two 
competing languages: one side trying to prove that the Letters are dominated by the 
voice of civic humanism and the other side trying equally hard to prove the 
Lockean voice is strongest. Both voices have to be attended to if one is to 
understand what Trenchard and Gordon were saying. It is not the intention of this 
thesis, therefore, to argue that Locke should be restored to the commanding 
position he once occupied in the history of British and American political ideas. 
37See ibid, I, no. 62, pp. 431-32. 38See ibid, I, p. xxxvii. 
39R. Hamowy, 'Cato's Letters, John Locke and the Republican Paradigm', History of Political 
Thought, 11 (1990), 273-94, at 294. Perhaps because Hamowy's main concern is to spotlight the 
Lockean element of Cato's Letters he tends to ignore the pervasive presence of Hobbes in 
Trenchard and Gordon's work. 
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Rather, it is to suggest that the imposition of a single dogmatic reading on a 
dialogue which employs other vocabularies besides that of neo-Harringtonianism 
does a disservice both to the complexity of eighteenth thought and to a 
contemporary understanding of it. 
In two recent studies Michael Zuckert has sought to maintain that Locke was the 
inspiration for the natural rights philosophy that informed American political 
thought. "' Cato's Letters figures in his analysis as a bridge between the seeming 
competing liberal-contractarian and republican traditions. He argues that 
Trenchard and Gordon fused into a coherent whole two lines of thought that had 
proceeded previously in partial independence - Whig political science and Lockean 
political philosophy. 4' `Cato', he claims, was both a republican and an adherent to 
the Lockean principles later incorporated into the Declaration of Independence. 
However he rejects Pocock's characterisation of `Cato' has committed to 
republican concepts of the public good, a participatory ideal of citizenship and 
selfless virtue. Instead, he presents `Cato's' republicanism as incorporating 
specific components of oppositional ideology, such as condemnation of standing 
armies, ministerial corruption and subversion of a mixed and balanced constitution. 
This analysis is valuable but it is also flawed. Zuckert is right in placing Trenchard 
and Gordon in the natural law tradition, as he is in arguing that the relationship of 
their political philosophy to traditional Whig ideology has been misunderstood. " 
40See Michael Zuckert, Natural Rights and the New Republicanism (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1994) and The Natural Rights Republic (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1996). 
41Natural Rights and the New Republicanism, p. xix. 42'Cato's political science does have much to do with the older Whig political science of 
Shaftesbury, Sidney, Marvell, and others, including Machiavelli and Harrington, who must be freed 
33 
However, Zuckert's analysis fails to take account of the subtleties of Trenchard and 
Gordon's thought. He does not examine how their religious beliefs and broader 
philosophical views, beyond Locke, informed their `opposition' to Walpole. Once 
these aspects of their thought are understood it becomes apparent that their 
republicanism was not constituted by an opposition to standing armies and 
ministerial corruption but by a commitment to religious toleration and by a lack of 
confidence in man's capacity for true virtue. Only in a commercial republic, they 
argued, could men's passions be channelled so as to safeguard their rights. " 
Pocock's reading of Cato's Letters has also come under attack from another front. 
Recently Marie McMahon has argued, with much justification, that insufficient 
weight has been given to Trenchard and Gordon as Whig writers, that `the "Whig" 
behind "Independent" and "Establishment" is much larger and more rooted in the 
political struggle between Whigs and Tories than the Country-versus-Court 
analysis holds. '44 Her work provides an overview of the extensive secondary 
literature on the period from the Restoration up to the mid-eighteenth century, with 
the aim of demonstrating the endurance of providential and legitimist doctrines 
after the Glorious Revolution and the political strength and ideological vitality of 
the Tories after 1714. This allows her to argue that Cato's Letters should be read 
as a response to a genuine fear, whether valid or not, of `High-Church 
counterreformation and High-Tory counterrevolution', reinforcing Caroline 
from the Pocockian civic humanist interpretation if their relation to Cato is to be clear. ', Natural 
Rights and the New Republicanism, p. 313. 43See chapter 3 of this thesis. 
4°Marie McMahon, The Radical Whigs, John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon (Lanham: University 
Press of America, 1990), p. 5. 
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Robbins' view of Trenchard and Gordon as radical Whigs staunchly committed to 
Revolution Principles 45 
Despite some reservations, in general this thesis is in agreement with the main 
thrust of McMahon's argument. However, as will be clear from what has been said 
above of her work, a large part of it is taken up with tracing, by reference to recent 
scholarship, the persistence of the Tory/Whig divide from the Exclusion Crisis 
through to the 1720s. In contrast, the object of this thesis is to look in depth at the 
relationship between Trenchard and Gordon's political, religious and philosophical 
beliefs and the extent to which these beliefs resemble those of another 
`independent Whig', Bernard Mandeville. Nevertheless, McMahon's work is 
valuable for the challenge it delivers to the image of Trenchard and Gordon as 
`Country' opposition writers. 
Indeed what is surprising is that so many historians have accepted the conventional 
judgement that the main preoccupation of Cato's Letters is ministerial corruption. 
Although the South Sea scandal provided the impetus for the Letters, Trenchard 
and Gordon swiftly moved on to the wider issue of civil and religious liberty, both 
of which they believed could only be guaranteed under a Whig government. 6 The 
Letters, in similar vein to the Independent Whig, are vehemently anti-clerical and 
forthright in their support of freedom of conscience. Trenchard and Gordon's 
preoccupation with these subjects indicates that their overriding concern was not 
asroid., p. 5. 
460f 144 letters, including six additional letters written by Gordon after Trenchard's death, 12 deal 
in detail with the financial and political fall-out of the South Sea Company crash and a number of 
others touch in passing on the Company's directors and the measures taken by parliament to pursue 
thern. 
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liberty in the civic humanist sense but liberty of conscience - because for both them 
and their contemporaries religious and political ideology were inextricably linked. 
The presence of the language of civic humanism in Cato's Letters obviously can 
not be ignored but it needs to be re-evaluated and placed in context, both in terms 
of the Letters as a whole and Trenchard and Gordon's other works and also in 
terms of the party politics of the day and the writings of their contemporaries. 
Chapter II 
The Character of Two Independent Whigs 
Most historians, despite differences of perspective, have tended to regard Cato's 
Letters as representative of what has been termed a `Country ideology' and the 
dominant axis along which the political landscape of the period is seen to have 
been divided is that of Court and Country. Pocock has argued that the `Whig 
canon' of commonwealthmen, traced by Caroline Robbins and which includes the 
Letters' authors, Trenchard and Gordon, `can often better be understood in a Court- 
Country context than in a Tory-Whig or a Whig official-Whig intellectual one. '1 
And he has characterised Cato's Letters and Bolingbroke's writings as 
`constituting a country campaign, a polemic designed to drive Walpole from power 
by mobilising a "public opinion"' .2 Alternatively, whilst Isaac 
Kranmick, writing 
from a different standpoint, has conceded that Trenchard and Gordon's adherence 
to the principles of Lockean political philosophy distinguishes them from 
Bolingbroke, he claims: `In all that Cato had to say of the new age, he spoke with 
the same voice as Bolingbroke's Opposition. '3 It is an assertion which illustrates a 
common misconception, that because Bolingbroke or other Country writers spoke a 
language also employed by Trenchard and Gordon, that of `civic humanism', the 
lingua franca of political discourse of the period, that what they have to say is the 
1J. G. A. Pocock, Politics, Language, and Time, (London, Methuen & Co., 1972), pp. 107-8. See 
also J. G. A. Pocock, `Authority and Property: The Question of Liberal Origins', in After the 
Reformation, ed. Barbara C. Malament (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980), pp. 331- 
354: `It is clear ... that Locke played no predominant role 
in the formation of what Caroline 
Robbins has called "the Whig canon" in the tradition of the eighteenth-century commonwealthmen. " 
That group of middle and late seventeenth-century writers, and the Tories as well as Whigs of the 
second critical period who singled them out for canonization, are defined by their relation to the 
classical republican tradition, with which Locke had little if anything to do. They took a "country" 
as opposed to a "court" view of the ideal of the balanced constitution', p. 345. 
2Machiavellian Moment, pp. 467,472. 
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same. Yet a close reading of the Letters elicits a very different response to 
questions of political theory and political practice than to that articulated by 
Bolingbroke, one accentuated more by Whig than by Country concerns. This is not 
to downplay the validity of the Court and Country polarity but to argue that a 
preoccupation with it has tended in the case of Cato's Letters to obscure a more 
fundamental divide between Whig and Tory. 4 Central to this division, and one 
obscured by historians who adopt the Court/Country analysis, was the issue of 
religious toleration, which had remained undiminished in force since the drawing 
up of battle lines by the precursor Whig and Tory parties of the Restoration. As 
one critic of the Court/Country analysis has argued, the attempt to forge a 
`Country' ideology was itself a political gambit, aimed at papering over party 
differences, and despite common ground on issues such as standing armies the 
profound and lasting ideological antipathies between Tories and Whigs over 
3Bolingbroke and His Circle, p. 248. 
4There is no doubt that in the latter part of the seventeenth century and in the first decades of the 
eighteenth century men continued to use the distinctions 'Court' and 'Country', terms which pre- 
dated the Civil War. It is questionable, however, whether this division reflects accurately the major 
issues of the day that divided men. As Frank O'Gorman has maintained: 'There was a Country 
platform, but there was no Country party in the early Hanoverian period ... the 
hypothesis that early 
Hanoverian politics was dominated by these distinctions cannot be accepted. The basic structural 
polarity of politics in this period remained that between Whig and Tory. ', Frank O'Gorman, The 
Long Eighteenth Century (London: Arnold, 1997), p. 143. D. Hayton, a parliamentary historian, 
has argued: `Although the area of the Country interest on any pattern of polarities can still be 
mapped out, it may be better to treat "Court and Country" separately from "Whig and Tory", as 
something quite different: "another level of political consciousness" has been one suggested [by 
Frank O'Gorman, The Rise of Party in England]. Certainly in this period [1689-c. 1720] "Court and 
Country" ceased to represent a [standing] political division. A Country party manifested itself from 
time to time, the Country party did not have a continuous existence. Whigs and Tories co-operated 
in Parliament on Country measures, at elections sometimes, on a Country platform - but they did 
not lose their identity. They still remained Whigs and Tories first and foremost. ' See D. Hayton, 
'The 'Country' interest and the party system, 1689-c. 1720', in Party and Management 1660-1784, 
ed. Clyne Jones (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1984), pp. 37-85, at p. 65. See also Eveline 
Cruickshanks, `The Political Management of Sir Robert Walpole 1720-42', in Britain in the Age of 
Walpole, ed. Jeremy Black (London: Macmillan, 1984), pp. 23-68: 'In examining the parliamentary 
Opposition at this time a court-country dichotomy should be discounted ... 
There was indeed a 
'country platform' based on reducing the number of placement and pensioners and curbing electoral 
corruption, but there was no country party. ', p. 32. 
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religious and dynastic issues, exacerbated after 1714, prevented them from 
cementing an effective union either ideologically or tactically. 5 
Pocock and others who support the Court/Country thesis base it on the paradigm 
established by historians such as J. H. Plumb, of an `age of party' succeeded by an 
`age of oligarchy' following the Tory defeat and exclusion from office in 1714.6 
After that date, they argue, the polarity shifted from that of Tory versus Whig to 
that of Court versus Country. However, the Court/Country analysis received a 
grave blow to its credibility in 1970 with the publication of volumes of the History 
of Parliament covering the years 1715-54. These volumes, edited by Romney 
Sedgwick, show the survival of the Tory parliamentary party after 1714 and 
indicate that dynastic and religious questions, left unresolved since the 1688 
Revolution, remained the key issues dividing the two parties. The work of other 
historians, including Eveline Cruickshanks and Linda Colley, B. W. Hill and J. C. D. 
Clark, have added weight to the growing evidence of the persistence of the Tory 
party after 1714 and the endurance of providential and legitimist doctrines.? 
5See J. C. D. Clark, Revolution and Rebellion, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 
114. Clark remains unpersuaded by Pocock's contention that England and its American colonies 
spoke with a `humanist and Machiavellian vocabulary' after 1688 and that political issues 
increasingly revolved around the secular concepts of credit and commerce, virtue and corruption. In 
place of Pocock's analysis he offers, convincingly it would seem, an alternative model, one with 
which broadly this thesis concurs, of a society preoccupied with religion. See English Society 1688- 
1832 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 423. 
61n J. H. Plumb's classic work, The Growth of Political Stability in England 1675-1725 (London: 
Macmillan, 1967) he suggested that between 1689 and 1714 the Tory/Whig division prevailed, 
fuelled by the growth of an active electorate. After 1714, the diminuition and close control of the 
electorate and the prohibition of a political opposition meant that Tory/Whig party politics came to 
an end, replaced by a Court versus Country alignment. Similarly, A. J. Foord's His Majesty's 
Opposition 1714-1830 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964) sees the years after 1714 as a 
period of stability, with an absence of religious conflict. Pocock claims 'it was J. H. Plumb's 
remodelling of the patterns of English political history, in The Growth of Political Stability in 
England 
... which provided the setting in which the Whig regime and the English and American 
oppositions to it became properly intelligible. ', `The Machiavellian Moment Revisited', 50. 
7Linda Colley ascribes the survival of the Tory party to effective organisation at Westminster and in 
the constituencies. Unlike Cruickshanks, she does not believe proscription of the Tory party drove 
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Outside parliament, from the 1690s into the first two decades of the eighteenth 
century, struggles between the Lower and Upper Houses of Convocation testified 
to the Whiggish politics of most of the bishops and to the Tory sympathies of the 
lesser clergy. These tensions meant that Whig fears of a Jacobite threat, whether 
real or imaginary, kept alive the two party division up until 1745. Throughout the 
first half of the eighteenth century the fundamental political division remained that 
of Tory and Whig rather than Court and Country and, moreover, the bearing of 
religion on political ideology was of significant importance. 
The political basis of Trenchard and Gordon's anti-clericalism was spelt out in 
both The Independent Whig and Cato's Letters. In The Character of an 
Independent Whig, the pamphlet which inaugurated the weekly Independent Whig, 
Gordon set the confrontational tone of subsequent issues, pressing his argument 
that High Church clergy were politically suspect. They continued to oppose the 
Revolution Settlement with all their malice and might, he contended, and even 
those Churchmen who remained silent on the subject, and failed to offer the 
Revolution their vocal support, were enemies to the cause: `So true is it that they 
who are not for us, are against us. '8 The 1721 edition of the collected numbers of 
The Independent Whig was addressed to the Lower House of Convocation and 
accused its members of seeking to place themselves above the civil government. 
Trenchard argued the English clergy had no jurisdiction, power or authority that 
its members to become Jacobites. Hill and, to a greater extent, Clark and others, such as Jeremy 
Black, argue forcibly that important matters of principle continued to divide Whigs and Tories for 
much of the eighteenth century. See Linda Colley, In Defiance of Oligarchy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982); Eveline Cruickshanks, Political Untouchables: The Tories and 
the '45 (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., 1979); J. C. D. Clark, Revolution and Rebellion and 
English Society 1688-1832; B. W. Hill, The Growth of Parliamentary Parties 1689-1742 (London: 
George Allen & Unwin, 1976); and Jeremy Black, ed., Britain in the Age of Walpole. 
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was not derived from parliament. Contrasting the actions of High Churchmen with 
those of Low Churchmen, he railed that the former had always shown enmity to the 
Reformation and the latter had consistently supported loyal measures. 9 The High 
Church clergy, like the clergy of the Church of Rome, were seen by both Trenchard 
and Gordon as a pillar and chief support of absolute monarchy: `Crown'd Heads 
always thought it their Interest to keep Measures with [High Church clergy], 
Ministers of State are not able to Trick successfully, and play the Knave, without 
their leave and Assistance'. 1° Trenchard presented the relationship as a conspiracy 
to oppress the people: a conspiracy in which the co-conspirators claimed authority 
on the basis of a `divine commission'. 
In two papers Trenchard compared and ridiculed the doctrines of divine right and 
the `indelible character' claimed by some clergy, which rested on the doctrine of 
apostolic succession, implying that these doctrines were analogous and mutually 
reinforcing. Absolute monarchs and clergy who claimed an `indelible character' 
had a shared interest in keeping the people in ignorance and in awe of them, the 
`sacred' authority of one lending weight to the `sacred' authority of the other. " 
8Thomas Gordon, The Character of an Independent Whig (London, 1719), p. 30. 
9See nos. 12,13,14,15 and 16 of The Independent Whig. The titles of these numbers illustrate that 
politics and religion were intimately bound together: 'Of Uninterrupted Succession', `The Absurdity 
and Impossibility of Church Power as Independent of the State', 'The Church Proved a Creature of 
Civil Power by Acts of Parliament and the Oaths of the Clergy', `The Clergy Proved to be Creations 
of the Civil Power by the Canons and Their Own Public Acts'. 
10Ibid., p. 83. 
11It is hard not to see an implied parallel between Francis Atterbury, Bishop of Rochester, exiled 
after discovery of the conspiracy initiated by him, and the Pretender. Trenchard thundered that 
despite Atterbury's banishment and his being deprived of his bishopric, the 'indelible character' 
bestowed on him when he was installed as bishop meant that he was deemed to remain `a bishop of 
the Universal Church', as the Pretender was deemed by Jacobites to remain the true king of 
England. See CL, II, no. 135, p. 932. 
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The linkage between the two doctrines is made clear in an ironic letter, from a 
supposed Nonjuror, in a pro-government paper of the day: 
I am a Nonjuror, and have always been told, that as in Religion an 
uninterrupted Succession of Bishops was absolutely necessary, and the 
most infallible Mark of Orthodoxy; so in Politicks, that a Lineal Descent 
was the only and sufficient Reason for our Obedience to Princes ... 
12 
As J. A. I. Champion has argued, during this period `Debates about the nature of 
monarchical sovereignty necessarily intersected with discussions about the 
competence and independence of the Church ... To define the sacerdotal 
competence of the priest in a certain manner held implications for conceptions of 
civil authority. To argue for one form of Church government was to negate the 
legitimacy of a related form of civil administration. There was no conceptual 
separation between issues of Church and state, religion and politics. ' 13 
This seamless connection between religion and politics is evident in Gordon's 
attack on charity schools. The charity school movement had become an arena 
where party differences were fought out and where the spoils at stake included the 
malleable minds of the young. Although the establishment of both Anglican and 
Dissenting charity schools in the late seventeenth century represented a common 
line of defence, in response to the founding of Jesuit schools in 1685, this united 
front gradually broke down. 14 Under Anne's reign, a period during which the High 
12The Briton, 30 October 1723. The Briton was merely restating a common dictum when it asserted 
`What judicious Protestant does not know, that their Non-conformity is at least as much Political as 
Religious, if not more? ', 18 August 1723. The author of The Briton is uncertain but its witty, 
irreverent style, attacks on Jacobitism, backhanded defence of Walpole's ministry and insistence 
that self-interest governs the world reads very like Gordon. 
13J. A. I. Champion, The Pillars of Priestcraft Shaken (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992), p. 6. 
14For the background to the charity school movement see M. G. Jones, The Charity School 
Movement (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1964). 
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Church party gained ground, mutual suspicion and jealousy gave way to open 
hostility. A High Church campaign drained support from Dissenting schools and 
led to a decrease in their number, a decline hastened by the passage of the Act 
against Occasional Conformity of 1711 and the Schism Act of 1714. The resulting 
capture of the movement by the High Church party inevitably led to accusations 
that the schools had become seminaries of disaffection, nurturing fresh generations 
of Jacobites and papists. In his savage criticism of the schools Gordon claimed that 
they threatened to undo the work of the Revolution, that their governors and those 
who had management of them were `for the most part, staunch Jacobites, or, in 
other words, furious high churchmen'. The schoolmasters were similarly portrayed 
as enemies to the establishment, seditious conspirators who engaged `the parents 
and friends of the children in the interests of a popish Pretender, and breed up the 
children themselves to fight his battles in due time. '15 Gordon's fears, whilst 
exaggerated, were not entirely baseless. Charity school children had been drawn 
into the country-wide riots of 1715, reminiscent in their intensity of the violent 
anti-Whig demonstrations which followed the Sacheverell trial in 1710, and for 
more recent evidence of the danger of Jacobitism Gordon had only to look to the 
previous year, 1722, and the Atterbury plot. 
Champion has rightly observed that in stressing their debt to the classical 
republican tradition, the preoccupation of `radicals' with religious affairs has been 
sidestepped by historians. He appears incorrect, however, in arguing that 
republicans such as Trenchard and Gordon extended the parameters of traditional 
ecclesiological debate from discussing rival claims of conflicting imperium and 
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sacerdotium to a fusion of state and religion, embodied in the classical idea of 
religio or civil religion. Their immediate aim, he argues, was not a Lockean 
ambition of separation of the Church from the state. They believed in the necessity 
of the Church. 16 This may have been true of some `radicals', perhaps of Walter 
Moyle, but it was certainly not true of Trenchard and Gordon. They had little faith 
that religion could make men virtuous and they, unlike most men of the period, 
believed that even atheists could be good men and good citizens. Gordon was 
quite emphatic that nothing but a total separation of the Church from the state 
could ensure civil and religious freedom: 
Civil and Religious Liberty are certain Signs of each other, and live and die 
together; but I believe I may lay it down for a maxim, that in any Country 
where there is ne'er a Separatist from the Church, there is ne'er a Freeman 
in the state. 17 
A civil religion, in the Roman model, may have implied toleration, as under Numa, 
but it could also be seen as an unwarranted intrusion into matters which did not 
concern the state. Anthony Collins, writing in The Independent Whig, criticised the 
idea of a civil religion, arguing that it was morally wrong for magistrates to 
legislate in matters of religion. Echoing Locke, he argued that to do so took away 
`Men's Right to follow their Consciences therein; which constitutes the very 
Essence ofReligion'. 18 
15CL, II, no. 133, p. 925. 
16See The Pillars of Priestcraft Shaken, pp. 171,173,230. 
17TheIndependent Whig, no. 36, p. 228. 18Ibid., p. 269. See also Locke, `A Letter Concerning Toleration' and `A Second Letter Concerning 
Toleration, Letters Concerning Toleration (London, 1765), pp. 36,115-16. Trenchard and Gordon, like Collins, would have taken issue with Hobbes' denial of religious freedom to Dissenters. See 
The Independent Whig, p. 109. 
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Nor did Trenchard and Gordon subscribe to the hierarchical epistemology which 
Champion sees as central to the idea of civil theology, distinguishing between a 
commonly accepted popular religion and a `true' set of propositions that only a 
community of wise men could grasp. Unlike other `radicals', they had little 
confidence in man's ability to be ruled by reason. They celebrated reason in 
opposition to superstition and in the limited sense of man's ability to determine 
what was best for himself but they had no illusions that man could arrive at real 
`truths' in matters such as religion, which were beyond his comprehension. Like 
Locke, they held that this very inability on the part of man to understand `truth' 
was an argument in favour of toleration, as was the fact that men were at least as 
likely to differ in their religious beliefs as they were in matters that came within the 
compass of their senses. However, even if man was incapable of discovering truth, 
Trenchard and Gordon recognised that the desire to search for it was natural to man 
and, they believed, he should be allowed to carry out his search free from 
persecution, as Gordon argued: `He who, in the Search of Truth, does all that he 
can, does as much as he ought. God requires no more. '19 
Although Trenchard and Gordon denied being opposed to the established Church 
they, like many others, still regarded it as a refuge for Jacobite sympathisers and 
crypto-Catholics. Its hierarchical structure and the powers it claimed for its clergy 
resembled too closely those of the Roman Church to allow it to escape suspicion 
and the common perception was that papacy and arbitrary government went hand 
in hand. Both were oppressive institutions, they argued, which used a fog of 
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mysticism to cloud men's minds, relying on the doctrines of an uninterrupted 
apostolic succession and divine right to awe uninformed and untrained minds and 
maintain them in submission. The titles, privileges and `indelible character', or 
cloak of spiritual authority, assumed by Catholic and High Church clergy were 
contrived to persuade men that they should allow others to do their thinking for 
them; to leave the direction of their beliefs to those divinely ordained to guide 
them. 20 
The aim of the Letters, as stated in Gordon's preface, was to rouse men from this 
mental lethargy and make them think for themselves. It is a sentiment which 
echoes the anti-clericalism of Locke's Two Treatises, and one also, of course, 
found in the writing of contemporaries such as Marvell as well as in 
popularisations of Locke's work. 21 As already noted, Trenchard and Gordon both 
appear familiar with the Two Treatises, whether directly or indirectly. And, like 
Locke, they believed the sole end of government to be the preservation of man's 
property, both in his person and in his goods. The function of government, they 
held, was to protect men from the injuries of one another and not to direct them in 
their private affairs. Intervention should be kept to a minimum. As Gordon 
enquired: 
Must the magistrate tie up every man's legs, because some men fall into 
ditches? Or, must he put out their eyes, because with them they see lying 
19The Independent Whig, no. 24, p. 159; also nos. 28 and 36, pp. 179 and 226. Also see Locke, 'A 
Fourth Letter for Toleration' and 'A Third Letter for Toleration', Letters Concerning Toleration, 
pp. 388-90,266. 
20CL, II, nos. 135 and 136. 
21In `John Locke and Anglican Royalism', Political Studies, 31 (1983) 61-85, Mark Goldie argues 
that one of the major concerns reflected in Locke's work was a belief that the Anglican 
establishment was not merely an adjutant to the monarchy but aspired to an extension of temporal 
power. 
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vanities? Or, would it become the wisdom and care of governors to 
establish a travelling society, to prevent people, by a proper confinement, 
from throwing themselves into wells, or over precipices; or to endow a 
fraternity of physicians and surgeons all over the nation, to take care of their 
subjects' health, without being consulted; and to vomit, bleed, purge, and 
scarify them at pleasure, whether they would or no, just as these established 
judges of health should think fit? ... Let people alone, and they will take 
care of themselves, and do it best; and if they do not, a sufficient 
punishment will follow their neglect, without the magistrate's interposition 
and penalties. It is plain, that such busy care and officious intrusion into the 
personal affairs, or private actions, thoughts, and imaginations of men, has 
in it more craft than kindness; and is only a device to mislead people, and 
pick their pockets, under the false pretence of the publick and their private 
good. To quarrel with any man for his opinions, humours, or the fashion of 
his clothes, is an offence taken without being given. What is it to a 
magistrate how I wash my hands, or cut my corns; what fashion or colours I 
wear, or what notions I entertain, or what gestures I use, or what words I 
pronounce, when they please me, and do him and my neighbour no hurt? 
As well may he determine the colour of my hair, and control my shape and 
features. 22 
Applying to both the secular and the religious sphere the Puritan dictum that each 
man is his own best guide, Gordon declared: `I know no man so fit as himself to 
rule himself, in things which purely concern himself. '23 This sphere of autonomy 
extended to the pursuit of wealth and, he argued, man had a right to engage 
unimpeded in the acquisition and disposal of his property as long as no one else 
was hurt in the process. In this respect, depredations carried out under the direction 
or auspices of those to whom authority had been entrusted by the people were as 
unlawful as any committed by a robber, since the purpose of government was to 
render property secure: 
True and impartial liberty is therefore the right of every man to pursue the 
natural, reasonable, and religious dictates of his own mind; to think what he 
will, and act as he thinks, provided he acts not to the prejudice of another; 
to spending his own money himself, and lay out the produce of his labour 
his own way; and to labour for his own pleasure and profit, and not for 
others who are idle, and would live and riot by pillaging and oppressing 
22CL, I, no. 62, pp. 428-29. 
23Ibid., I, no. 39, p. 273. 
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him, and those that are like him. ... 
To possess, in security, the effects of 
our industry, is the most powerful and reasonable incitement to be 
industrious; and to be able to provide for our children, and to leave them all 
that we have, is the best motive to beget them. But where property is 
precarious, labour will languish. The privileges of thinking, saying, and 
doing what we please, and of growing as rich as we can, without any other 
restriction, than that by all this we hurt not the public, nor one another, are 
the glorious privileges of liberty; and its effects to live in freedom, plenty, 
and safety. 24 
Trenchard and Gordon maintained that far from being destructive of liberty wealth 
was its chief support. When man was afforded the freedom to accumulate property 
and enjoy the fruits of his industry he was provided with an overriding motive to 
defend the constitution, which was the basis of that liberty. Gordon argued that to 
live securely, happily and independently was the end and effect of liberty and that 
as no man desired to live under a master `therefore all men are animated by the 
passion of acquiring and defending property, because property is the best support 
of that independency, so passionately desired by all men. '25 
Neo-Harringtonianism, Pocock argues, located the citizen's independence, and 
therefore his capacity for virtue, in his possession of landed property, an 
independence which was undermined by the unreal world of commerce and paper 
credit. Yet Trenchard and Gordon made no distinction between landed and mobile 
property and viewed well regulated public credit as a boon to national prosperity. 26 
They accepted commerce, and the financial instruments which facilitated it, as the 
basis of Britain's wealth and greatness. Rather than denouncing the change from 
24Ibid., I, no. 62, pp. 429,432. 
251bid., I, no. 68, p. 483. 
26CL, I, nos. 62 and 4. Elsewhere, in the St. James's Journal, October 11 1722, Gordon spoke 
enthusiastically about the vast benefits which accrued to a nation capable of skilfully managing a 
public deficit. 
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old to new forms of property brought about by the financial revolution, Trenchard 
and Gordon enthusiastically supported the transition. Theirs was a pragmatic 
analysis which far from rejecting the new economic age applauded the benefits it 
brought the nation. They did not regard commerce, and the financial instruments 
necessary to support a flourishing trade, as a `necessary evil', the foundation of the 
nation's wealth and greatness but also that which threatened to undermine the 
whole structure of society. 27 Instead they perceived it as an expression of one of 
the natural rights of man - ranked with freedom of conscience and freedom of 
speech and intimately bound with both - man's right to acquire and dispose of 
property free from constraint, except where he prejudiced the equal right of another 
to believe, speak or act as he pleased. 28 
What Trenchard and Gordon objected-to when they criticised the handling of the 
South Sea scandal was that government had not allowed a level playing field, in 
permitting those close to Court to manipulate the market and then escape without 
punishment. It was not that they were opposed to the market itself but to the 
government's failure to police it adequately. As realists they argued not for a 
retreat into a past golden age of virtue, or for experiments in government designed 
to create a future utopia, but for present vigilance. They wished to mobilise public 
opinion in order to root out corruption and to create a framework of accountability 
within which it would fail to thrive again. However, antipathy to Walpole's 
27Charles Davenant's description of commerce, `Balance of Trade', The Political and Commercial 
Works of Charles D'Avenant, 2 vols. (London, 1771), II, p. 255. 
28CL, 1, no. 64, p. 448. Trade thrived under a free government, Trenchard argued, `she is the 
portion of free states, is married to liberty and ever flies the foul and polluted embraces of a tyrant'. 
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management of the South Sea affair did not make them a friend to the Tory party, 
despite the attempt by its leaders to forge a Country party consensus. 
The proviso that the accumulation of wealth should not entail harm to anyone else, 
a condition flouted by the directors of the South Sea Company, is the reason 
Trenchard and Gordon denounced monopolies in commerce. Whilst this stance 
may seem in contradiction to their defence of free trade, like other opponents of 
mercantilism of the period their enthusiasm for laissez-faire principles only carried 
so far, government intervention being deemed necessary in circumstances where 
the market had become so unbalanced that it could not otherwise be righted. In 
their opinion a monopoly, wherever it occurred - and whether exercised by a 
branch of government, a religious denomination or a company - produced the same 
pernicious effects. It involved the concentration of power in the hands of the few, 
which was then employed for the benefit of that number in opposition to the 
interests of the people. The consequence of this was the destabilisation of the 
whole structure of civil society, as when government denied protection to men's 
property, either in their person or goods, they no longer had an interest in its 
preservation: 
In fine, monopolies are equally dangerous in trade, in politics, in religion: a 
free trade, a free government, and a free liberty of conscience, are the rights 
and the blessings of mankind. 29 
29Ibid., II, no. 91, p. 653. Ronald Hamowy has also argued that Trenchard and Gordon were not 
opponents of the new commercial era and the changes it brought it in its wake. He is perhaps 
mistaken, however, in arguing that the real target of their animus was the government practice of 
intervention in the marketplace, a suggestion which tends to present `Cato' as a crusading proponent 
of laissez-faire economics. As such it is an inaccurate image, as Trenchard and Gordon, like most 
so-called advocates of free trade of the period, were not wholly consistent in their criticism of 
government interference in the world of commerce. For them, and other critics of mercantilism, the 
issue was one of degree. Generally free-traders were in favour of less restrictions in the domestic 
market but they still expected government to protect national markets from foreign competition. 
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For both Trenchard and Gordon, as later for Hume, the much vaunted liberty of the 
ancients was hardly worthy of its name. Liberty in any real sense of the word, that 
is in relation to men as they are rather than as shaped by a unique set of historical 
circumstances, was a modem invention. It was the product of a prosperous and 
refined society, one which had reached an advanced stage of development: 
In the first rise and beginning of states, a rough and unhewn virtue, a rude 
and savage fierceness, and an unpolished passion for liberty, are the 
qualities chiefly in repute. To these succeed military accomplishments, 
domestic arts and sciences, and such political knowledge and acquirements, 
as are necessary to make states great and formidable abroad, and to preserve 
equality, and domestic happiness, and security, at home. And lastly, when 
these are attained, follow politeness, speculative knowledge, moral and 
experimental philosophy, with other branches of learning, and the whole 
train of the muses 30 
Similarly, they subscribed to the Court Whig interpretation of England's history, 
which relied on the Royalist Robert Brady's account of the nation's progress from 
feudal despotism to modern liberty. This is in opposition to the neo-Harringtonian 
reading, which viewed history up to the Glorious Revolution as a trajectory not of 
progress but of decline. Pocock has argued that Walpole's journalists countered 
the Country party's appeal to the `original principles' of the constitution by arguing 
that liberty in England was modern, not ancient, and that constitutional government 
had emerged out of feudal disorder. 31 Yet this is precisely the view of history 
endorsed by Trenchard and Gordon. Their interpretation of England's history was, 
like that of Harrington, an indictment rather than a celebration of its feudal past. 
`Gothic' government held no charm for them, it was characteristic of a subsistence 
Similarly, they also called for government to intervene to prevent the operation of monopolies. For 
Hamowy's view see `Cato's Letters, John Locke and the Republican Paradigm', 273-94. 
30CL, II, no. 71, p. 514. 
31See Virtue, Commerce, and History, p. 181. 
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level economy `where a few have liberty, and all the rest are slaves. '32 
Bolingbroke, with whom Trenchard and Gordon are grouped as Country opposition 
writers, celebrated `Gothic' liberty, finding it politically expedient to embrace the 
early Whig neo-Harringtonian analysis, which harked back to a golden age 
inhabited by a nation of freeholders. 33 In this way he was able to offer himself and 
those of his party as defenders of age-old freedoms: 
A spirit of liberty, transmitted down from our Saxon ancestors, and the 
unknown ages of our government, preserved itself through one almost 
continual struggle, against the usurpations of our princes, and the vices of 
our people ... Let us 
justify this conduct by persisting in it, and continue to 
ourselves the peculiar honour of maintaining the freedom of our Gothic 
institution of government. 34 
Political rhetoric aside, Bolingbroke and Trenchard and Gordon were not at one in 
their view of Walpole's ministry not only on grounds of party differences, centring 
on concerns with religious toleration and arbitrary government, but because their 
philosophical frameworks differed, reflecting contrary ideological perspectives. 35 
Bolingbroke's concept of the nature of man and politics was essentially classical 
and non-egalitarian. The fundamental division he saw running through society was 
that `of the multitudes designed to obey, and of the few designed to goven. '36 
These few, a natural aristocracy, were qualified to govern because they were 
motivated not by self-interest, as was the case with the mass of mankind, but by the 
highest virtue: 
32CL, I, no. 67, p. 473. 
33See `The Principles and Practice of Opposition: The Case of Bolingbroke versus Walpole'. 
34Bolingbroke, `A Dissertation upon Parties', Bolingbroke's Political Writings, ed. Bernard Cottret 
(London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997), p. 124. 
35It is to be remembered that Cato's Letters and The Craftsman, the periodical founded by 
Bolingbroke and Pulteney and the chief weapon in their campaign against Walpole, were not 
contemporaneous. The Letters were brought to a close with Trenchard's death in 1723, although 
Gordon continued alone for a further six letters until finally signing off on December 7th 1723. The 
Craftsman did not make its appearance until late 1726. 
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These are they who engross almost the whole reason of the species, who are 
born to instruct, to guide, and to preserve; who are designed to be the tutors 
and the guardians of human kind. 37 
Trenchard and Gordon believed, with Hobbes, that self-preservation was the 
fundamental law of nature and that men, all men, would always follow their own 
self-interest, unless persuaded or forced to do otherwise. 38 They were emphatic, 
therefore, about the need to strictly monitor those who governed because, unlike 
Bolingbroke, they did not expect virtue of them. 39 Although both they and 
Bolingbroke looked to constitutional balance as the means of securing good 
government, Bolingbroke stressed the need for virtuous governors, an oppositional 
tactic which distinguished him from Trenchard and Gordon. Contrary to what 
Pocock has argued, Trenchard and Gordon were not concerned with a politics of 
morality. 40 They did not condemn the presence of placemen in parliament per se - 
they expected a measure of venality in government - but rather they criticised the 
presence of too many placemen, which would prevent the legislative branch of 
government from acting as an effective check on the executive: 
I would not be understood quite to exclude Parliament-men from having 
Places; for a Man may serve his Country in two Capacities: but I would not 
have it to be a Qualification for a Place ... Indeed, tho there may 
be no 
great inconvenience in suffering a few Men that have Places to be in that 
House, such as com[e] in naturally, without any indirect Means, yet it will 
be fatal to us to have many: for all wise Governments indeavor as much as 
possible to keep the Legislative and Executive Parts asunder, that they may 
be a check upon one another. 41 
36'A Dissertation upon Parties', p. 132. 
37Bolingbroke, 'On the Spirit of Patriotism', Political Writings, ed. David Armitage (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 193. 
38See chapter 3 of this thesis. 
39Bolingbroke claimed he differed from Machiavelli in one significant respect: `he declares the 
affectation of virtue to be useful to princes: he is so far on my side in the present question. The only 
difference between us is, I would have the virtue real: he requires no more than the appearance of 
it. ' 'A Patriot King', Bolingbroke's Political Writings, p. 63. 
40See Machiavellian Moment, p. 447. 
4tJohn Trenchard, A Short History of Standing Armies in England (London, 1698), p. vi. 
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Bolingbroke's strategy was directed at ousting Walpole's allegedly corrupt ministry 
and installing himself at the head of a Tory or, if his rhetoric is to be believed, a 
Country administration. Trenchard and Gordon merely wished to curb the excesses 
of a party which in fundamental respects was still their natural home but which 
they believed had compromised its revolutionary principles in pursuit of power. 
McMahon argues that Trenchard and Gordon were concerned that by its disregard 
of public opinion, such as the outrage inspired by its mismanagement of the South 
Sea scandal, Walpole's ministry would render itself so deeply unpopular with the 
nation that the door would be opened to Jacobitism 42 However, whilst there is 
much truth in this argument it only tells half the story. Trenchard and Gordon were 
also much troubled by Walpole's abuse of power and just as they did not wish to 
see another Stuart as arbitrary governor nor did they wish another tyrant such as 
Cromwell: 
The partizans of Oliver Cromwell, when he was mediating tyranny over the 
three nations, gave out, that it was the only expedient to balance factions, 
and to keep out Charles Stuart; and so they did worse things to keep him 
out, than he could have done if they had let him in 43 
Trenchard and Gordon were deeply critical of the fact that once in power 
establishment Whigs had ignored, and continued to ignore, central tenets of 
traditional Whig orthodoxy. They contrived at the enlargement of the royal 
prerogative, countenanced standing armies and failed to forward religious 
toleration. In Three Political Letters to a Noble Lord, Concerning Liberty and the 
Constitution Gordon catalogued with heavy sarcasm the `excellent and useful 
42See The Radical Whigs, p. 170. 
43CL, II, no. 94, p. 674; see also no. 118, p. 823. 
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Laws' introduced since the accession of George I and under Walpole's ministry. 
Recent legislation, of which he observed wryly `These Laws show the Happiness 
of such an Administration', included the Riot Act (1715) and suspension of the 
Habeas Corpus Act (1715) 44 Measures which were directly opposed to the 
cherished Whig principles of freedom from arbitrary imprisonment, freedom of 
speech and freedom of assembly. 
In bracketing Walpole's legislative record with that of a previously compromised 
Whig administration, Gordon showed that a change in chief minister meant a 
change in appearance rather than substance. The inference was that a similar lack 
of Whig principles was apparent in the limited nature of the action taken by 
Walpole's ministry to bring the South Sea Company directors to justice; men who 
stood guilty in Trenchard and Gordon's eyes of undermining the constitution by 
concentrating the nation's property, and therefore power, in the hands of a few. 
The ridicule heaped on Walpole's trade legislation, presented as useless when not 
outrightly destructive of commerce, also served to underline Gordon's frustration 
that since gaining power the Whigs had secured the passage of a number of laws, 
few of which had addressed the discrimination still suffered by Dissenters. Indeed 
after the Whig split in 1717 Walpole, who then entered an alliance with the Tories, 
consistently opposed measures brought forward by Stanhope's ministry which 
reflected traditional Whig principles, the most significant of these being the bill for 
the repeal of the Occasional Conformity and Schism Acts in 1719. 
44Thomas Gordon, Three Political Letters to a Noble Lord, Concerning Liberty and the 
Constitution (London, 1721), p. 17. 
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After such treatment, Gordon observed, the Dissenters had learned to distrust 
Walpole, for whilst `Mr W- was once their great Favourite: They see how he 
served them. '45 It is surprising, therefore, that McMahon asserts that Walpole's 
ministry possessed the overt support of Trenchard and Gordon because they saw it 
as the only bulwark against papacy and absolutist government. The two writers, 
McMahon claims, `welcome Walpole as the best man to secure the Protestant 
succession in the House of Hanover. '46 It would perhaps be more correct to argue 
that they regarded him as not the best man but, in the absence of a better, they were 
prepared to lend him their support in times of crisis. That is why they rushed to the 
administration's defence in 1722 after the Atterbury plot had been discovered. 
At first Cato's Letters expressed suspicion that the entire story of a Jacobite plot 
might have been fabricated by Walpole as a pretext to increase his hold on power. 
However, as more details of the plot emerged and of those involved, the tone 
changed and Trenchard and Gordon threw their weight behind Walpole. They 
voiced their support for the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act, the maintenance 
of a standing army and the quartering of troops in Hyde Park, and the prosecution 
of Atterbury by a Bill of Attainder, all measures which ran completely counter to 
Country principles. Gordon also expressed regret for his past naivete in failing to 
recognise that his valid criticisms of government might be taken up by the Tories 
and used by them to their own advantage. He believed the Tories had capitalised 
on the public dissatisfaction with the handling of the South Sea scandal, a 
dissatisfaction fuelled by papers such as Cato's Letters, and he feared that his 
45The Character of an Independent Whig, p. 30. 
46The Radical Whigs, p. 91. 
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words might have helped to create an atmosphere in which Jacobites had felt they 
stood some chance of success. In marked contrast to those Old Whigs who 
opposed the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act, and who voted in parliament in 
favour of an opposition amendment limiting suspension of the Act to six months, 
Trenchard and Gordon offered Walpole's ministry their support. This indicates 
where their priorities lay. They were Whigs first and foremost and were prepared 
to sacrifice the Country principles attributed to them when necessary. So instead of 
castigating Walpole, they laid responsibility for the imposition of repressive 
measures at the door of the Jacobites. 
[Jacobites] exclaim against armies and taxes, and are the cause of both, and 
rail at grievances of their own creating. Who make armies necessary, but 
they, who would invade, and enslave, or destroy us by armies, foreign 
popish armies? Who makes taxes necessary, but they, who by daily 
conspiring against our peace and our property, and against that 
establishment which secures both, force us to give part to save all? ... What is here said of taxes and armies, may be said of the suspension of the 
Habeas Corpus Act. They complain of suspension as a heavy evil; and by 
their incessant plots and rebellions, make long and frequent suspensions 
inevitable. By their eternal designs and attacks upon us, they force us upon 
the next means of self-preservation; and then complain of oppression, 
because we will not suffer them to oppress and destroy us 47 
Throughout the Letters, Trenchard and Gordon made a clear distinction between 
their own criticism of Walpole's ministry, which was unmotivated by party spite 
they claimed, and that of the Tories, who attempted to capitalise for their own 
advantage on every evidence of government corruption or oppression. Both in the 
Letters and in writings produced during the same period by Trenchard and Gordon, 
some of which are more overtly critical of Walpole, they appear to have found 
47CL, II, no. 125, pp. 867-8, also see no. 129, p. 895. In a subsequent letter, Trenchard asked with 
indignation `Can [the High Church clergy] have the forehead to complain of armies, of taxes, or any 
sort of oppression (however just such complaint may be in others) they who have never shewn 
57 
themselves in the difficult position of feeling a duty to offer what, in their eyes, 
was constructive criticism in the knowledge that in so doing they would almost 
certainly provide ammunition to a party they believed to be intent on the 
destruction of the Revolution Settlement. It necessitated a strategy which involved 
moderating their criticism at times when it appeared disaffected Tories might 
possess sufficient power to bring down the Whig administration. In a pamphlet 
written after the discovery of the Atterbury plot, Gordon argued that his writings 
had been forced into service by Jacobites. In one Jacobite pamphlet, he lamented, 
`a great Man [Walpole] who was contriving to save us from Ruin, was exposed to 
the Rage of the Populace, under the Character of a Screener of the Guilty. ' 
Upbraiding himself for his naivety, he continued: 
So little indeed was their Design perceived by myself, that I own many 
things dropped from my Pen, which seemed calculated for the Service of 
the Faction; and so insensible was I of the projected Insurrection, that I 
inveighed against the Forces encamped on that Occasion, with the Zeal 
always shewn by us Old Whigs against standing Armies. 
Refusing any longer to be used as a cat's paw by Jacobites he told his audience he 
had had his eyes opened: 
By artfully spreading the Poison amongst us, they have made us the loudest 
in the Clamours rained against the best of Kings, and the wisest of 
Ministers. But e'er yet it be too late, let us convince them, that we tread in 
their dangerous Footsteps only whilst we are hood-winked, and that having 
recovered the Light of Reason, we all unanimously join against the 
common Enemies of our Country, of our Religion, and of our Liberties 48 
themselves for any government, but what subsisted by armies and oppression? ', CL, II, no. 128, pp. 
887-8. 
48Thomas Gordon, A Short View of the Conspiracy, with some Reflections on the Present State of 
Affairs. In a Letter to an Old Whig in the Country. By Cato. (London, 1723), pp. 128-9,151-2. 
When the South Sea scandal was at its height Walpole was accused of acting as a `screen' to protect 
the guilty. Trenchard and Gordon joined in this accusation. In the preface to the collected Letters, 
Gordon complained: `It was no matter of wonder that these letters should be ill understood, and 
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The problem was that Walpole offered such an easy target to all sides. The 
naturalistic concept of man held by Trenchard and Gordon meant that they, unlike 
Bolingbroke, believed a measure of corruption was acceptable, indeed inevitable, 
in a politician. What they objected to was Walpole's reckless excess: 
Most Men are willing to allow a great Officer, if he would but carefully 
cook the Nation's Money, to Lick his own Fingers and thrive upon his 
Employment. But he who exhausts the Nation for his own Use, is a publick 
Highwayman and the whole Kingdom should be his Prosecutors 49 
Before the Atterbury conspiracy rekindled fears of Jacobitism Walpole, whose 
rampant nepotism suggested dynastic aspirations, appeared the more pressing 
threat to the constitution: 
[O]n Reading the London Journal, I could not but observe with pleasure 
how many of the W[alpoles] are in Places of the Greatest Power and 
Advantage, and rejoyce that one Family is capable of serving the King and 
Nation, in all these Important Posts. Such a Instance is not often to be seen. 
Formerly a Prime Minister would think He had done and deserv'd 
sufficiently, if he had brought Three or Four of his Relations into part of the 
Administration: But now we have a Generation, like the famous Fabii in 
Rome, that appear All together in the Defence of their Country ... one Brother in the T[reasur]y, another S[ecretar]y of S[ta]te, and a Third P[ost]- 
M[aste]r G[enera]l. 5° 
After the plot had been uncovered, however, the focus of Trenchard and Gordon's 
concerns changed and the more pressing need became that of securing the 
prosecution and punishment of the conspirators. Hence their apparent conversion 
in spring 1723 to the idea of standing armies and their endorsement of the 
suspension of civil liberties occurred at a time when a Bill of Pains and Penalties 
maliciously applied, by some, who, having no principles of their own, or vile ones, were apt to wrest 
Cato's papers and principles to favour their own prejudices and base wishes. ', CL, I, p. 13. 
49The Character of an Independent Whig, p. 20. 
50Three Political Letters to a Noble Lord, Concerning Liberty and The Constitution, pp. 34-5. 
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against Atterbury was about to be put to the vote in parliament. 51 They would also 
have been concerned to ensure that the Bill, which called for Atterbury's exile and 
was successfully carried on 15th May, did not act as the trigger for riot and 
violence, as had occurred after the Sacheverell trial when Dissenting meeting 
houses became the focus of attack under the cry of `the Church in danger'. The 
Sacheverell experience had shown that for many, Whig and Dissenter were 
virtually synonymous terms and anger at the prosecution of a High Churchman by 
an unpopular Whig ministry could be easily channelled into outbreaks of public 
disorder. 
Trenchard and Gordon's defence of the measures taken by Walpole at this time, 
therefore, should be seen as a response to a period of perceived crisis and not 
interpreted as evidence of warm support for a Protestant Defender of the Faith, as 
seems to be suggested by McMahon. Trenchard and Gordon's overriding concern, 
and the theme which dominates the letters, is the danger of arbitrary power, 
whether it be exercised by a Protestant or a Catholic governor. Writing after the 
passage of the Bill of Pains and Penalties against Atterbury, Gordon reminded his 
readers that Protestant rulers, like any others, could make the same ill use of power: 
I could name Protestants who have had impostors of their own as cruel as 
the Pope, had their power been as great, and their hands as loose ... 
Protestant rulers have no more right than the Sultan to oppress Protestants 
52 
51G. V. Bennett calls the Bill used against Atterbury a `dangerously arbitrary procedure' in 
`Jacobitism and the Rise of Walpole', in Historical Perspectives: Studies in English Thought and 
Society in Honour ofJ. H. Plumb, pp. 70-92, at p. 89. 
52CL, II, no. 131, pp. 907-8. 
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However, Trenchard and Gordon's distrust of Walpole was overridden by their 
distrust of the High Church party which, in their eyes, posed a more tangible threat 
to liberty, as witnessed by the Atterbury plot, than the loss of an antique civic 
virtue. In The Independent Whig Trenchard and Gordon declared their project to 
be one of reformation. However unlike previous `seeming Attempts of this Kind' 
which focused on small faults, such as the luxury of the rich, and therefore were of 
small service, they meant to attack major defects in the state: 
But the greater and more important Mischiefs, which affect Humane 
Society, have been, for the most Part, left untouch'd by our finest Writers; 
and Priestcraft and Tyranny have been seldom attacked by any, but rather 
flattered and supported. 53 
The real danger that Trenchard and Gordon feared was that posed by priestcraft, 
which robbed men of their independence of thought and sought to make the state 
subordinate to the Church. For both men, therefore, when faced with a choice, 
establishment Whigs, adequately kept within bounds by institutional checks, would 
always prove preferable to an alliance with Tories of questionable loyalty. 54 In 
53The Independent Whig, p. 4. Trenchard and Gordon's programme was not unlike that of 
Mandeville, who a decade earlier had attacked similar projects. In The Female Tatler, a journal 
which capitalised on the popularity of The Tatler and set about puncturing the self-righteous 
pomposity of Steel's creation, Sir Isaac Bickerstaff, he lampooned the moral crusade undertaken by 
the Societies for the Reformation of Manners. These societies were set up in the eighteenth century 
for the purpose of attacking luxury and licentiousness. Trenchard and Gordon, like Mandeville, 
were not in favour of conventional movements to reform manners. They regarded these matters to 
be relatively trivial and believed the reforming societies to represent an unwarranted intrusion into 
men's private lives. 
The Taller, a champion of the Societies, cast itself as the nation's censor and guardian of society's 
morals, proclaiming: `The general Purpose of this Papers is to expose the false Arts of Life, to pull 
off the Disguises of Cunning, Vanity and Affectation, and to recommend a general Simplicity in our 
Dress, our Discourse and our Behaviour. ', Richard Steele, The Tatler, 4 vols. (London, 1713), I, pp. 
iv-v. Like Trenchard and Gordon, Mandeville saw the real evils facing the nation as priestcraft and 
arbitrary rule, exemplified by Louis XIV. See Free Thoughts on Religion, the Church and National 
Happiness (London, 1720); The Origin of Honour and the Usefulness of Christianity in War 
(London, 1732); and The Virgin Unmask'd (London, 1709), pp. 80-1. 
54Trenchard and Gordon would probably have agreed with Hume's judgement that faction founded 
on interest was more benign and therefore preferable to that founded on principle, associated with 
religious intolerance. The Letters are in part based on the premise that the Whig ministry might be 
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extremis, with Protestant liberty apparently under threat, it is easy to see where 
Trenchard and Gordon's priorities lay. So it was that in the wake of an attempted 
Scottish rebellion and the landing of the Pretender at Peterhead, Trenchard, that 
staunch Commonwealthman, compromised his commitment to frequent elections 
by supporting the 1716 Septennial Act, although he subsequently argued, once the 
crisis was passed, for repeal of the Act. And, as already shown, in the wake of the 
Atterbury conspiracy he was persuaded to support measures he had consistently 
condemned in the past. 
It is obvious from a reading of Cato's Letters and The Independent Whig, as well as 
other works by Trenchard and Gordon, that their major preoccupation was not civic 
virtue and the threat posed to it by commercial values but religious toleration and 
the threat posed by High Church Tories. The latter's commitment to the 
indefeasible right of both kings and clergy evoked the spectre of a return to 
Catholic rule and therefore, in the eyes of Trenchard and Gordon, religious and 
state tyranny. A Whig administration, albeit a corrupt one, was at least pledged to 
safeguard the gains won by the Revolution Settlement and it still offered the best 
chance of securing a wider toleration through the repeal of the Test Acts, which 
barred Dissenters from office and placed them under a number of restrictions. That 
is the reason why Trenchard and Gordon did not consistently oppose Walpole - 
their position was much more nuanced than that suggested by Pocock. They 
should be seen as critics of the Whig order, certainly, but ones who wanted to see 
that order preserved rather than destroyed and replaced by Tory rule. 
brought to see that its long term interest lay in securing the happiness of the people. Jacobites and 
High Church Tories, however, blind to reason, were capable of ruining the country in defence of the 
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Trenchard's priorities are evident in a pamphlet he wrote before the 1722 election, 
in which he set out his advice to electors on the issues that he believed should 
decide their votes: 
In the first and chief Place, you should promote the Interest of those who 
are true Friends to his Majesty King George, as by Law established, in his 
royal House ... So you should 
fix your Eyes on those, who have shewn a 
particular Regard to the Protestant Succession, when most in Danger. 55 
The next thing to consider, he urged, was `your Religion and Liberties'. The 
inference was that only in Whig hands were all of these secure, even if the hands of 
a few were rather tarnished. Walpole's ministry may have failed in its duty as 
steward of the public finances but it remained the best, or only, guardian of the 
nation's liberties. Corruption, the watchword of civic humanism, hardly figured as 
an election issue. It should not go uncensured but it made little sense to bar the 
door to a thief, especially when one could place all valuables out of his reach, only 
to allow in a murderer who would take one's lifeblood - liberty. Moreover, he 
argued, those Tories clamouring most loudly against corruption had themselves 
been the worst offenders when their party had held power and now, denied office, 
they would have people take their lack of opportunity for virtue: 
[Another consideration is] our late Misfortunes in relation to the wicked 
Management of the South-Sea Scheme; though in my own Opinion I cannot 
think it so important as the others which I have offered to you. You cannot 
be ignorant how this has been made use of by designing men, and how it 
has misled many well-meaning People; and here Gentlemen, be not over- 
hasty in your Censures on this Head. Consider, in the first Place, that all 
Men are liable to Mistakes, that there may be such a Thing in the World as 
involuntary Error, that Men may design very well, and the Consequences be 
principle of divine right or the independence of the Church. 
55John Trenchard, `Seasonable Advice to the Electors of Great Britain; with a Word or two relating 
to the Influence of the Clergy in Elections' [originally published 1722], A Collection of Tracts by 
the Late John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, 2 vols. (London, 1751), I, p. 273. 
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very bad. I would not be here understood, that I am vindicating any who 
designed to plunder us, or was in the Bottom of that Mystery of Iniquity. 
No, I would only set Matters right: Allowing, therefore, that two, or three, 
or more, should have been Plunderers, for God's Sake don't think a whole 
Community, or Party is guilty, don't condemn a whole Administration for 
the Sake of a few who have corrupted themselves ... let not 
designing Men 
guide you to work your own Ruin, and though we were in as bad a 
Condition as they would represent (which thank God is not our Case) yet let 
us take Care not to trust those now, that we have formerly (for very good 
Reasons) opposed; for, can we think the Enemies of our Country are 
altered, or have they changed their Sentiments and Cause ... Have we 
forgot 
their known maxim, That no Government is worth serving without Jobs? 
Why then should we trust such, and think those now the only disinterested 
Men, who when in Power, have been the most wicked and corrupt of any in 
the World? 56 
Warning against ridding the nation of one band of robbers only to allow in greater 
ones to take their place, he implored electors that they: 
[T]hink of the Men, who, though they have taken the Oaths to the King, yet 
think they owe him no Duty; who have abjured the Pretender, but not forgot 
him; who perhaps never engaged in any Rebellion or Invasion, yet either in 
Words, pleasing Looks, or finally, by an avowed Silence, aided or wished 
well to a Popish Pretender: when the Cause of the King, the Protestant 
Religion, and the Liberties of England were in Danger. These are the 
Persons that when they have it in their Power, will plunder your Liberties, 
and these are the Plunderers you ought most to fear and despise ... Let those 
who'd enslave you know you may have lost your money but have resolved 
not to part with your souls nor lose your Liberties 57 
He also cautioned against being swayed by priests, well aware of the Tory party's 
standing with the lower clergy and its ability to canvass support from the pulpit. 
561bid., pp. 274-5. 
57Ibid., p. 275. In the same work, Trenchard commended another pamphlet, written by his 
colleague, to the attention of his readers. Gordon, who did not enjoy the same standing as 
Trenchard, could be counted upon to express himself more robustly: `A Tory is a Monster, with 
English Face, a Popish Heart, and an Irish Conscience ... 
[Tories] are a Sort of wild Boars, that 
would fain root out the Constitution, and break the Balance of our happy Government, by rendering 
that despotic which is established, and bounded by Law ... In a Word, a Tory, 
is a Tool of Rome, an 
Emissary of the Pretender's, a Friend to Priestcraft, an Enemy to his King and Country, and an 
Underminer of our happy Constitution, both in Church and State', Thomas Gordon, `The True 
Picture of a Modem Tory; or a High-Churchman painted to the Life' [originally published 1722], A 
Collection of Tracts by the Late John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, pp. 278-80. 
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Finally, he played on the popular association of the Tory party with the landed 
interest: 
It is highly necessary that all Places, who send Representatives to 
Parliament, should fix on such Persons, who either know, or are interested 
in Trade and Commerce; and as we depend on Trade for our chief Support, 
so none can be better Judges who is fit to represent them, than the 
Inhabitants themselves. 58 
Trenchard's message to the electorate was unequivocal; the moral character of their 
governors was relatively unimportant. Of crucial importance, however, was that 
they should not hand over power to a party that once possessed of the reins of 
government would overturn the advantages won by the Revolution Settlement and 
extinguish political and religious liberties. 
Trenchard not only offered advice to electors. In 1722 he also offered himself for 
election as the member for Taunton in Somerset. He won the seat but did not hold 
it long, dying the following year. It was not the first time he had attempted to enter 
the Commons. Private correspondence between Trenchard and William Simpson 
reveals that in 1718 he had hopes of entering the House with the aid of the Earl of 
Sunderland, latter implicated in the South Sea scandal. 59 The letter gives an 
indication of Trenchard's political leanings. In it he rejected the idea of standing as 
a Tory and declared that he was prepared to support Sunderland's ministry in all 
matters, that is, with the important proviso, all matters that tended to the public 
good: 
58Ibid., p. 276. The association was a somewhat spurious one, as many Tories also had trade 
interests, but it still appears to have retained a certain currency. 
"The Whig party was riven at this time by a dispute between Sunderland and Stanhope on one side 
and Walpole and Townsend on the other. 
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I have dropt all thoughts of standing for Shaftesbury finding I must stand 
entirely upon the Tory interest, and be at great expense and trouble in the 
Election, and be at last a Petitioner, and perhaps have the Court against me 
in the House; besides I am well assured I shall be chosen at Taunton if my 
Ld. Sunderland continues the same sentiments he owned when I was last in 
Town, and the affair be kept private. 
You know me well enough to assure My Ld. I have a disinterested 
inclination to this Government and this Ministry, and shall give them my 
Assistance in every thing which I shall think consistent with the publick 
interest, and am prepared to meet in all Mankind common failings, and you 
can assure him of one thing more, that I shall expect none of the rewards 
which are so eagerly sought after, being too easie in my private affairs to 
engage upon any terms which are ever likely to be in my power. 
If my Lord thinks it can be of any consequence to the Government or the 
Ministry to have my assistance, I am persuaded in this Age He will not 
esteem the Conditions hard, but of this his Lordship must be Judge, and the 
favour I desire of you is only to know his Resolution which will much 
oblige Your affectionate humble servant John Trenchard. 60 
In a letter to another correspondent, undated but from textual clues probably 
written after 1719, he again stressed his attachment to Sunderland's ministry, as 
long as his lordship continued to act upon the principles of liberty, a reference to 
Sunderland's support for the repeal of the Occasional Conformity and Schism Acts 
in 1719: 
When I was last to wait upon your Lordship you informed me that Lord 
Sunderland continued in the disposition to bring me into the House and the 
only obstacle to it was that he could not readily find a proper place for a 
gentleman of Mr. Pynsent's condition: I confess I always doubted it, and do 
so now more than ever since there are reasons to believe the Court are upon 
a new plan of politics, but I have now an opportunity to try the sincerity of 
great men's promises, for Mr. Pynsent is content to quit the House upon 
any terms, and will accept any place to do it which he will give up again 
immediately, so that my Lord can have no objection but what must be 
personal to me, for Mr. Pynsent never attends. 
If my Lord continues to act upon the principles of liberty he is sure of my 
utmost assistance and there can scarce such a circumstance of affairs 
60SRL, MS G23, John Trenchard to William Simpson, 10 October 1718. 
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happen, but my attachment to the present ministry will be greater than to 
any who now appear to oppose them. 61 
After Trenchard's death, in a preface to the collected Cato's Letters, Gordon 
insisted that Trenchard was `more partial' to Walpole's ministry than to any other. 
Whether this is true or not, and some would doubt the veracity of Gordon's 
assertion because of his apparent political volte-face after Trenchard's demise, 
other correspondence indicates that he was not opposed to the Whig establishment 
on ideological grounds, merely that he was critical, as was Gordon, of certain of its 
measures. 62 Yet the conventional interpretation of Trenchard and Gordon's 
departure from the London Journal is that they were forced to leave when Walpole 
orchestrated a buy-out of the journal, in an attempt to silence the formidable 
`Cato'. 
This was apparently after previous attempts by Sunderland's ministry to put a stop 
to troublesome criticism from the London press had failed. On 28 May 1721 a 
parliamentary committee was set up to deal with newspaper `libels' against the 
61Sunderland (Blenheim) MSS, quoted in The History of Parliament: The Commons 1715-1754, ed. 
Romney Sedgwick, 2 vols. (London: HSMO, 1970), II, p. 481. In Sunderland's plans for the 1722 
parliament drawn up around October 1721, Trenchard is put down to replace Pynsent at Taunton. 
620ne anonymous contemporary wrote as follows: `It has been since discovered that [Gordon] was 
assisted in writing [Cato's Letters] by Mr. Trenchard, a Man of sever Principles with regard to 
Liberty, and very much esteem'd by Persons of Judgment and Sense: In short, he perhaps was the 
only Man in his Time, who in political Subjects wrote what he thought, and wrote it for no other 
Reason but because he thought it, and that it could be of Service for his Country to know it. These 
Letters however had a great Character by their being more free from Party-Zeal & Personal 
Reflections than any other publick Writings that ever appeared. This Mr. G-n has been lucky in 
Life; from being no better than a common Amanuensis to Mr. Trenchard, he is now possest of a 
handsome Fortune and a profitable Post ... 
But see Sir, what the Effect of all these Rewards was; As 
soon as the Man got a Competency, he even quietly sat down, and trouled his Head no farther about 
Politics or Religion. ', An Historical View of the Principles, Characters, Persons, etc. of the 
Political Writers of Great Britain (London, 1740), pp. 15-16. Modem historians have tended to 
accept Gordon's `apostasy' as a given without questioning the possible partisan nature of 
contemporary criticism. See, for example, Beyond Liberty and Property, p. 2; and W. A. Speck, 
Stability and Strife (London, Edward Arnold, 1977), p. 227. 
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government. John Peele, the publisher of The London Journal, was one of those 
sent for but he evaded the committee by absconding. Gordon, although not 
Trenchard, was also sent for but he too avoided making an appearance by claiming 
to be indisposed. No further action was taken on the matter until two months later. 
When the government did act, however, it was not against Trenchard and Gordon 
but against another writer at The London Journal, Benjamin Norton Defoe. An 
introduction written by Defoe to an article entitled, `Examination taken by the 
Parliamentary Committee of Secrecy with an account of what happened to them 
thereupon', aimed at disposing people to petition for a new parliament, roused the 
government's indignation. The offices of The London Journal were raided, its 
printing presses smashed and all copies of the offending paper were confiscated. 
Libel proceedings were initiated against Defoe but were later dropped. 63 
Yet it would appear from a letter written by Trenchard to William Simpson that 
even while the committee on libels was sitting, government approaches were being 
made to Gordon. Trenchard wrote: 
'Tis certain all the time the Committee was prosecuting him he had 
constant overtures from men in Power, who invited him to come and see 
them, which by my advice he has constantly refused till the Parliament was 
up; soon after which I consented he should wait upon a certain Lord ... 
64 
A letter from Gordon to Trenchard indicates that the meeting subsequently took 
place, at a time when Cato's Letters were still being published serially in The 
London Journal. Gordon reports that the lord had declared Cato's Letters to be 
fine and that he had said their authors deserved encouragement. Gordon's amiable 
63See `The London Journal and its Authors 1720-1723', 13-19. 
64SRL MS G23, John Trenchard to William Simpson, 25 October [1721]. 
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interview with an apparent representative of the Whig ministry would seem 
therefore to suggest, contrary to historical opinion, that the government did not 
regard the authors of Cato's Letters as hostile critics. 65 Nor does it appear that 
Trenchard and Gordon regarded themselves as such. Gordon assured Trenchard in 
his letter: `I next acquitted you and myself from all Imputation of personal Enmity 
to any of the ministry'. 66 
The interview closed without any apparent animosity or threats from either side. 
Indeed the unnamed lord seemed to regard Trenchard and Gordon as useful allies 
rather than as political enemies: 
When I told him my intention to drop Politicks, he said He [would] not 
have me do that, but to mitigate my vehemence and try the way of Cicero's 
Ingenium temperatum; that I had shewn myself an Orator and a great man, 
and could never acquire higher Reputation; and as I had rais'd the passions 
of men too high, he would advise me to throw no more oyle but Water. I 
knew [what] all that meant; and repeated [that] I had done for [the] present 
with the subject, and whenever I resumed it It must be ex animo else I never 
could write with spirit or success. 67 
Later Walpole, who took the helm after Sunderland's death in 1722, may have been 
discomforted by Trenchard and Gordon's dogged campaign to see those behind the 
South Sea Bubble brought to book but at the same time he had much to gain from 
their anti-Jacobite polemics, which helped render him more secure in his position 
65See, for example, `The London Journal and its Authors 1720-1723', 34. 
66SRL, MS G23, Thomas Gordon to John Trenchard, 1 August [1721]. W. T. Laprade notes 'Early 
in September [1723] "Tom Brodrick and Mr. Trenchard" were at Bath with some of Walpole's 
friends, who hoped that "dangerous machinations" would not be imparted to their holidays. ', Public 
Opinion and Politics in Eighteenth Century England (New York: Macmillan, 1936), p. 274. 
Laprade does not cite where these quotations are taken from. Whether or not Trenchard was on 
amiable terms with Walpole, or his friends, he was still prepared to challenge the chief minister 
when he deemed it necessary. As the elected member for Taunton, on 12 December 1722 he 
opposed Walpole's proposal to remit £2 million owed to the government by the South Sea 
Company. See The History of Parliament: The Commons 1715-1754, I, p. 481. 
67SRL, MS G3, Thomas Gordon to John Trenchard, 1 August [1721]. 
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by keeping alive a fear of the Pretender and his friends and the danger posed by 
them to the nation's liberty. 
It would also appear from another of Gordon's letters that Walpole had made 
certain promises to him, promises which Trenchard seems to have known of and 
wished to see come to fruition. In a letter to Simpson shortly after Trenchard's 
death, Gordon told him that Trenchard had been `only solicitous about Mr. 
Walpole's keeping his promise to me, and press'd me to write to him over and over 
the day before he died. '68 This of course might seem to lend support to the 
generally held view that after Trenchard's death in 1723 Gordon, the moral and 
intellectual lightweight of the partnership by common assent, sold his services to 
Walpole, receiving in return for his silence and editorial assistance to the 
ministerial press the office of First Commissioner of Wine Licenses. 69 
Yet Gordon continued, even after Trenchard's death, to uphold the Revolution 
Principles he had always espoused. In the commentary to his translation of 
Tacitus, published in 1725, he again attacked standing armies and the abuse of 
681bid., Thomas Gordon to Simpson, 28 December [1723]. Trenchard trusted Gordon would not 
abandon his principles for pecuniary gain and believed it was possible under a Whig ministry to 
serve the 'cause' of liberty and at the same time serve one's private interest. In the same letter in 
which Trenchard informs Simpson of Gordon's meeting with a government representative, he notes 
the lord offered Gordon `all the service in his Power, and gave him hints that he should have a 
Pension. ' Trenchard reports that Gordon respectfully refused the offer and he goes on to express his 
confidence in his literary partner: '[I]f I could help the Poor fellow to a creditable employment I 
should be willing to doe it, and I assure you the cause should not suffer by it, left him act how he 
pleases; but I don't suspect him'. 
69The appointment gave rise to Pope's mocking allusion to Gordon as `Silenus' in The Dunciad 
whilst elsewhere, in an Epilogue to the Satires, he observed: `There's honest Tacitus once talked as 
big, /But he is now an Independent Whig', quoted in 'Thomas Gordon, the "Independent Whig"', 
748. In part, modern misconceptions about Cato's Letters may be due to the selective use made of 
them by Bolingbroke and other contributors to the Craftsman a decade after they were first 
published, a practice, as already noted, roundly condemned by Gordon in the preface to the 1733 
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power. And in 1734, when Edmund Gibson, Archbishop of London, opposed the 
nomination by Lord Talbot, the Lord Chancellor, of Thomas Rundle as candidate 
for the see of Gloucester, Gordon stepped in on the side of Talbot. Gibson wanted 
to see Rundle's appointment blocked because he believed him to be a heretic and 
Walpole appeared to wish only to avoid a confrontation with the Church. Gordon, 
however, weighed in with a pamphlet entitled A Letter to the Reverend Dr. Codex, 
in which he thundered that ecclesiastical tyranny would arise from Gibson's 
scheme for trying and disqualifying candidates to Church preferments. 7° If Gordon 
was never again as vocal in his criticism of Walpole as he had been at the height of 
the South Sea scandal it need not be attributed to his biddability. He had married 
Trenchard's widow and had in consequence become a wealthy man. It is perhaps 
more likely that he did not wish to aid Bolingbroke's cause by adding his voice to 
the vociferous criticism levelled at Walpole. 
To view Gordon's later career as a fall from grace, therefore, is to misread Cato's 
Letters. It means glossing over the predominant concerns of both authors - the 
political influence of the Church on government and on the minds of the people 
and institutional, rather than personal, corruption - and ignoring what might be 
expected from writing which was journalistic in nature, that it was reactive. It was 
both shaped by specific political developments, such as the Atterbury plot, and in 
turn sought to shape public opinion. Yet viewed simply from the civic humanist 
perspective Trenchard and Gordon's attitude towards Walpole, which runs the 
edition of the Letters. Taken out of context the `Cato' of the Craftsman would indeed seem a 
turncoat dressed in Walpole's livery. 
70See Public Opinion and Politics in Eighteenth Century England, p. 349. The 'Dr. Codex' of the 
title refers to Gibson. 
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gamut from criticism to support, fails to make sense. Just as it is not credible to 
enlist Trenchard and Gordon in the ranks of Walpole's supporters, nor is it possible 
to place them in the vanguard of a Country opposition. They were too deeply 
suspicious of Tory religious and political sympathies to ally themselves with men 
who they believed threatened to destroy the liberties won by the Revolution. In 
sum, `Cato' was the very model of an Independent Whig. 
Chapter III 
The `scientific politics' of Trenchard and Gordon 
As already seen, Trenchard and Gordon have been cast by revisionist historians as 
fervent proponents of civic virtue and lacerating critics of Court corruption under 
Walpole's ministry, who looked not to constitutional mechanisms but rather, like 
Bolingbroke, to leaders of heroic and inspirational virtue to forestall the nation's 
descent into corruption and consequent loss of liberty. ' However, Trenchard and 
Gordon feature as singularly unlikely recruits in the impressively successful 
campaign by Pocock and others to displace Locke and the natural law tradition and 
install Machiavelli and the civic humanist tradition as the dominant ideology of the 
eighteenth century. Indeed if Trenchard and Gordon stand anywhere it is four- 
square in the opposition camp, with the `moderns' rather than the `ancients', and 
although only foot-soldiers they should, nevertheless, be viewed as enlisted in a 
similar enterprise to that undertaken by a line of more illustrious figures. Like 
Hobbes, Locke, Mandeville and Hume, to the extent that Trenchard and Gordon 
can be said to have had a political theory it was `scientific', in that it was informed 
by an attempt to understand the governing principles of human nature in the light 
of increased knowledge of the material world. Rather than indulging in what Isaac 
Kramnick has called `the politics of nostalgia', the Country party's glorification of 
a previous age untouched by corruption, Trenchard and Gordon embraced the 
modem world, including the scientific revolution and especially the insights they 
believed it had allowed into human psychology. While obviously they do not rank 
as highly as Hobbes and Locke, their importance is as popularisers of radical 
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philosophic and political ideas and what they lack in intellectual stature is made up 
for by the scope of their influence. 2 
One of the most pervasive vocabularies, and like neo-Harringtonianism seized on 
and fought over by ideological or political opponents, was that belonging to the 
world of science. It reflected a notion which had become prominent during the 
seventeenth century that, in the words of Newton's tutor Isaac Barrow, the `world 
natural' provided man with a model for the operation of the `world politick' .3 
Newtonian natural philosophy offered a response to the radical implications of the 
science-based materialist philosophy of Hobbes, Descartes and Spinoza. For 
Latitudinarians in particular it offered a solid anchor for a raft of concerns. They 
saw in it a moderating influence and a means of shoring up the religious, social and 
political status quo. Science might be used as the basis for rational belief and as a 
way of opposing the dangerous tide of superstition and fanaticism which threatened 
not just the position of the established Church but also the social and political 
order. 
I See chapter 1 of this thesis. 
2The term `radical' is used with some reservations. Trenchard and Gordon were certainly radical in 
their philosophical ideas but, as has been argued previously and will continue to be argued, 
politically they were supporters of the Whig establishment. They were not, therefore, politically 
`radical' in the meaning of the word as defined by Pocock in a recent work: `By "radical criticisms" 
I shall mean the increasingly articulate body of characterisations of and attacks upon [Walpole's] 
regime, "radical" in the sense that they formulated criticisms of the foundations of this regime in 
society and of the kind of society it was bringing into being. ', `Radical Criticism of the Whig Order 
in the Age between Revolutions', p. 33. Trenchard and Gordon might, however, be termed political 
radicals in the context of traditional Tory/Whig ideology, in that essentially they were in favour of a 
limited executive role in government and a separation of the Church from the state. Their politics 
might also be considered radical in the sense that their writings were taken up by British, American 
and French radicals at the end of the eighteenth century. 
3Quoted in The Radical Enlightenment, p. 30. No reference for the Barrow quotation is given. 
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Newtonianism reimposed religious and social order by providing a mechanical 
philosophy which allowed for the existence of a controlling God who imposed 
harmony and stability in the natural world, a pattern repeated in man's creation and 
maintenance of society. 4 The model of society that it legitimised was one which 
was rigidly defined, where every man knew and kept to his place. It rested on a 
theory of nature which conceived of matter and motion as intrinsically distinct. 
Matter being essentially inert, mere stupid or `brute' substance, and incapable of 
motion except when acted upon by external forces. Superior to matter, and quite 
separate and distinct from it, was the force that animated it, which was derived 
externally from a Supreme Being who set all in motion and oversaw its progress. 
Man was divinely imbued with analogous powers on earth, to move, regulate or 
craft matter, so that he might produce a similar order to that imposed by God on 
nature. To do so required that man be guided by reason in the exercise of this 
power and, like God's power, that it not be employed arbitrarily. Men had each 
been allotted their particular place in the grand order but those chosen to govern 
4Newtonianism countered purely mechanical accounts of the workings of the material world by 
making God the author of the mechanical laws of nature. He, it was argued, had set in place and 
continued to regulate the powers of gravitation and motion and the orbits of the planets. The 
following account of the ideological significance of science during the decades spanning the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries draws on Margaret Jacob's The Radical Enlightenment and 
The Newtonians and the English Revolution 1689-1720 (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1976). 
Jacob's central argument, that Newtonianism was embraced by Low Churchmen and the Whig 
establishment because it could be made to serve specific social and political ends, appears sound. 
Less convincing, however, is her identification of a 'radical Enlightenment', which developed in 
opposition to Newtonianism, characterised by a set of markedly different philosophic and political 
beliefs. The political burden of Newtonianism, she contends, was monarchist. Arguably she 
overemphasises contemporary understanding of the implications of competing natural philosophies 
and underestimates the relevance of issues of partisan and practical politics. She is aware of the 
difficulty in fixing on a prescriptive definition of Latitudinarianism, cautioning against 
characterising its proponents as exclusively Whigs. See The Newtonians and the English 
Revolution, p. 29. However, she perhaps makes too much of the distance between the 'Latitude' 
men and the so called 'radicals', particularly when they often found themselves thrown together and 
under attack from High Churchmen. Trenchard and, in particular, Gordon consistently supported 
Hoadly and rallied to the defence of Whiston, Tillotson and other Low Churchmen when they came 
under fire, either for expressing heterodox views or urging toleration. Chapter 4 of this thesis moves 
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had to mould lesser men of uncultivated reason so as to create social harmony. 
Newtonian science and natural religion taught men, particularly those of lower 
rank, they should not be `extremely and unreasonably solicitous' to alter greatly 
their station in life. 5 At the same time man's power to acquire material possessions 
was seen as a facet of the control he exercised over matter. 6 
Newtonianism, therefore, naturalised both social hierarchy and self-interest and in 
sanctioning them, as part of a Christian God's design, simultaneously placed 
constraints on the form they were able to take. Arbitrary government and rampant 
self-interest, placed before the public good, perverted the social order and presaged 
decay, analogous to the decay seen in nature. The way in which the principle of 
universal gravitation explained the natural world, revealing the operation of a 
system `for keeping the several Globes of the universe from shattering to Pieces', 
allowed Newtonians like Samuel Clarke to suppose a similar order could be 
imposed on society, based on the obedience of reasoning man to the providential 
will of God .7 The same Providence which regulated the mechanical 
laws of the 
universe kept watch over the `world politick' and men, if they were to conform 
their actions to the will of God, had to produce conditions of political and social 
stability. 
on from the present chapter to examine neo-Harringtonianism and deism and includes a discussion, 
and rejection, of Jacob's representation of neo-Harringtonians as `radicals'. 
5Richard Bentley, The Works of Robert Bentley (1838), quoted in The Radical Enlightenment, p. 
92. 
6The Newtonian and the English Revolution, p. 189. 
7William Derham, Physio-Theology (1714), quoted in The Newtonians and the English Revolution, 
p. 192. 
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Newtonianism was hostile to a purely mechanical law of motion that eliminated the 
need to postulate a separate and eternal Creator and to a theory of matter that 
rejected the dualism of Descartes and sought to explain the operation of the mind 
in terms of physical processes, thereby denying man free will. Those who took an 
opposing view and conceived of matter as self-moving, constantly in motion, and 
undifferentiated were consequently accused by the scientific and political 
establishment of atheism and republicanism, of making men the equals of God and 
of each other. Their denial of free will laid them open to charges of libertinism, of 
allowing men a licence for misconduct. 
Hobbes came under attack because he threatened the Newtonian vision of order by 
seeming to offer a licence for the very excesses which threatened decay. By 
exploiting the possibilities inherent in Cartesian dualism he was able to posit an 
explanation of man and his thought processes which was purely mechanistic, an 
interpretation firmly rejected by Descartes himself, and explain the operation of the 
mind in terms of mechanical laws of motion. Trenchard, and Gordon, fully 
concurred with Hobbes' explanation of the `springs' that determined human 
thought and action, coupling it with the epistemology of Locke: 
It is justly observed by Mr. Locke, and by Mr. Hobbes, and others before 
him, that we have no innate ideas, nor can reflect upon them before we have 
them; that is, we cannot think before we have something to think upon. All 
objects and materials for thinking must be let in upon the mind through the 
organs of sense; and when they are there, we reflect or reason upon them; or 
to speak philosophically, when the action of exterior bodes strikes upon us, 
it must cause a second action or motion, and continue in finitum, unless it 
meets obstruction. This first action causes sensation, and the second 
reflection; and the first seems to me as necessarily to produce the latter, as 
wind sails a ship, or the winding up of a clock sets it in motion. 8 
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In contrast to the Newtonians, Hobbes framed men as self-moving mechanisms and 
was therefore able to suggest that morality emanated from their motions rather than 
from being imposed externally. In the eyes of his opponents he was seen as 
presenting a social world dominated by competing interests and driven by the 
levers of self-interest and the desire for power, paralleling his conception of a 
universe in which mechanical laws were governed by material forces. Men, in his 
model of society, who rose in position and achieved great wealth did so not 
through the hand of Providence but by their own skill and cunning. 9 It was a 
doctrine of `self-sufficiency' which effectively rendered God redundant and was 
seen by his critics as necessarily presaging a decline into lawlessness, 
licentiousness and anarchy. '° 
Following Hobbes, Trenchard and Gordon moved easily from materialism to 
determinism, arguing that man thought and acted mechanically and necessarily, in 
response to external stimuli. By casting man as a mere cog, a mechanism propelled 
by necessity rather than free will, Trenchard and Gordon were accused like, 
Hobbes and Mandeville, of encouraging immorality and lawlessness. It was said of 
them that their intention was to: `subvert the Foundation of all Morality and 
Religion, destroy the essential Difference of Virtue and Vice, Good and Evil; and 
8CL, II, no. 116, p. 808. 
9See The Newtonian and the English Revolution, p. 169. 
100ne anonymous critic of deism identified the originator of this dangerous creed of `self- 
sufficiency' in England: `The first, who distinguished himself in England as a successful adversary 
to religion, and a teacher in Self-sufficiency, was Hobbes', Deism Revealed, or the Attack on 
Christianity Candidly Reviewed In its real MERITS, 2 vols. (London, 1751), II, p. 211. The 
libertine spirit, the author contended, could be defined in one word as 'Self-sufficiency', p. 206. 
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take away the Ground, and Reason, and Obligation of all both divine and human 
Laws. ' ' 
Edmund Law, in a footnote to a discussion of free will in his translation of William 
King's An Essay on the Origin of Evil, linked Trenchard and Gordon with Hobbes 
and Locke as supporters of the pernicious doctrine that man acts necessarily: 
The most remarkable Defenders of this opinion, [that man acts necessarily; 
his will being part of a chain of cause and effect and therefore not free] 
among the Modems, seems to be Hobbs, Locke, (if he be consistent with 
himself) Leibniz, Boyle the Authors of the Philosophical Enquiry 
concerning human Liberty, and of Cato's Letters. '12 
The implication which followed from the doctrine that men acted necessarily was 
that it seemed to absolve men from responsibility for their actions. It suggested 
that men's actions could be regarded as neither deserving of blame nor of praise 
and that notions of vice and virtue consequently were rendered meaningless. 
Trenchard and Gordon, however, did not argue that men were not responsible for 
their actions. Merely that man could not, as it were, stand outside himself in 
exercising his will. Trenchard believed men thought and acted `necessarily' 
because they did so in response to a cause. To argue otherwise, he insisted, was 
absurd: 
One may as well say, that a man can avoid seeing, when an object strikes 
the eye, or hearing, when it hits the ear, as to believe that he can decline 
thinking, when the motion caused by the object reaches the brain ... and 
when he does think, he must think as he can, that is, according as objects 
from without are represented and their images to him within. 13 
1IJohn Jackson, A defense of Human Liberty (London, 1730), preface. 
12William King, An Essay on the Origin of Evil, trans. Edmund Law (London, 1731), p. 208, n. 42. 
13CL, II, no. 111, p. 783. The titles of the group of letters dealing with this subject illustrate the 
direction of Trenchard's arguments: no. 108, 'Inquiry into the Source of Moral Virtues'; no. 109, 
'Inquiry into the Origin of Good and Evil; nos. 110 and 111, `Of Liberty and Necessity'; and no. 
116, 'That whatever moves and acts, does so mechanically and necessarily'. 
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Vice and virtue were not merely meaningless words. However, following Hobbes, 
Trenchard insisted that `virtue' was just the name men gave to actions they deemed 
socially useful. Actions were given the title of virtuous or vicious by man 
according to their social utility: 
Every passion, every view that men have, is selfish in some degree; but 
when it does good to the publick in its operation and consequence, it may 
be justly called disinterested in the usual meaning of that word ... 
Disinterestedness, in any other sense than this, there is none. For men to 
act independently of their passions, is a contradiction! Since their passions 
enter into all that they do, and are the source of it: And the best actions 
which men perform, often arise from fear, vanity, shame, and the like 
causes. '4 
John Jackson, a critic of the `absurd System of the Materialists', also lambasted 
`Cato' for reducing all questions, both spiritual and temporal, to science: 
That which seems to have led Cato and others, both Antients and Modems, 
to think that nothing is the object of Knowledge, but necessary Truths or 
Events, is, the taking all Knowledge to be scientffical; or understanding it in 
the Sense of Science. 15 
Trenchard and Gordon were denounced as deists and the accusation was certainly 
not without foundation. Rebutting the Newtonian model of a universe and society 
watched over by an ordering Providence, Trenchard presented the image of God as 
a superior if disinterested watchmaker: 
He certainly is a more skilful artificer, who can make a watch which will go 
for a thousand years, and then break to pieces at a stated time, than another 
who makes one which must be wound up every day, and mended every 
month. ' 6 
The accusation of deism also carried with it very clear political connotations of 
Erastianism and republicanism. In Deism Revealed Trenchard and Gordon, as 
14Ibid., II, no. 116, p. 808; I, no. 44, p. 302; no. 40, p. 281; no. 40, pp. 279-80. 
15A defense of Human Liberty, p. 61. 
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authors of The Independent Whig, are counted along with Toland, Tindal and 
Collins, as well as Hobbes and Mandeville, as those `known to be Deists'. They 
are condemned for having endeavoured to prove: 
[T]here is no such order among us, distinct from and independent of, the 
State. They represent us, as constituted, and as almost ordained by Act of 
Parliament. When, in pursuit of Hobbes's scheme, they insist, that the 
Clergy ought always to be the creatures of the civil power, they serve no 
other cause than that of Deism, or rather Atheism. '? 
Similarly, another critic made a connection between Trenchard and Gordon's 
republican principles, Hobbes' analysis of human nature and Spinoza's pantheism: 
['Cato'] condescended to copy Mr. Hobbes's monstrous Draught of human 
Nature, whose Pride dispos'd him to draw his own Picture for that of 
Mankind. Spinoza's scheme of religion, and some odd Notions of 
Government, were also reviv'd, tho' they have been often and 
unanswerably refuted. 18 
The link made between Hobbes' views on human nature and republicanism was 
not an entirely outlandish one. Those who viewed Hobbes as a dangerous figure, 
who threatened the foundations of British society, would have been able to find 
ready confirmation of their fears by looking at the ease with which republicans 
were able, contrary to Hobbes' intention, to wrest from his works arguments which 
reinforced their own. His rejection of a hierarchical concept of mind and matter 
was seen to undermine both the spiritual authority enjoyed by the Church and the 
temporal authority of the monarchy. 
Perhaps because of shared preoccupations with liberty, defined by toleration and 
the primacy of civil rather than ecclesiastical authority, Hobbes proved as 
16CL, II, no. 116, p. 814. 
17Deism Revealed, p. 312. 
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serviceable to Dutch republicans as he did to those at home, such as Trenchard and 
Gordon. In the 1650s and 1660s Johan and Pieter de la Court and others had used 
Hobbes' works in order to counter the monarchist bias inherent in orthodox 
Calvinism and in support of their position on the unitary nature of sovereign power 
and, consequently, the relationship between Church and state. 19 The de la Court 
brothers, however, differed from Hobbes in that they viewed civil society in terms 
of the accommodation of opposing passions rather than rights. 
The contrast in emphasis was probably due to the de la Court's enthusiastic 
embracing of Descartes' theory of the passions, which they adopted less critically 
than Hobbes. Although they may have hoped to gain from Descartes a more 
scientific and realistic foundation for their political theory, in accepting a dualistic 
analysis of man they ensured that they remained within a largely conventional 
framework. 20 Like Hobbes, however, the de la Courts viewed man as inherently 
selfish. All his actions could be traced to self-love, which in its most elemental 
form was seen as the desire for continued existence, a desire which surpassed even 
the universal and consuming desire for power: `Self-preservation is the supreme 
law of all individuals'. 21 Given that men were by nature broadly equal, their 
t 8Popicola's Supplement to Cato's Letter Concerning Popularity, (London, 1722), p. 2. 
19They were anxious, like Hobbes, that the national Church hierarchy should not rival the power of 
the secular authority. However, they would have rejected his view that men should conform to the 
religion sanctioned by the state. 
20Men, Pieter de la Court argued, like beasts, were machines but they differed in that they possessed 
a soul. There is a moralising tone to his Fables, Moral and Political that resembles the seventeenth 
century French moralistes rather than Hobbes. All men, de la Court insisted, had a duty to lead a 
life that benefited the general welfare. Men failed in this, however, because they were ruled by self- 
love. See Fables, Moral and Political, with Large Explications, 2 vols. (London, 1703), passim. 
21Political Discourses, quoted by Noel Malcolm, `Hobbes and Spinoza', The Cambridge History of 
Political Thought 1450-1700, ed. J. H. Burns (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 
530-57, at p. 548. The following discussion of the de la Courts draws on the above text, pp. 547-50, 
and Eco O. G. Haitsma Mulier's The Myth of Venice and Dutch Republican Thought in the 
Seventeenth Century (Assen: Van Gorcum and Comp., 1980), pp. 120-169. 
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survival was best achieved by placing themselves under the protection, and subject 
to the authority, of a sovereign power. However, man's nature remained 
essentially the same both prior to and after the establishment of civil society. The 
battle of wills continued, with men having to be coerced into compliance: `All 
obedience is caused by compulsion', the only change being it was conducted in a 
less explicitly violent form. 22 The desire of each man to live according to his own 
will also meant that governors inevitably strove to increase their power over their 
subjects. If there was to be any real stability a system had to be instituted which 
would balance these conflicting interests. 
The state, therefore, had to function as an independent mechanism, the wheels of 
which could operate without being oiled by virtue, capable of controlling and 
channelling the passions of governors and governed so that both were compelled, 
by reason or force, to identify their private interest with that of the public interest. 
Contrary to Hobbes, the de la Courts believed a republican form of government 
was the most effective means of achieving this end: 
Seeing the true Interest of all Countrys consists in the joint Welfare of 
Governors and Governed; and the same is known to depend on a good 
Government, that being the true Foundation whereon all the Prosperity of any 
Country is built; we are therefore to know, that a good Government is not 
that where the well or ill-being of the Subjects depends on the Virtues or 
Vices of the Rulers but (which is worthy of observation) where the well or 
ill-being of the Rulers necessarily follows or depends on the well or ill-being 
of the Subjects. 23 
By representing the interests of the many, republican government prevented the 
private interests of the few from predominating and, by cancelling out particular 
22Political Discourses, quoted in `Hobbes and Spinoza', p. 548. 
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interests, constrained men to further the common interest. Man might be incapable 
of true virtue but constitutional mechanisms could supply this lack and ensure that 
the public good was served, in spite of his corruption. 24 It was argued that the 
welfare of the people could only be secured by placing legislative power in the 
hands of `so many, and of so many different sorts of men, as not by words only, but 
truly and indeed represent the whole People, and who being chang'd and reliev'd 
by turns, cannot promote their own advantage but by promoting that of the Publick 
at the same time. '25 A republic would also exercise those powers necessary to fulfil 
the role for which government was instituted - to safeguard life and property - with 
less difficulty than a monarchy, that is with less force and strife, as men would 
more easily comply with laws that expressed their own will: 
When men receive Commands and Laws from Persons who have one 
common Interest with them, and whom they take to be wiser than the 
common sort of Men, they easily yield to be led, directed, persuaded and 
governed by them. 26 
For the de la Courts, therefore, a republic was best suited to man's nature, not 
because in ruling and being ruled he expressed the defining characteristics of what 
it was to be a man but because a republic constituted the only means of restraining 
man's otherwise ungovernable passions. 
23Pieter de la Court, The True Interest and Political Maxims of the Republick of Holland and West- 
Friesland (London, 1702), p. 2. 
24Pieter de la Court argued: `[F]or that Men, when they come to be vested with the Power of the 
Government, cannot lay aside this natural humane Affection [self-love], it evidently follows that that 
is a good Form of Government, where those who sit at the Helm cannot promote their own Interest 
and Advantage unless they take care to advance the publick utility; nor avoid their particular ills, but 
in avoiding likewise those of the publick. ', Fables, Moral and Political, I, p. 84. 
25thid., I, p. 225. 
26Ibid., I, p. 194. 
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A republic also rendered property more secure than under a monarchy, which 
demanded heavier and more arbitrarily levied taxes, and so conformed to the law of 
nature which taught `That we must leave and give to every Man his own'. 27 Unlike 
other admirers of the classical republics, and Machiavelli's Discourses, the de la 
Courts also wrote extensively on economic matters and argued commerce 
flourished most in republics. Moreover, a thriving commerce was linked in their 
arguments to religious toleration. They held that the only consequence of 
persecution was the driving out of useful communities - who would be forced to 
seek refuge in rival trading nations - and the transfer of those communities' talents 
and wealth to the new host nations. 28 
Spinoza, like the de la Courts, supported Johan de Witt, grand pensionary of 
Holland, in his challenge to the power exercised by the House of Orange. De 
Witt's blend of republican anti-clericalism so resembled that of the de la Courts 
that the anonymous pamphlet De Jure ecclesiasticorum, now attributed to Pieter de 
la Court, was commonly credited to his hand. 29 Critics of Spinoza, like those of 
Hobbes, viewed his scientific theory and his political theory as of one piece and he 
was consequently attacked for the political, social and ethical implications of his 
pantheistic materialism. In rejecting the notion of finite substance and the dualism 
of spirit and matter Spinoza undermined the doctrine of rule by divine right and, 
more explicitly than Hobbes, denied the existence of any right except that of 
27Ibid., I, p. 277 
28F. B. Kaye notes Mandeville's similar pairing of religious and commercial freedom See Bernard 
Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, ed. F. B. Kaye, 2 vols. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1988), I, p. 
xcix. 
29See `Hobbes and Spinoza', p. 550. 
85 
power. 30 Consequently, he was perceived as presenting men with a world in which 
they were free to live by `their own Determinations', where they might pursue their 
own interests and desires without fear of an external spiritual power, and the 
attendant threat of eternal damnation, and unawed by a divinely inspired temporal 
hierarchy. 31 
In Spinoza Reviv'd, William Carroll's attack on Tindal's The Rights of the 
Christian Church, Hobbes, Spinoza and Tindal were indicted as `Modern Men of 
Matter', descendants of Epicurus and atheists: `a Characteristical Mark of an 
Atheist, is to be a Materialist, that is one who maintains, that all is but Matter 
differently Modified'. 32 Their view of the operation of the material forces in the 
natural world was linked by Carroll to their interpretation of the forces at work in 
the formation of political society. In spite of Hobbes' defence of monarchy, 
Carroll perceived that royal authority was weakened by a materialist explanation 
which excluded a providential design. Observing that Hobbes, Spinoza and Tindal, 
seconded by Locke, were agreed in their description of the origin of society, that 
30'But since the universal power of Nature as a whole is nothing but the power of all individual 
things taken together, it follows that each individual thing has the sovereign right to all it can do; i. e. 
the right of the individual is co-extensive with its determinate power. ', Spinoza, Tractatus 
Theologico-Politicus (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1989), p. 237. 
31Francis Gastrell, The Certainty and Necessity of Religion in General (1697), quoted in The 
Newtonians and the English Revolution, p. 170 
32William Carroll, Spinoza Reviv'd (London, 1709), p. 102. Carroll also labelled Locke a 
materialist. Pointing to chapter 4 of Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Carroll 
accused him of teaching Spinoza's doctrine, `viz. The Eternal Existence of one only Cognitive and 
Extended Material Substance, differently modified in the whole World, that is the External 
Existence of the whole World itself; to which th e two authors give the Holy Name of GOD, and 
ascribe some of his Divine Attributes. ', Spinoza's hypothesis, Carroll continued, `is the very same 
that all the Atheists which ever were, did establish and maintain; for they were all of them without 
exception; that is, the few of them we have upon Record, Materialists. All that Spinoza and M. 
L[ocke] have done, is to endeavour to give that Hypothesis a Systematical Consistency', A 
Dissertation Upon the Tenth Chapter of the Fourth Book of Mr. Locke's Essay Concerning 
Humane Understanding (London, 1706), pp. ii, 289. Later Carroll goes on to link Locke with 
Toland and says that they shared the same design, p. 277. 
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men were forced to band together out of fear, he argued this was to maintain `That 
all Power is Originally in, and immediately from the People. That all the Right, 
Power and Authority of the Sovereign is immediately deriv'd from `em. '33 In order 
to prove Tindal to be a disciple of Spinoza, Carroll drew repeated parallels between 
the republican and anti-clerical sentiments expressed in The Rights of the Christian 
Church and The Rights of the Clergy, or De jure ecclesiasticorum, which he 
attributed to Spinoza. 
In terms of the implications for the `world politick', critics such as Carroll failed to 
differentiate between Hobbes' mechanistic materialism and Spinoza's pantheistic 
materialism - the subversive element was the absence of an interventionist God. 34 
A materialist explanation of the universe was seen, irrespective of the intentions of 
its proponents, as a threat to the prevailing social order, since if `there is no God 
nor Religion ... [then] all men are equal. '35 Such scaremongering, however, was 
largely unfounded. Those like John Toland, Anthony Collins, Trenchard and 
Gordon who espoused a form of `scientific politics' possessed no desire to see a 
levelling of men and an abnegation of property rights. Their radicalism was 
limited in scope and did not encompass a popular republic. 36 Although opposed to 
33Spinoza Reviv'd, p. 41. 
34So too, when attacking Hobbes, Spinoza and Toland in the 1704-5 Boyle lectures, Samuel Clarke 
did not distinguish between their philosophies. See The Newtonians and the English Revolution, pp. 
232,238. Similarly, Leibniz associated Toland's philosophy with that of Hobbes rather than with 
Bruno or Spinoza. (It was Bruno and not Spinoza, Jacob argues, who shaped Toland's pantheism). 
On Jacob's own evidence, this tendency on the part of not insignificant figures to ignore completely 
the differences between materialist philosophies tends to tell against her contention that these 
divergent interpretations supported opposing ideologies. 
35The Certainty and Necessity of Religion in General, quoted in The Newtonian and the English 
Revolution, p. 322. 
36Gordon, in the preface to Cato's Letters said of Trenchard that he was against all levelling and 
that he was `fearful of trying experiments upon the constitution. He thought that it was already upon 
a very good balance', CL, I, p. 30. Nevertheless, many of their critics saw or chose, for party 
advantage, to see them as dangerous republicans. Certainly the implications of some of the views 
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the idea of an absolutist monarchy, they believed the `limited monarchy' won at the 
time of the Revolution Settlement was the surest means of avoiding such tyranny. 
Political pragmatism meant that they found themselves subscribing to an 
idiosyncratic model of republicanism, one in which the chief magistrate was a 
king. 37 It would seem incorrect then to argue, as Margaret Jacob does, that a great 
ideological divide existed between Newtonianism, portrayed as monarchist in 
political bias, and pantheism, which formed `the philosophical foundation for 
republican and even democratic philosophies of government. '38 
Jacob is right, however, in emphasising the links which existed between English 
and Dutch freethinkers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 39 One of the 
figures on whom she focuses is Toland. It was during his residence in Holland in 
1693, whilst engaged on theological studies, that he was drawn into the `Anglo- 
Dutch republican nexus' and came into contact with men such as the republican 
Benjamin Furly and the Arminian theologian Jean Le Clerc. Furly's home in 
Rotterdam, which housed a formidable library of heretical books, acted as a point 
of contact between Dutch Dissenters, French refugees and English republicans. 
Shaftesbury was also a member of this circle and thought of Furly and other of his 
associates as the `Holland Whig Party'. It was through this Dutch connection too 
that Toland met Locke. He and Collins also later became involved with a coterie 
of French Protestant refugees in The Hague, which included Prosper Marchand, the 
expressed by Trenchard, Gordon and their associates were, if followed to their logical conclusion, 
extremely radical in political terms. 
37Though perhaps no more idiosyncratic than the Dutch Republic, governed effectively, except 
during the `Stadholderless' periods, by the House of Orange. 
38The Radical Enlightenment, pp. 85-6,224. 
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editor of Bayle's Dictionary, and the anti-absolutist Jean Rousset de Missy, men 
who professed radical views about God, nature and, Jacob would argue, politics. 
She numbers Trenchard as one of the members of this Anglo-Dutch coterie of 
radicals who, in London, congregated at the Grecian Inn. Whilst it is doubtful that, 
as Jacob would have it, Trenchard, together with Toland, Collins and Tindal, 
constituted the `intellectual heart of the radical Whig "college"', what is 
noteworthy is that his involvement with this Anglo-Dutch network gave him access 
to a different tradition of thought to that of civic humanism, that is to say, to the 
natural law tradition of Hobbes, mediated through the de la Courts and Spinoza. 4° 
This natural law tradition allowed Trenchard, and Gordon, to conceive of a 
republic built not on virtue but on self-interest. 
It is clear that Gordon's political philosophy was also shaped by the natural law 
tradition. His pamphlet An Essay on Government, published in 1747, just two 
years after the Jacobites' last hurrah, was conducted entirely in the language of this 
tradition. Dismissing exhortations for Tories and Whigs to unite in an `amphibious 
sect', he set out what he believed to be the first foundations of government. He 
ridiculed the doctrine of divinely ordained government but asserted that men were 
under a duty, as a law of nature, to obey the supreme power. Borrowing chiefly 
from Locke, he argued that men in the state of nature agreed to establish an 
arbitrator in order to avoid violence when their rights were invaded, property and 
family rights being antecedent to the constitution of states. Taking issue with 
39Jacob is not alone in highlighting this connection. See, for example, Rosalie L. Colic, `Spinoza 
and the Early English Deists', Journal of the History of Ideas, 20 (1959), 23-46. 
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Grotius, he argued that a people and an individual were entrusted with rights that 
could not be surrendered. Moreover, if a man could not totally transfer a right to a 
third party, much less could he transfer those of his posterity. The surrender of a 
people's rights could not be absolute and could not bind their posterity. If a trustee 
of power transgressed the limits tacitly set to the grant of power the people had a 
right to call him to account. The supreme power, he insisted, was always with the 
people, even if some parts of it were delegated to the monarch. The basis on which 
this theory of government rested was an idea of an unchanging human nature, 
driven by the same fundamental passions: 
What Reason have we to imagine ourselves so much more wicked than our 
Fore-fathers? In Cases where the Motives and Objects are the same, why 
are we to presume they would pursue more righteous Measures to obtain 
their Ends? ... It is the most common Saying with Divines and Philosophers, that the World grows daily worse and worse; why they say so, 
is only that they may indulge their own Spleen and rail at the vices of 
Mankind 4' 
It would appear that the intellectual framework which shaped Trenchard and 
Gordon's thought was that of the natural law rather than the civic humanist 
tradition and the idea that man should be understood as he was, rather than in 
relation to an unachievable classical ideal. And for both men, a republican system 
of government, which might include a monarchical element, flowed logically from 
a scientific study of man and the natural world. Building on similar foundations as 
the de la Courts, whose interpretation of Hobbes was informed by a reading of 
Tacitus as well as Machiavelli, they contended, like them, that a republican form of 
40See The Radical Enlightenment, pp. 142-176,150-1,230 and The Newtonians and the English 
Revolution, p. 226. Pocock has argued that the English, unlike the Scots and other Europeans, spoke 
predominantly in the language of civic humanism (see chapt. 1 of this thesis). 
41Thomas Gordon, An Essay on Government (London, 1747), p. 14; also see pp. ii, 6,7,8,31,35- 
9. 
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government was best adapted in terms of man's psychology to produce stability. 42 
Trenchard and Gordon knew human nature to be the same everywhere and at all 
times and for men to be equally frail, both morally and physically. They knew too 
that the idea of a divinely ordained model of government was an absurdity and that 
in the `world politick', as in the `world natural', the governing principle was the 
relative power of material forces: 
[F]rom the nature of man, and of power itself, our government must at last 
centre in a democracy; for all power is of a growing nature, and men will 
always do what they can do, when they can meet no restraints, but what 
they put upon themselves 43 
From what Trenchard had to say elsewhere in his writings it is clear that this was 
not an endorsement of `radical democracy'. It was merely a rejection of an 
aristocratical form of government. For both Trenchard and Gordon, government by 
the best, a natural aristocracy, was an impossibility. 44 As already noted, on this 
point, as on many others, they differed from Bolingbroke. Even a noble character, 
they believed, if such existed, was soon corrupted by power. Constitutional checks 
had therefore to supply the defects of human nature. Following Hobbes, they 
argued men were inherently selfish and self-seeking. Given that they were also 
broadly equal, in terms of strength and abilities, if no artificial arbiter was 
42Gordon appears to have been acquainted with Pieter de la Court's The True Interest of Holland, to 
which he refers in the St. James's Journal, 13 August 1723. The True Interest was published in 
English translation in 1704; a translation of Fables, Moral and Political had already appeared in 
1703. From what has already been said of Trenchard's contacts with radical circles in Holland it is 
not unlikely that he, if not also Gordon, was aware of the de la Courts' other works, including 
Political Discourses and Political Balance. For a discussion of the reading of Tacitus and 
Machiavelli as republican writers see chapter 7 of this thesis. 
43John Trenchard, `On Elections', Essays on Important Subjects (London, 1755), p. 45, written 
under the signature of `Cato'. 
"Gordon insisted: `It is not blood or nature, but art or accident, which makes one man excel others. 
Aristotle, therefore, must either have been in jest, when he said that he, who naturally excelled all 
others, ought to govern all; or said it to flatter his pupil and prince, Alexander the Great. ', CL, I, no. 
45, pp. 307-8. 
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permitted to intrude the inevitable outcome was a lifetime of unremitting 
internecine struggle. It was to escape this state of perpetual hostility, and not 
through any instinct of benign sociability, that men submitted themselves to 
government. Men, they contended, were naturally distrustful of one another and 
`this made a great philosopher call the state of nature, a state of war' 45 So 
although their theory of government was Lockean their understanding of basic 
human nature resembled that of Hobbes. All that was possible was that men who 
were by nature selfish could be brought to realise that the surest way of satisfying 
their selfish desires was by not impeding the general interest 
Harrington also, of course, figured largely in Trenchard and Gordon's analysis but 
not, it would seem, in the manner described by Pocock. In The Machiavellian 
Moment, Pocock argues that Harrington's dominant purpose was the expression of 
individual virtue through civic participation. 46 Yet there is little evidence that there 
451bid., I, no. 33, p. 236. 
46See Machiavellian Moment, pp. 388-400. It is this expression of individual virtue through civic 
participation that appears central to the civic humanist or classical republican paradigm. Public 
virtue is the keynote term in the definition of the republican paradigm given by those historians 
whose names have become most strongly associated with it. Pocock has claimed the 'basic concept 
in republican thinking is virtus' and his readers must take him at his word. See `Cambridge 
paradigms and Scotch philosophers', p. 248. As Lance Banning, a stout defender of Pocock, has 
recently explained: `Pocock argued that the central theme of eighteenth-century British discourse - 
the fulcrum on which fundamental changes turned - was its preoccupation with the dangers posed to 
virtue by the growing role of commerce. ', `The Republican Interpretation: Retrospect and Prospect', 
The Republican Synthesis Revisited, ed. M. M. Klein, R. D. Brown, J. B. Hench (Worcester: 
American Antiquarian Society, 1992), pp. 91-117, at p. 109. Similarly, Gordon Wood also believes 
virtue to be at the heart of the republicanism of the American Revolution: `The sacrifice of 
individual interests to the greater good of the whole formed the essence of republicanism and 
comprehended for Americans the idealistic good of the Revolution. From this goal flowed all of the 
Americans' exhortatory literature and all that made their ideology truly revolutionary. This 
republican ideology both presumed and helped shape the Americans' conception of the way their 
society and politics should be structured and operated -a vision so divorced from the reality of 
American society, so contrary to the previous century of American experience that it alone was 
enough to make the Revolution one of the great utopian movements of American history. ', The 
Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969), p. 54. 
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was any great optimism on the part of Harrington, and certainly not on Trenchard 
and Gordon's part, that the practice of civic virtue alone might transform society. 47 
On this point, Trenchard and Gordon's position was a good deal closer to that of 
Harrington than to Pocock's neo-Harringtonian construct. The utopian republic 
depicted in Harrington's Oceana is one of institutional checks and balances which 
rather than allowing scope for its citizens to display their virtue is proof against 
their propensity for vice. `Give us good orders' Harrington argued `and they will 
make us good men. '48 Trenchard and Gordon concurred with Harrington. Men, 
they believed, were not generally by nature virtuous and, therefore, a civil 
constitution and legal framework had to supply this deficiency and impart the 
vigour necessary to sustain society, without which it would disintegrate. Man's 
self-interest and desire for power were so strong that they were incapable of 
However what is historically contingent, it would appear, is the way in which public virtue is 
exercised. Pocock outlines how in the Graeco-Roman world virtue would be expressed in direct 
participation in the political process, in ruling and being ruled in turn. For Florentine thinkers such 
as Machiavelli the virtue of the citizen was displayed predominantly in his role as a member of the 
city's militia. For neo-Harringtonians it was associated with opposition to a system of public credit, 
political patronage and standing armies. `It was in the course of criticizing, attacking and defending 
these perceived realities that the classic oppositions between virtue and fortune, virtue and 
corruption, were joined by a third, that between virtue and commerce. ' See 'Cambridge paradigms 
and Scotch philosophers', pp. 235-7,236-7. 
471bid., p. 399. As already noted, Pocock's account of the neo-Harringtonian inversion of 
Harrington's historical time-frame does not hold true for Trenchard and Gordon. See Machiavellian 
Moment, p. 420. Quite the opposite, they adhered to Harrington's unsepiaed view of Gothic 
government. See CL, I, no. 67, p. 473. They had no use for such a device precisely because their 
intention was not to denounce corruption in the terms described by Pocock. Trenchard and Gordon 
accepted Harrington in a more undiluted form than Pocock suggests but, like the de la Courts, they 
added elements which made the republic of Oceana more relevant to a commercial economy. On 
the other hand, and again contrary to Pocock's account, Trenchard and Gordon were ready to 
jettison certain Harringtonian principles, such as opposition to a standing army, or at least put them 
on hold until a present threat to the nation's liberty had passed. Indeed the surrender of principle on 
this point may not have been so keenly felt by Trenchard and Gordon in the face of a gradually 
changing society, in which the benefits to be derived from a division of labour may have begun to 
be perceived as of greater value than a citizen militia. 
48'Give us good Men, and they will make us good Laws, is the Maxim of a Demagog, and is (thro 
the alteration which is commonly perceivable in men, when they have the power to work their own 
Wills) exceeding fallible. But give us good Orders, and they will make us good Men, is the Maxim 
of a Legislator, and the most infallible in the Politics. ', James Harrington, `The Commonwealth of 
Oceana', The Oceana of James Harrington and His Other Works. With an Exact Account of We, 
Prefix 'd by John Toland (London, 1700), pp. 75-6. 
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internal check and had therefore to be controlled by external mechanisms 49 The 
imperfections of human nature, Harrington argued, had to be remedied by the 
structural mechanics of government: 
[T]he perfection of Government lys upon such a libration in the frame of it, 
that no Man or Men in or under it can have the interest; or having the 
interest, can have the power to disturb it with Sedition. 5° 
49Trenchard and Gordon did believe that men could be made to understand that their long term 
private interests were best served by subsuming their immediate desire to the public interest. See 
chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis. However this was only possible if constitutional mechanisms were in 
place which would offer equal protection to the rights of all. The de la Courts also seem to have 
been impressed by Harrington, Pieter de la Court addressed a manuscript on trade to him in 1674. 
See `Spinoza and Hobbes', p. 670. 
50'The Commonwealth of Oceana', p. 52. David Wootton has identified a number of problems with 
Pocock's analysis of republicanism, two of which centre on the latter's account of Harrington. 
Firstly, Wootton argues that in order to build a bridge from Machiavelli to Madison, Pocock plays 
down the significance of representative government. Machiavelli and Renaissance thinkers 
conceived of participatory politics in terms of the city-state. But in Wootton's view: `[o]ne of the 
reasons why Harrington is supremely important is that he adapts the civic tradition of republicanism 
to the nation state ... 
Harrington, because he thinks in terms of representation not participation, is 
able to cut the tie between republicanism and the city-state ... 
Harrington marks the death, not the 
continuation, of this classical republican tradition. ' Secondly, Wootton argues that Harrington's 
lack of preoccupation with virtue, and his reliance on constitutional mechanisms alone, places him 
in a line of thought to which Hume was heir. See `The Republican Tradition: From Commonwealth 
to Common Sense', pp. 14,15. It could be argued that Trenchard and Gordon similarly belong to 
this tradition. To a certain degree this is true. However, to talk of a `tradition' which descends from 
Harrington to Hume runs the risk of obscuring important differences. Moreover, it is precisely 
because Trenchard and Gordon appear so close to Hume on the issue of virtue - as on others such as 
religion (see chapter 4 of this thesis) - that it might be rash to draw too close a comparison. There 
are significant points of divergence in their political thought. Most obviously there is the different 
stand taken by Trenchard and Gordon on the one hand and Hume on the other regarding natural 
rights. Trenchard and Gordon, as has been shown (see chapter 2 of this thesis in particular), were 
unambiguous in their defence of natural rights. Hume was also more amenable to the idea of 
monarchy than were Trenchard and Gordon. It is hard to imagine they would have countenanced a 
'civilised' monarchy (to use Hume's term), no matter how benign, as opposed to a mixed 
constitution. 
This second point raises the question of whether Trenchard and Gordon might best be understood in 
terms of what Quentin Skinner has called the 'neo-roman' tradition in early modem political 
thought. In brief, at the risk of doing a disservice to the cogency of Skinner's argument, he contends 
that the defining division between the neo-roman and the liberal understanding of freedom is that 
neo-roman writers repudiate categorically the classical liberal assumption that force, or the coercive 
threat of it, constitutes the only form of constraint that interferes with individual liberty. They reject 
the proposition that no matter the form of government, be it a republic or a monarchy, the freedom 
is the same. `The neo-roman writers insist, by contrast, that to live in a condition of dependence is 
in itself a source and a form of constraint. As soon as you recognise that you are living in such a 
condition, this will serve in itself to constrain you from exercising a number of your civil rights. ' 
The idea of `dependence' is associated with the classical notion of servitude. Neo-roman theorists 
`assume that what it means to speak of a loss of liberty in the case of a body politic must be the 
same as in the case of an individual person'. And they go on to argue `in the clearest proclamation 
of their classical allegiances - that what it means for an individual person to suffer a loss of liberty 
is for that person to be made a slave. ' See Liberty Before Liberalism, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), pp. 84,36. There is little evidence, however, that Trenchard and Gordon 
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Trenchard and Gordon similarly looked to a system of government which would 
function effectively, that is, protect the interests of the people, regardless of the 
virtue of those who governed. They were political pragmatists who displayed a 
lack of confidence in civic virtue as a warrant of liberty. Following Harrington, 
they believed it was political institutions and not the virtue of a people and its 
leaders that ensured liberty. Gordon argued that `the making of laws supposes all 
men naturally wicked; and the surest mark of virtue is, the observation of laws that 
are virtuous: if therefore we would look for virtue in a nation, we must look for it 
in the nature of government'. 51 What he had in mind was a government that would 
operate, in his words, as a `piece of Clockwork', that would constrain men to act in 
the public interest and would not require the practice of virtue to oil its wheels. A 
study of men, he argued, showed that true virtue, free from self-interest, could not 
realistically be expected of men. Yet this was of no matter in terms of maintaining 
a free society. All that mattered was that men should find it in their own interest to 
serve the general good and punishable and parlous to oppose it. 52 
It was an idle dream, Trenchard and Gordon believed, to imagine corruption might 
be eliminated but it was possible to remove the opportunities which allowed it to 
flourish. Trenchard repeatedly urged that a commission should be established by 
parliament to police the collection and expenditure of public revenue. He also 
proposed that a register be set up, open to the public, in which members of 
thought in such terms. They favoured a republic over a monarchy purely because one was 
government by the rule of law and the other was government by personal prerogative. In the former 
man enjoyed the fullest possible possession of his liberty and in the latter he did not. Trenchard and 
Gordon consistently discussed liberty in `liberal' terms of freedom from constraint and not in terms 
of dependence. See, in particular, chapters 2 and 8 of this thesis. 
51 CL, I, no. 31, p. 222. 
52Ibid., I, no. 40, p. 282. 
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parliament should be legally bound to record all pensions, gratuities or favours 
received from the Crown and that failure to register receipt of such rewards be 
deemed a treasonable offence. Gordon likewise called for transparency and 
accountability in the raising and stewardship of revenue, insisting that the people 
should be informed of how their taxes were being spent and that parliament should 
ensure managers of the public coffers were made answerable for their actions. 53 
At the same time, their materialist philosophy, based on the sensationalism of 
Hobbes and Locke, viewed man as a mechanism driven by his desires and passions 
and in doing so they explained and validated a new market orientated society 
dominated by self-interest. 54 Walpole epitomised its worst excesses but that did 
not mean the system was reprehensible in itself - corruption after all was as old as 
human nature - merely that institutional guards had to be established and 
maintained in order to prevent an abuse of power, whether this be by trade 
monopolies or by government. A commercial republic was, therefore, presented by 
both Trenchard and Gordon and the de la Courts as most suited to man's nature. It 
allowed play to his dominant and inextinguishable passion, the fountainhead of all 
other passions, self-love, whilst keeping it within bounds by means of a 
constitutional and legal framework. 
53See John Trenchard, `Some Considerations upon the State of our Publick Debts in general, and of 
the Civil List in particular', A Collection of Tracts by the Late John Trenchard and Thomas 
Gordon; `On Offices and Corruption', Essays on Important Subjects; and Thomas Gordon, 'The 
Nature and Weight of the Taxes of the Nation', A Collection of Tracts by the Late John Trenchard 
and Thomas Gordon. 
54Contrary to what Jacob argues, therefore, in the case at least of these two `radical' Whigs the 
ideological implications of the natural philosophy and psychology they espoused were not at odds 
with Newtonianism, or rather not in the way she suggests. Indeed Trenchard and Gordon's adoption 
of Hobbesian materialism and Lockean epistemology permitted them to legitimise the ruling order, 
that is the new commercial society, more emphatically than the tools offered by Newtonianism 
would have allowed. 
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Trenchard and Gordon recognised, however, that institutional checks alone were 
not enough. It was necessary for the people to exercise vigilance in defence of 
their liberty. The difficulty though, Trenchard and Gordon realised, was how a 
society of self-interested men, for whom true civic virtue was an impossibility, 
could be prevailed upon to attend to the public interest. Like Locke, they suggested 
that man's first nature could be remoulded by education, that `Education alters 
nature'. 55 For Trenchard and Gordon, however, this second nature was as 
incapable of true virtue as the first. As appeals to reason were ineffective, that 
faculty being subordinate to the passions, for Trenchard and Gordon the process of 
education involved an address to a higher authority, that which Hume was later to 
call man's `calm desires'. The lesson to be learnt, they argued, was that by first 
serving the public interest man merely served his own long-term interest: `[T]he 
whole people, by consulting their own interest, consult the public, and act for the 
public by acting for themselves. '56 And the public interest was defined in terms of 
a wealthy and flourishing trading nation, not as a classical ideal: 
Nothing is so much the interest of private men, as to see the publick 
flourish: for without mentioning the pleasure and internal satisfaction 
which a generous mind must receive, in seeing all people about him 
contented and happy, instead of meagre and starved looks, nakedness and 
rags, and dejected and melancholy faces; to see all objects gay and pleasing; 
to see fruitful and well manured fields; rich splendid, and populous cities, 
instead of barren rocks, uncultivated deserts, and dispeopled and empty 
towns: I say, besides avoiding all this horror, every man's private advantage 
is so much wrapt up in the publick felicity, that by every step which he 
takes to depreciate his country's happiness, he undermines and destroys his 
own: when the publick is secure, and trade and commerce flourish every 
man who has property, or the means of acquiring property, will find and 
feel the blessed effects of such a circumstance of affairs; all the 
commodities which he has to dispose of will find a ready vent, and at a 
good price; his inheritance will increase every day in value; he is 
encouraged, and finds it his interest, to build, and improve his lands, 
55CL, II, no. 62, p. 431. 
561bid., I, no. 38, p. 271. 
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cultivate new trades, and promote new manufactures; and by these means 
the people will be employed, and enabled to live in plenty, to marry, 
increase, and pay for the productions of the land, which otherwise will have 
little or no production: foreigners will be invited to partake of our 
happiness, and add to the publick stock; and even the poor and helpless will 
have their share in the general felicity, arising from the superfluities and 
charity of the rich. 57 
Reason was not to be depended upon. Gordon dismissed the idea that men could 
be guided by pure reason, which would lead them on the path to truth. Every man, 
he argued, reasoned differently because he was moved by his passions and not by 
reason: 
So mechanical a thing is human judgment! So easily is the human machine 
disconcerted and put out of its tone! And the mind subsisting in it, and 
acting by it, is calm or ruffled as its vehicle is so. But though the various 
accidents and disorders happening to the body, are the certain causes of 
disorders and irregular operations in the mind; yet causes that are internal 
affect it still more; I mean the stimulations of ambition, revenge, lust, and 
avarice. These are the great causes of the several irregular and vicious 
pursuits of men. 
Neither is it to be expected, that men disagreeing in interest, will ever agree 
in judgment. Wrong, with advantages attending it, will be turned into right, 
falsehood into truth; and, as often as reason is against a man, a man will be 
against reason: And both truth and right, when they thwart the interests and 
passions of men, will be used like enemies, and called names. 58 
Avarice, however, was a unifying interest, common to most men. The desire for 
wealth, or avarice, was also one of man's strongest passions. Moreover, as 
Trenchard and Gordon argued, it could serve as one of the foundations of a free 
society. 59 For once men accepted that avarice was best satisfied under a 
government which protected the property of its subjects, they would realise that it 
57Ibid., II, no. 89, pp. 638-39. 
58Ibid., I, no. 47, p. 317. 
59As Trenchard observed: `[W]here the public is secure, and trade and commerce flourish, every 
man who has property, or the means of acquiring property, will find and feel the blessed effects of 
such a circumstance of affairs', ibid., II, no. 89, p. 639. 
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was in their private interest to give assiduous attention to the choice of their 
governors and maintain a vigilant watch over them once elected: 
[N]othing upon earth is of a more universal nature than government, and 
every private man upon earth has a concern in it, because in it is concerned, 
and nearly and immediately concerned, his virtues, his property, and the 
security of his person. 60 
For Trenchard and Gordon, as for Francis Hutcheson, the desire for wealth was 
laudable, at least in terms of its social effects, when achieved by lawful industry or 
`honest commerce'. And like Mandeville and Hume they saw man's unsatisfied 
desires as the driving force of progress and civilisation. Once the basic needs of 
the body were satisfied man sought new means of gratification: 
As soon as men are freed from the importunities of hunger and cold; the 
thoughts and desire of conveniency, plenty, ornament, and politeness, do 
presently succeed: and then follow after, in very quick progression, 
emulation, ambition, profusion, and the love of power: and all these, under 
proper regulations, contribute to the happiness, wealth, and security of 
societies. 61 
The sensationalist philosophy of Hobbes and Locke helped provide Trenchard and 
Gordon with a rationale for the modern commercial age. For them, man was 
defined by his limitless desire, fired by imagination, rather than by his reason: 
[N]ew acquisitions bring new wants; and imaginary wants are as pungent as 
real ones. So that there is the same end of wishing and of living, and death 
only can still the appetites. 62 
601bid., I, no. 38, p. 269. 
61Ibid., I, no. 67, p. 473. 
62Ibid., I, no. 40, p. 278. Hobbes had claimed: `[T]here is no such thing as perpetuall Tranquillity 
of mind while we live here; because Life it seife is but Motion, and can never be without Desire, nor 
without Feare, no more than without Sense.. . For there is no such Finis ultimus (utmost ayme) nor Summum Bonum (greatest Good) as is spoken of in the Books of the old Morall Philosophers. Nor 
can a man any more live, whose Desires are at an end, then he, whose Senses and Imaginations are 
at a stand. Felicity is a continuall progresse of the desire from one object to another; the attaining of 
the former, being still but the way to the later. ', Leviathan, (London: Penguin, 1985), pp. 129-30. 
99 
The definition of man as a pleasure-seeking creature naturalised the pursuit of 
wealth and presented it as morally neutral, hedged of course by the proviso that no 
one should be harmed in the process: 
[S]ince the mind of men, like every thing else in nature, is in constant 
progression, and in perpetual pursuit of one thing or other, I do not 
condemn the moderate pursuit of wealth if we do not buy it too dear, and at 
the price of our health or integrity. 63 
For Trenchard and Gordon, Hobbesian and Lockean epistemology, and behind that 
the modem tradition of Bacon and Newton, were all of one piece with their moral, 
political and religious thought. All men were the same, Trenchard argued, and they 
had common failings because they were like `machines or systems of nature'. In 
the case of all life forms, each plant and animal system, or species, had a distinct 
identity. Men differed from other systems only in that they were composed of 
`vastly finer and more numerous parts ... capable of more operations'. Whilst one 
of these operations was the facility for reflection, Gordon argued man was 
nevertheless ruled by his passions and observed, quoting La Rochefoucauld, `that 
the understanding is the dupe or tool of the heart, that is our sentiments follow our 
passions'. Man was by nature selfish, a self-focused machine `who naturally 
pursues what is pleasant or profitable in his own eyes, though in doing it he entails 
63CL, II, no. 102, p. 726. It is because Trenchard and Gordon viewed the pursuit of wealth and 
material possessions as a legitimate pursuit and mental tranquillity as an unachievable goal that it 
seems problematic to label their thought Epicurean. Both Trenchard and Gordon would probably 
have been familiar with a rehabilitated Epicurus through translations of Gassendi's commentaries on 
the Greek philosopher, such as Three Discourses of Happiness, Virtue and Liberty. Collected from 
the World of the Learn 'd Gassendi by Monsieur Berner (London, 1699). Gordon also refers in 
Cato's Letters to Bayle's favourable entry on Epicurus in his Dictionary. Trenchard was aware of, 
and in sympathy with, Epicurus' views on the nature of God. See chapter 4 of this thesis. Of course, 
both Trenchard and Gordon also had much in common with the French Epicurean tradition of the 
late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, which was not antagonistic to worldliness. 
Trenchard and Gordon wrote approvingly of literary moralistes such as St. Evremond but there were 
important differences in their thought, such as in their definition of virtue. See chapter 6 of this 
thesis. 
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misery upon multitudes' and was capable of exhibiting only a simulacrum of 
virtue. 
As one of Trenchard and Gordon's critics recognised, the sensationalist philosophy 
of Locke's An Essay concerning Human Understanding and Hobbes' Leviathan 
could be used not only to explain but to justify ministerial corruption. It was seen 
to have political as well as moral implications. In a letter written to the London 
Journal after Trenchard and Gordon's departure, `Philaretus' deliberately 
misquoted the Letters, whilst retaining the spirit of Trenchard's sensationalism, and 
in doing so presented Trenchard and Gordon as Court apologists: 
"You are only Machines, of one particular Frame, call'd the Ministerial, 
who must be acted upon in the Manner You are: and I Myself don't find 
Fault, because there can be Blame in You, but because as I am a Machine of 
another particular Frame, call'd the Patriotical, I cannot help it. I do assure 
You, as it is with You, and all the World, so it is with Me. I neither move, 
nor act, but am moved, and acted upon, without any Will or Choice of my 
own; and therefore, truly and philosophically speaking, have no Virtue, and 
can neither deserve, no expect, the Praise of Good Actions. " And thus 
ends the glorious Scheme of making Ministers VIRTUOUS, and the World 
UNCORRUPT. 64 
In another letter, written shortly afterwards to Trenchard and Gordon's new home 
at the British Journal, `Popicola' made it clear that he believed `Cato's' sympathies 
inclined towards Walpole's ministry rather than to a Country or Tory Opposition: 
Your answerable Arguments concerning our Spring of Action, are perverted 
to maintain the most enormous Villanies. I have seen a late Epistle to that 
Purpose, with several strained Allusions to Clock-work. It supposes 
(amongst other Curiosities) two Clocks; the one a Court Clock, and the 
other a Country Clock; and concludes, that if the Court Clock does not go 
as well as the Country Clock, yet the Country Clock can't reproach the 
Court Clock, nor vaunt its own Perfections, since they both move alike by 
Necessity. Now, Sir, I apprehend this to be a sophistical Way of 
Reasoning, for a Court Clock, however splendid or valuable to outward 
64London Journal, 2 March 1723. 
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Appearance, (if it goes amiss) ought to be examined into and, if possible, 
set to go right; but if, upon Enquiry, it be found faulty beyond a Possibility 
of Amendment, then it must (like one of the inferior Sort) be sentenc'd to a 
Dissolution. 65 
It is difficult to square Trenchard and Gordon's rejection of the idea of man as a 
`free agent' and the idea of virtue as anything but a social construction with the 
image of the authors of Cato's Letters presented by Pocock. 66 They could not hold 
these beliefs and at the same time believe in the civic humanist idea of an 
autonomous, rational individual whose nature as man was only truly realised 
through the practice of virtue. Clearly, it was not the Aristotelian tradition, with the 
image of man as a zoon politikon, which formed the basis of Cato's Letters, rather 
they bear the impress of the natural law tradition of Grotius, Selden and Hobbes, 
grounded on the central premise of man's overarching self-interest. 67 Equally, the 
Letters were shaped by the materialist and sensationalist philosophy of Hobbes and 
Locke, providing validation and a firmer `scientific' basis for a perspective which 
viewed man as primarily a property owning individual. Consequently Trenchard 
and Gordon's republic, in common with that of the de la Court brothers, was built 
on very different foundations to those of the civic humanist ideal and the impact of 
classical influences on Cato's Letters was largely confined to its rhetorical facade. 
65British Journal, 16 March 1722. The letters written by 'Philaretus' and `Popicola' were in reply 
to a number of Trenchard's letters in which he denied that man was a `free being'. See footnote no. 
13 above. 
66Trenchard dismissed the opinion that virtue was 'a sort of real being [that] subsists in its own 
nature', CL, II, no. 109, p. 767. 
67Besides numerous direct or indirect references to Hobbes and Locke, Gordon also cited Grotius, 
Pufendorf and Selden in his writings. See `An Account of the Author', p. 6; An Essay on 
Government; and CL, I, no. 44, pp. 299,301, and II, no. 116, p. 808. 
Chapter IV 
`Neo-Harringtonianism' and Deism 
Since the eighteenth century historians have noted a recurrent link in late 
seventeenth century and early eighteenth century England between what has 
recently been termed `neo-Harringtonian' republicanism and deism. Pocock 
believes the two developments display a shared continuity with Puritanism and that 
they carried on the latter's crusade against Church interference in state affairs. 
' 
Earlier historians were struck by a similar association of ideas during the English 
civil war. In his History of Great Britain David Hume included deists amongst 
those who constituted the republican party, placing Harrington and Sidney at their 
head, and recorded that they had no other object than political liberty. 2 And in `Of 
Superstition and Enthusiasm', he observed that deists and Independents whilst 
most opposite in their religious views were united by their political principles 
during the civil war. 3 
In recent years Margaret Jacob has written at length, and somewhat controversially, 
on this connection after the 1688 Revolution, presenting it as a conjunction of 
radical politics on the one hand and radical philosophy and science on the other, set 
in opposition to the status quo, that is to the reactionary conservatism of both Court 
'Pocock regards as noteworthy the `high degree of correlation in the early eighteenth century 
between neo-Harrington republicanism and deism' and observes `republicanism and deism, alike 
carried on the English and Puritan crusade against a clergy enjoying separate or jure divino 
authority', Machiavellian Moment, pp. 476-7. 
'See Günter Gawlick, `Hume and the Deists: a Reconsideration', in David Hume: Bicentenary 
Papers, ed. G. P. Morice (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1977), pp. 128-138, at p. 132. 3See David Hume, `Of Superstition and Enthusiasm', Essays Moral, Political, and Literary 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1985), pp. 78-9. 
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Whiggery and Newtonianism 4 Rejecting what she sees as the simplistic 
assumption that at every turn Newtonian natural philosophy fostered the 
intellectual revolution which is at the heart of so much of modem thought and 
belief, Jacob recasts it as a bulwark against a radicalism that might more correctly 
be seen as the inspiration for later Enlightenment thinkers. Newtonian 
enlightenment, Jacob insists, far from preparing the ground for the deists of the 
Enlightenment was seen by its participants as a vast holding operation against 
materialism and its concomitant republicanism. s 
In England, Jacob contends, Newtonian natural philosophy was championed by 
those sections of society who saw their interests represented and safeguarded by a 
conservative Whig government and the moderate Anglicanism of the Low Church 
episcopacy. Jacob persuasively argues that early Newtonians, liberal Anglicans, 
presented the great man's system and their natural religion as `justification for the 
pursuit of "sober self-interest" and for the maintenance of property and social 
hierarchy within a cosmically ordered, regulated and stable market society. ' 
Newtonianism naturalised a political doctrine that ordered society according to the 
mechanical laws of balanced government rather than the arbitrary will of an 
absolute ruler, yet at the same time it reinforced the notion of a natural hierarchy 
necessary to both the operation of the universe and the functioning of society. In 
4Jacob's analysis of the nature of radicalism in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century has 
been touched upon very briefly in chapter 3 of this thesis, in the broader context of her discussion of 
the connection between the `world natural' and the `world politick'. In this chapter, her contention 
that philosophical radicalism translated into political radicalism is examined in relation to the neo- 
Harringtonians. 
5See The Radical Enlightenment and The Newtonians and the English Revolution, passim. The 
version of Enlightenment history Jacob is reacting against is that presented by those such as Cassirer 
and Westfall. 
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this way it was able to present both High Church Tory adherents of the doctrine of 
divine right as well as republicans, of whatever hue, as dangerous subversives who 
threatened the constitutional balance of the nation and therefore its liberty and 
prosperity. Newton's followers, Jacob argues, `preached his science and natural 
philosophy, with Newton's consent, as the philosophical underpinning of a social 
and political vision'. 6 
It is a weighty assertion and one which is only partly supported by the evidence. 
Whilst Jacob presents a valuable re-evaluation of Newtonianism, and her 
characterisation of it as a politically and socially conservative force appears borne 
out by an examination of contemporary texts and manuscripts, she would seem to 
have been rightly criticised for claiming too large an ideological role for science in 
the eighteenth century. Equally, however, it would be a-mistake to relegate science 
to a position of minor social and political influence. 7 Political pamphleteers of the 
period, as well as philosophers and scientists, persistently imbued Newtonianism 
with social, political and moral meaning and actively employed it as a tool in 
ideological debate. In The Newtonian System of the World, Desagliers, a 
prominent Newtonian and supporter of the Whig administration, explicitly and 
relentlessly drove home the parallel between the physical and political worlds, 
6M. C. Jacob, `Newtonian Science and the Radical Enlightenment', Vistas in Astronomy, 32 (1979), 
545-55, at 547. 
7Roy Porter has criticised Jacob's claim that science was an `essential' weapon in the eighteenth 
century ideological armoury for explicating and legitimating economic and political relations. See 
'Review', Social History, 31 (1978), 246-9. In doing so he provides a necessary corrective to 
Jacob's over-extension of her thesis. However, he travels too far in the opposite direction by 
ignoring the way in which science was harnessed to political debate and formed a significant 
component of the ideological battle between the ancients and modems. 
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pointing up the symmetry between two perfect systems, demonstrated by Newton 
in one case and Walpole in the other: 
I have consider'd Government as a Phaenomenon, and look'd upon that 
Form of it to be most perfect, which did most nearly resemble the Natural 
Government of our System, according to the Laws settled by the All-wise 
and Almighty Architect of the Universe ... The limited Monarchy, whereby 
our Liberties, rights and Privileges are so well secured to us, as to make us 
happier than all the Nations round about us, seems to be a lively Image of 
our System; and the Happiness that we enjoy under His present Majesty's 
Government, makes us sensible that ATTRACTION [universal gravity] is 8 now as universal in the Political, as the Philosophical World. 
It is hardly surprising that some High Church Tories chose to reject a Newtonian 
order which validated political and religious principles to which they were 
opposed. In John Hutchinson's natural philosophy, however, as C. B. Wilde has 
shown, they found a system which represented their interests and vision. 
Hutchinson's system, like that of Toland and his associates but most unlike that of 
Newton, was self-sufficiently mechanical, a perpetual motion machine which 
functioned without the intervention of God. 9 At the same time, Hutchinson 
believed the bible was philosophically true in every detail and that Hebrew 
contained the key to all knowledge, natural and spiritual. His physico-theology 
was emphatically Christo-centric and Trinitarian and offered a defence of 
theological tenets which High Church Anglicans felt were under attack from 
Socinians and Arians as well as Dissenters. He claimed Newtonian philosophy 
was a perversion of knowledge found in Genesis and that all which was true in 
8J. T. Desaguliers, The Newtonian System of the World, The Best Model of Government (London, 
1728), pp. iii-v. 
9The marriage in Hutchinsonianism of a mechanical system more radical than Newton's - in which 
an immanent God had no place - and political conservatism would tend to give the lie to Jacob's 
somewhat simplistic equation. Of course, it also runs counter to a commonly recognised pattern in 
which organic rather than mechanical theories of nature are seen as lending themselves to a 
traditional, hierachical perspective. 
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Newtonianism was derived from that source. His system, he insisted, 
demonstrated the scriptural origins of the doctrine of the Trinity and showed how it 
could be empirically verified in nature. Using scripture he also mounted a defence 
of divine right and, although Hutchinsonians claimed they stood apart from party 
divisions, the political implications of their system was obvious to their opponents. 
Whilst the Whigs held power Hutchinsonians were never preferred to positions of 
influence. lo 
Wilde considers his work provides indirect support to Jacob's argument that 
Latitudinarians were committed to defending the Whig constitution and used 
Newtonianism as its philosophical underpinning. He does not touch on Jacob's 
analysis of the opposition between radicals and Latitudinarians. However, it is 
here that Jacob's thesis breaks down. Her presentation of Newtonianism as a force 
of conservatism rather than as a progenitor of Enlightenment ideals seems 
eminently convincing. However she is completely unconvincing in her portrayal of 
English philosophic radicals as political radicals and in her representation of 
Latitudinarian Newtonians as a homogenous mass who stood four square against 
them. Her analysis ignores a rich diversity of opinion within both groups as well as 
important points of convergence between Low Churchmen and radicals. She 
presents not merely a simplified but a misleading picture when she argues `[j]ust as 
the science, natural religion and political ideology of the Newtonians was of a 
piece, so too ... radical critics of the status quo articulated an alternative vision that 
1°See C. B. Wilde, `Hutchinsonianism Natural Philosophy and Religious controversy in Eighteenth 
Century Britain', History of Science, 18 (1980), 1-24. 
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encompassed prescriptions for political action, a social program based upon 
scientific methodology and an entirely new religion of nature. ' 1t 
Jacob draws a picture of radical Whigs doubly disillusioned and disaffected. On 
the one hand, she argues, they were critical of the course taken by their party 
leaders once in power, believing they had betrayed their `Revolution Principles' of 
balanced government and civil liberty. Similarly, it was clear to them, she 
believes, that the scientific revolution's principle of unfettered rational enquiry had 
been circumscribed by the Latitudinarian counteroffensive against materialism of 
the kind propounded by Hobbes and Spinoza. Materialist systems were seen by 
their opponents as undermining existing hierarchies of power and, therefore, were 
perceived as a threat not just to the position of the established Church but also to 
the nation's social and political order. 
Jacob's radicals include Anthony Collins, Matthew Tindal, John Trenchard and, 
pre-eminently, John Toland, yet none of these subscribed to the democratic or 
levelling programme she seeks to ascribe to them. Indeed they vehemently denied 
any such aim. They denied it not to deflect the criticism of opponents, who were 
quick to damn them in the eyes of the public as republicans, but because they were 
all committed to a Whig government which they believed, despite its 
imperfections, offered their countrymen the only realistic prospect of religious, 
political and economic freedom. 12 Toland, therefore, apparently found no 
"Newtonian Science and the Radical Enlightenment', 548. 
12There is an obvious logic to Jacob's argument. Men who denied a hierarchy of spirit and matter 
and who viewed the universe as mere undifferentiated matter, differently modified, in a ceaseless 
108 
contradiction in holding to the socially and politically conservative views of his 
day whilst entertaining a deeply radical philosophical belief. 
It is incorrect to argue, as both Pocock and Jacob do, that Toland and his associates 
should be seen as adamant opponents of successive Whig administrations and of 
the socio-economic changes brought about in the wake of the financial revolution 
of the late seventeenth century. 13 To do so misreads the issues which were of 
central importance to them, chief amongst which was religious liberty and 
toleration. For Toland liberty meant essentially liberty of conscience. In its train 
followed other liberties, amongst which he numbered a free press and free trade, 
but fundamentally he defined liberty as the absence of restraint rather than in terms 
of the civic humanist model of man's freedom to fulfill his role as a political 
animal. Robert Sullivan is right in saying that Toland's work incorporated both 
negative and positive concepts of liberty and they interpenetrated rather than 
coexisted. 14 However, there is also a subtle but important difference between the 
way Toland employed these two concepts. Whilst negative liberty constituted the 
substance of his belief he, like his contemporaries, dressed it in the rhetoric of 
positive liberty. That it was at bottom empty rhetoric is apparent from the ease 
with which the embodiments of positive liberty, frequent elections and a citizen 
militia, were sacrificed to negative liberty, that is to freedom of conscience. 
motion of decay and reconstitution might reasonably be expected to translate a belief in matter 
devoid of essential distinction into a belief in a society equally devoid of distinction. Unfortunately 
for Jacob's thesis, however, and as Trenchard and Gordon never tired of telling their readers, men 
seldom reason according to the rules of strict logic, especially where their interests are engaged. 13It must be emphasised that although Pocock and Jacob represent those they style `radicals' as 
ideological opponents of the Whig order, they offer different interpretations of the basis of that 
opposition. Pocock, unlike Jacob, never suggests that their philosophic radicalism correlated with a 
belief in republican government on a democratic model. 14See R. E. Sullivan, John Toland and the Deist Controversy (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1982), p. 161. 
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Like Dutch republicans, Toland saw toleration as the spring of economic prosperity 
and his arguments echoed those of Johan and Pieter de la Court. Both he and they 
insisted that persecution drove out industrious God-fearing and law abiding men, 
who chose conscience over hypocrisy. Following the de la Courts, he argued it 
allowed more tolerant nations, who offered religious refugees a haven, to reap the 
benefit of their labour and wealth. Or where heavy fines were exacted for 
nonconformity, persecution acted as a disincentive to industry. It also restricted 
man in the search for religious truth, which could only be pursued through the 
exercise of his reason: 
The Liberty of the Understanding is yet a nobler Principle than that of the 
Body, if this be not a Distinction (as we say) without a Difference; and 
where there is no Liberty of Conscience there can be no Civil Liberty, no 
Incouragement for Industry, no proper means of rendering the Contry 
populous, no possibility of Men's freely informing themselves concerning 
the true Religion, nor any Refuge or Protection for the Distrest, which is the 
greatest Glory of free Governments. 15 
For Toland and most of his fellow freethinkers, liberty was closely bound up with 
the notion of man as a reasoning, autonomous individual and not primarily as a 
citizen. They viewed liberty principally in terms of religious or intellectual 
freedom, the liberty to think as one chose and to express one's opinions without 
persecution or restraint and without discrimination, such as that suffered by 
Dissenters under the Test Acts. Matthew Tindal championed freedom of the press 
not merely because he saw it as a safeguard of political liberty but because he 
"John Toland, Anglia Liberia (London, 1701), p. 100. See also Pieter de la Court, The True 
Interest and Political Maxims of the Republick of Holland and West-Friesland, pp. 65-6,81. 
Toland, more magnanimous than most of his fellow Commonwealthmen, advocated tolerance not 
merely for Dissenters but also Jews, atheists, Unitarians, Mohammedans and even loyal Catholics. 
See Caroline Robbins, The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthmen (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1959), p. 11. 
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believed it to be the only defence of liberty of conscience. He and other neo- 
Harringtonians valued political liberty for instrumental reasons rather than because 
they viewed it as the means by which man exhibited virtue and thereby achieved 
what as a political animal he had been framed to achieve. As freethinkers first and 
Commonwealthmen second, they supported the idea of political liberty and a 
`republic' on the British model of balanced government because it offered a man 
greater freedom to exercise his reason and therefore to realise more fully that 
aspect of his nature which defined him as man. The greatest enjoyment, or 
fulfilment, rational and sociable creatures were capable of, Tindal argued, was the 
employment of their thoughts on what they pleased and to be able to communicate 
them freely, `herein, consists the Dignity and Freedom of Human Nature, without 
which no other Liberty can be secure'. 16 That the neo-Harringtonians were 
prepared to sacrifice the `Country' principles ascribed to them in order to secure 
this end indicates where their priorities lay. 
Pocock presents Toland and his fellow radicals as `Country ideologists in the full 
sense of the term', vehemently opposed to standing armies, placemen, government 
corruption and a burgeoning national debt. '? Yet although Toland inveighed 
against all of these at one time or another he was also prepared to countenance 
them, or at least to turn a blind eye, when the need arose. In 1717, and on into 
1718, he felt able to set aside his opposition to the principle of a standing army and 
remained mute in the face of the Whig ministry's refusal to reduce the size of land 
16Matthew Tindal, 'Of the Liberty of the Press', Four Discourses (London, 1709), p. 319. '7See J. G. A. Pocock, 'Machiavelli, Harrington, and English Political Ideologies in the Eighteenth 
Century', William and Mary Quarterly, 22 (1965), 548-83, at 574. 
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forces expanded in response to the Jacobite danger exposed by discovery of the 
Gyllenburg plot. 18 However his reticence may perhaps be explained by reference 
to the turmoil caused by a split in the Whig ministry in 1717 and his consequent 
concern to bolster an administration under attack from both Tories and renegade 
Whigs. 19 Walpole had broken with Sunderland and Stanhope over foreign policy, 
resigning his position at the head of the Treasury, and together with Townshend 
had retreated into opposition. He joined with the Tories over the standing army 
issue and damned himself in the eyes of many Whigs by opposing the Bill 
introduced by Stanhope for the repeal of the Occasional Conformity and Schism 
Act and the nullification of the Test and Corporation Acts. Toland chose to support 
Sunderland and Stanhope and therefore refrained at this juncture from adding his 
voice to the `Country' opposition to a standing army. 20 In The Second Part of the 
State Anatomy, he criticised the opposition ruse of resurrecting and reprinting anti- 
standing army literature dating from William's reign and implied that whilst such a 
stance was justified in earlier years present circumstances demanded a different 
response. 1 
'SMolesworth, another stalwart critic of standing armies also recanted. In a Commons debate in 
1718, when he spoke on the side of government in support of the maintenance of a professional 
fighting force, he suffered the indignity of hearing extracts from his An Account of Denmark, in 
which he attacked standing armies, quoted back at him. 
19For an account of the Whig split see The Growth of Parliamentary Parties, pp. 161-8. 
20Anthony Collins, like Toland, also supported the Mutiny Bill introduced by the ministry, and 
opposed by Walpole, in January 1717. In a letter to his friend Desmaizeaux, dated 24 February, 
Collins writes of news received from Toland that such progress had been made by the Bill that its 
success was almost certainly assured. He goes on to express incredulity at the lies told about the 
Bill, including the rumour that it was an attempt to quarter the army on Tory innkeepers. See 
Letters to M. Des Maizeaux, British Library, MS 4282, f. 141, letter dated 25 February 1717. 
21John Toland, The Second Part of the State Anatomy (London, 1717), p. 33. 
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Tindal, his fellow freethinker and `commonwealthman', also threw his weight 
behind the ministry and launched an excoriating attack on Walpole in The 
Defection Consider'd. In this tract he represented the defectors as traitors who, by 
dividing the Whigs, had revived the hopes of the Pretender and therefore 
necessitated the Septennial Act. Walpole was accused of `Luciferian Pride' and 
ingratitude and compared to an earlier sower of discord amongst the Whigs, Robert 
Harley. The `two R[obert]s', as Tindal dubbed them, are judged to be made in the 
same pattern, self-serving and unprincipled, as proved by their desertion of the 
Dissenters, despite promises to repeal discriminatory Acts. 2 
Tellingly, some years earlier, Toland and other habitues of the Grecian Inn had also 
remained silent in the face of the struggle between Whigs and Tories over the 
proposed place provisions in the 1705 Regency Bill. Their silence occurred at a 
time when to speak out would have served only to add to the rising crescendo of 
anti-Whig sentiment which threatened to engulf the government. Godolphin's 
moderate administration had come under sustained attack from those members of 
his party who felt he had betrayed both them and the Church, following a general 
election which had seen parliamentary gains for the Whigs. The offensive reached 
a pitch with the introduction of a motion by High Church Tories on the theme of 
`The Church in Danger', calling into question the administration's commitment to 
22See Matthew Tindal, The Defection Consider 'd, and the Designs of those, who divided the 
Friends of the Government, set in a True Light (London, 1717). By 1722, and in the wake of the 
discovery of the Atterbury plot, Tindal had changed his tune and, in A Defense of our present 
Happy Establishment and the Administration Vindicated, was supporting Walpole's ministry 
against attacks from critics. One of Tindal's targets was Cato's Letters, however by this point 
'Cato' had also changed tack, realising that he was merely supplying ammunition to the Tories at a 
time when the threat of a Jacobite rebellion had become tangible once again. 
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safeguarding the position of the Anglican establishment. 23 Toland's The Memorial 
of the State of England In Vindication of the Queen, the Church, and the 
Administration is a response to this Tory onslaught and specifically a reply to 
James Drake's pamphlet, The Memorial of the Church of England. Toland's 
answer to Drake defended Godolphin, praising his `incomparable management and 
zeal for the Church', and lauded Sunderland as the `ablest Statesman of his 
Time'. 24 Brushing aside any suggestions that the Dissenters represented any danger 
to the Church, he argued they desired only a toleration, which is what they 
deserved as loyal subjects. The Memorial, therefore, indicates that Toland was 
prepared to set aside his opposition to placemen in 1705 in order to confront what 
he saw as the more pressing threat posed by the ambition of the High Church party, 
whose members were attempting to work the nation into a fever over the supposed 
danger to the Church as a means of precipitating a backlash against Dissenters and 
Whigs, who were represented by Tories as being synonymous. 
So too, frequent elections, another key plank of the neo-Harringtonian programme 
elucidated by Pocock, may have been a goal close to the heart of Toland and his 
fellow `radicals'. Yet both he and they were prepared to abandon it, at least 
temporarily, in 1716 in the hope that by allowing the Whig administration time to 
implement legislation opposed by High Church Tories, a greater proportion of the 
nation would enjoy the religious and civil liberties which were then the preserve of 
members of the established Church. In the State Anatomy Toland supplied 
23For an account of the events of 1705 see The Growth of Parliamentary Parties, pp. 105-7. 24 John Toland, The Memorial of the State of England In Vindication of the Queen, the Church, and 
the Administration (London, 1705), pp. 66,82. 
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justifications for the introduction of the Septennial Act. However, at the same 
time, he reminded the government that it must now follow through and fulfil the 
expectations of those Whigs who gave their vote to the Bill because they believed 
it would result in measures to safeguard further the Church and the state from the 
`popish faction' and ensure that the Dissenters were eased of hardships and bars to 
office. 25 Prior to a vote on the Act, Walter Moyle, Trenchard's collaborator on the 
opposition side of the pamphlet wars over standing armies in the last decade of the 
eighteenth century, wrote confidently to Horatio Walpole: 
No motion was at first treated with more coldness, the politicians of the 
Grecian and the neighbouring coffee-houses, fired with uncommon warmth, 
bellow'd aloud against it, but time and good arguments make them espouse 
the quite contrary opinion; you may depend on it, this bill in spite of all the 
drunken mercenary borough's letters, petitions, and remonstrances will be 
carried through the House of Commons by a considerable majority. 26 
Pocock does not ignore the backing given by prominent `commonwealthmen' to 
the Septennial Act and indeed mentions that Molesworth, Toland and Trenchard all 
accepted it mutely. However he fails to put their acceptance of the Act into any 
meaningful context, choosing to gloss over it. Discussing `Cato's' stance in favour 
of frequent elections, Pocock remarks that `nothing is said [in Cato's Letters] of 
the fact that Trenchard had supported the Septennial Act in 1717s27 It might be 
observed in turn that Pocock has nothing to say about why Trenchard should have 
been moved seemingly to compromise his principles. For Pocock to do so, 
"See John Toland, State Anatomy (London, 1717), pp. 40-1. 
26Mr. Moyle to Horace Walpole, April 20 1716, Memoirs of the Life and Administration of Sir 
Robert Walpole, ed. William Cox, 3 vols. (London, 1798), II, p. 62. After the vote Moyle wrote 
again to Horace Walpole: 'It must be own'd the whiggs when it was first propos'd did not relish it at 
all, but these arguments and the necessity of the times converted them ... [I]t is now evident that they should like what they have done the better, because there is not a Jacobite who does not rail 
aloud against it, which confesses a disappointment and that we have broke their schemes. ', II, pp. 
62-4. 
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however, would risk admitting the possibility that the position of Trenchard, and 
that of his associates, towards the Whig establishment was more nuanced than his 
neo-Harringtonian thesis would suggest. They were all periodic critics of Whig 
government but they were not ideologically opposed to the emergent status quo and 
the changes wrought by the financial revolution which had been launched in the 
late seventeenth century. 
As Pocock would have it, Toland and his fellow neo-Harringtonians fiercely 
denounced the transition from a society based on landed property, the function of 
which was to maintain the reality of personal autonomy, liberty and virtue, to one 
defined by the morally and politically corrupting influence of mobile property. Yet 
Toland never aligned himself on the side of the landed interest in opposition to the 
money men of the City. On the contrary, a sizeable proportion of the City's 
financial community were Dissenters, whose cause Toland consistently 
championed throughout his career. He dedicated his edition of Harrington's works 
to the municipal authorities and declared the constitution of the Bank of England to 
be the embodiment of Harrington's commonwealth. " One of his chief patrons was 
Sir Robert Clayton, a prominent Whig financier and a director of the Bank of 
England. It was on the advice of another notable City figure, Sir Theodore 
Janssen, a wealthy Tory public creditor, that Toland borrowed a not inconsiderable 
27Machiavellian Moment, p. 473. 
28Pocock does note the dedication included in Toland's edition of the works of Harrington. 
However, he dismisses it as doubtless an instance of Toland 'hedging his political bets' -a plausible 
interpretation. Less plausibly, he characterises it as indicative of the moral ambivalence about 
commerce and credit felt by eighteenth century men: `It is evident also that they were 
conceptualizing their common experience of a new politics and economics in ways which left them 
acutely aware that change was going on in both the material and the moral world, and that their 
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sum in order to invest in the South Sea Company, in the hope that his foray into 
stockjobbing would secure him an annuity sufficient to allow him a measure of 
financial independence. 29 Both he and his fellow `commonwealthman' 
Molesworth suffered badly when the bubble burst and the sting of personal loss is 
likely to have added edge to the Viscount's sustained and voluble attack on the 
Company's directors and those ministers who shielded them. Like Trenchard and 
Gordon, Toland and Molesworth objected to the lack of government policing of 
financial markets, particularly to their use as a vehicle for Court patronage, not to 
the idea of the markets themselves. 
It is also difficult to justify the view that the neo-Harringtonians were ideologically 
opposed to the Whig establishment in the face of evidence that they were ready not 
only to rally to its defence in time of need but to serve it actively and to solicit 
Court leaders to obtain preferment. Whilst other Whigs scorned Harley after he 
moved during Anne's reign to the head of the Court party, both Molesworth and 
Toland retained their association with him. In the case of Toland, he continued to 
offer Harley his services and to petition him for a reward for past services 
undertaken on the minister's behalf. Yet even as a supplicant he felt it necessary to 
remind Harley of what he took to be a shared commitment to religious toleration, 
claiming in a letter to the minister that he could not imagine `that you should not 
strenuously support the legal Toleration, ay and the general Naturalization too, in 
their utmost latitude', these being `the main springs and secrets of making any 
means of evaluating such changes led to a profound consciousness of moral ambiguity. ', 
Machiavellian Moment, pp. 449-50. 29See John Toland and the Deist Controversy, pp. 164,13 and 37. 
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country flourish in wealth and Learning, in arts and arms. ' He may have remained 
loyal to Harley in part out of ambition and self-interest but he also did so, and 
thereby appeared to collude in a betrayal of Country ideals, because he believed the 
Court leader had changed his party but not his principles. For Toland, Harley still 
therefore promised to hold out the best hope for securing those goals to which he 
was most ardently attached. On these he refused to compromise and, in the same 
letter to Harley, he identified his guiding principles: 
The special ones of usefully serving your Lordship, and securing a 
competent maintenance to my self, are supposed of course. But the general 
ones with me are unalterable and indispensable, are Civil Liberty, religious 
Toleration, and the Protestant Succession ... To obviate any 
misunderstanding, my LORD, I mean no more by Liberty than a 
government of Laws and not of will, particularly our own excellent 
constitution of King, Lords and Commons. 30 
Contrary to the view presented by Jacob, it appears clear that the ideological 
implications of Toland's pantheism, a term first coined by him, did not preclude 
him from being an unwavering supporter of the Protestant succession. Although he 
lent his pen to the campaign against standing armies in the closing years of the 
seventeenth century, he was consistent in his endorsement of the Revolution 
Settlement and accompanied Lord Macclesfield on his mission to Hanover in 1701 
to secure the succession. 31 It seems unnecessary for Jacob to attempt to excuse as a 
weakness borne of impecuniosity the apparent venality of Toland and his fellow 
radicals in accepting employment or favours from Whig ministers. On some 
30See John Toland, 'A memorial for the Most Honourable the Earl of *** Concerning A Scheme of 
Coalition' and 'Another memorial for the Most Honourable the Earl of ***, December 17 1711', 
John Toland, Miscellaneous Works, 2 vols. (London, 1747), II, pp. 230,226. See also John Toland 
and the Deist Controversy, p. 155. 
3'Rosalie L. Colie describes Toland as 'one of the most powerful of the regular Whig pamphleteers 
working for William III' in 'Spinoza and the Early English Deists', 37. 
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occasions self-interest and principle find themselves in accord and for those who 
believed in and urged toleration, however circumscribed, Whig ministers appeared 
to hold out most hope. 
There is nothing in Toland's writings which indicates, as Jacob suggests, that his 
pantheism formed a philosophical foundation for a democratic theory of 
government. In fact he called for a less rather than a more representative political 
system than currently existed, arguing that no-one should be chosen to represent a 
county or borough except those who had either the possession or reversion of a 
considerable estate. He supported the previous Qualifying Act passed by 
parliament and encouraged members to introduce a further Act, restricting the vote 
to men of sufficient means to discharge their obligations to the parish. 32 
Anthony Collins, freethinker and fellow member of the Grecian coterie, likewise 
displayed none of the ideological opposition to the Court party which is central to 
Pocock's neo-Harringtonian thesis. He shared his associates' commitment to the 
Protestant succession and religious toleration and was therefore prepared to support 
a Whig administration which appeared ready to act in pursuit of those ends. 
Presumably this is why he exhibited no embarrassment at seeking to be marked, 
and thereafter rewarded in some manner, for the support he proffered the 
government. Writing to his friend Desmaizeaux he enquired whether Lord Parker 
`took notice of the zeal I showed at the last assizes at Chelmsford for the King and 
32See John Toland, Governing by Partys (London, 1721), pp. 166,174. 
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government. '33 Collins was a Justice of the Peace, hence his reference to the 
Chelmsford assizes, and also involved himself in local politics. In both roles he 
adopted a notably conservative line which belies Jacob's assertion that the Grecian 
`college' were prepared to act out their radical politics. 34 
Whilst obviously it would be foolish to deny that radical Whigs were critical of the 
Whig establishment, and sometimes vehemently so, equally the evidence can not 
be ignored that both groups of Whigs shared the same politically and socially 
conservative vision and that this united them even in the face of fears about the 
abuse of power. Where they differed significantly is that the radicals, in contrast to 
Court Whigs, were much more committed to religious toleration, and 
correspondingly much more wary of High Church ambitions, and were prepared to 
be outspoken in voicing their opinion. 
Even here however, on the issue of toleration, the radicals quite often found 
themselves at one with those Jacob casts as their Latitudinarian opponents. Quite 
inexplicably she includes Benjamin Hoadly, famously Bishop of Bangor, in the 
ranks of these opponents. Yet Hoadly's strident Erastianism and sustained support 
for toleration made him a heroic figure to the radicals and by the same token a 
figure of opprobrium to High Church Tories. It was largely Gordon's spirited 
defence of Hoadly, following the ferocious High Church response to his sermon in 
1717 on the text `My kingdom is not of this World', that brought the young Scot to 
33BL, MS 4282, f. 121, Collins to Desmaizeaux, 22 September 1716. 
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Trenchard's attention. Both authors thereafter scarcely entered print without 
including some mention of the bishop's merits and their fellow radicals were 
barely less stinting in their praise. Toland was vocal in his defence of the 
`Illustrious' bishop, declaring he had been defamed purely as a consequence of 
having `nobly ingag'd in the cause of Mankind, in the cause of Christianity, in that 
of the Reformation, and in that of the Laity. '35 Tindal revered him as `the 
strenuous assertor of our religious, as well as civil Rights' whilst Collins, in a letter 
to Desmaizeaux, expressed himself pleased with Hoadly and with the controversy 
he had ignited by his sermon, hoping it had opened the eyes of at least a few to the 
All knowledge that the clergy were intent on nothing except wealth and power. 36 
of the radicals mentioned were also expansive in their praise for leading 
Latitudinarians such as Tillotson and Chillingworth. Arguably this might in part be 
seen as an attempt to cloak themselves and their cause in an aura of respectability, 
and at the same time to infuriate critics, but they also appear to have borne a 
genuine respect for men who distinguished themselves as advocates of toleration. 37 
34For Collins' involvement in local Whig politics see James O'Higgins, Anthony Collins, the Man 
and His Works (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), pp. 126-8,190. For Jacob see 'Newtonian 
Science and the Radical Enlightenment', 546. 
35John Toland, Reflections on Sacheverell's Sermon (London, 1710), p. 13 and Nazarenus (London, 
1718), p. xxiv. 
36Matthew Tindal, Christianity as Old as the Creation (London, 1731), p. 193; and Collins to 
Desmaizeaux, 1 July 1717, BL MS 4282, f. 137. Although Hoadly dealt a critical reply to Collins' ,4 
Discourse of Free-Thinking the criticism is perhaps slightly disingenuous. It was not uncommon for 
those suspected or accused of heterodox views to assert their orthodoxy by distancing themselves 
from noted freethinkers. 
37Judging by the response of the author of Queries Recommended to the Authors of the Late 
Discourses of Free Thinking (London, 1713), p. 32, Collins must have enraged many by counting 
Chillingworth and Tillotson with Hobbes as great freethinkers. Provocatively he pointed to 
Tillotson as the figure whom 'all English free-thinkers own as their head', A Discourse of Free- 
Thinking (London, 1713), p. 143. A few of the many instances of favourable allusions to Tillotson 
and Chillingworth include: Tindal, Four Discourses, p. 274, Christianity as Old as the Creation, 
pp. 28,143; Collins, Discourse of Free-Thinking, pp. 26,67-9,143; Toland, `Letter to Rev. Dr. 
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Nor is it valid for Jacob to represent Latitudinarian critics of Toland and other 
freethinkers as uniformly orthodox and representative of the Church establishment. 
Most significantly she ignores the divisions within Anglicanism and the intra- 
denominational struggle between High and Low Churchmen for ascendancy and 
establishment status. Instead she chooses to depict the Low Church position as a 
steady consolidation of power, which saw from the 1688 Revolution onwards all 
ecclesiastical preferments brought within its control. Yet she fails to mention that 
the Newtonians Samuel Clarke and William Whiston themselves came under 
suspicion of Arianism and were targeted by the Tory laity and the High Church 
dominated Lower House of Convocation, who regarded their views as dangerously 
subversive. Ironically, both men, criticised and sidelined for preferment by the 
establishment to which, according to Jacob, they belonged, discovered defenders in 
an unlikely quarter, amongst their intellectual adversaries, although their 
reputations were likely to have suffered rather than gained in the process and they 
were unlikely to have been grateful for the assistance. Collins defended Clarke 
from accusations of atheism and apparently both he and Tindal met socially with 
Clarke to discuss matters of religion. 38 Moreover, Tindal appears to have respected 
his adversary sufficiently to quote approvingly in Christianity as Old as the 
Creation from Clarke's Boyle lectures. In the case of Whiston, Collins defended 
his right to free speech, while disagreeing with much of what he had to say, and 
sought to vindicate him from the condemnation of the Lower House of 
Hooper', An Historical Account of the Life and Writings of the late Eminently Famous Mr. John 
Toland, ed. E. Curll (London, 1722), p. 88. 38See Anthony Collins, Discourse of Free-Thinking, p. 67 and John Toland and the Deist 
Controversy, p. 265. 
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Convocation. 39 Trenchard and Gordon also added their voice to Whiston's defence 
when he came under attack for his anti-Trinitarian views 40 
The picture is not nearly as black and white as Jacob would have it painted. 
Politically her radicals were little if any more radical than the Latitudinarians and it 
is difficult to see how they differed in terms of fundamental ideology from those 
such as Hoadly, a confirmed Erastian and supporter of the Whig order. The real 
battlelines are clear when one looks at a defining issue such as the Bangorian 
controversy, where the radicals and Low Church Whigs came out in favour of 
Hoadly and High Church Tories weighed in against him. It has also to be realised 
that philosophically Latitudinarianism, by its very definition, constituted a wide 
church of belief. It may not have stretched so wide as to admit the radical 
philosophy of Collins, Tindal and especially Toland, despite their protestations that 
they remained within the broad ambit of the Church, but it was not, as witnessed by 
Clarke and Whiston, the bastion of theological conservatism represented by Jacob. 
Unfortunately once it is accepted that those styled radicals by historians were so 
only in terms of their philosophy, and not their politics, it is necessary to reject the 
thesis put forward by Jacob and others, intellectually satisfying though it might be, 
that a correlation exists between the two. 1 It is true there does appear to be a 
continuity between the neo-Harringtonians and Puritan `radicals', as suggested by 
39See Discourse of Free-Thinking, p. 36. 
40See, for example, Thomas Gordon, The Tryal of William Whiston, for Defaming and Denying the 
Holy Trinity, Before the Lord Chief Justice Reason (London, 1734). 
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Jacob and Pocock. They do indeed share a common anti-clericalism and a reliance 
on personal judgement, as opposed to the weight of authority. However, it should 
be noted that this legacy was not an exclusively Puritan one and that the 
Latitudinarians were heir to it too. At the same time, Puritanism contained a 
number of aspects that the freethinkers would have found completely incompatible 
with their own views, most obviously an unquestioning belief in revelation. 
On this issue and on others such as predestination and, crucially, toleration there is 
a line of continuity not with Puritan thought but, conversely, with that of the 
Cambridge Platonists and with their intellectual successors the Latitudinarians. In 
opposition to Puritan enthusiasm the Cambridge Platonists stressed the role of 
reason and displayed an abhorrence, shared by Toland and other freethinkers, of all 
forms of fanaticism as well as a contempt for superstition. 2 The Cambridge 
school and most of the Grecian Inn group elevated reason to the position of man's 
ruling authority both in life and in the interpretation of scripture. There is also a 
parallel between, on the one hand, the Cambridge Platonists' rejection of the 
doctrine of predestination and their emphasis instead on the value of good works 
and a moral life and, on the other, the concern of freethinkers that men should 
focus on the issue of morality rather than doctrinal differences. 3 Similarly, in 
common with the freethinkers, the Cambridge Platonists were deeply committed to 
toleration and attempted to mediate differences and to assuage the bitterness 
41Whilst it is argued a correlation does not exist between philosophical and political radicalism in 
early eighteenth century England this is not to deny a connection might be found later in the 
eighteenth century and in a larger European context. 42See, for example, John Trenchard, The Natural History of Superstition (London, 1709). 
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between Calvinists and Laudians. As Bishop Burnet observed of the Cambridge 
men: 
They continued to keep a good correspondence with those who had differed 
from them in opinion ... and allowed a great 
freedom both in philosophy 
and divinity. From whence they were called men of Latitude; and upon 
this, men of narrower Thoughts and fiercer tempers fastened upon the name 
of Latitudinarians 44 
Ralph Cudworth and Henry More, in an echo of the Dutch Arminians whose aims 
they shared and with whom they had some correspondence, also stressed the social 
and economic benefits of toleration. They argued, against popular prejudice, that 
toleration ameliorated rather than exacerbated civil strife and that it allowed trade 
to flourish. The character and progress of Latitudinarianism and Dutch 
Arminianism to a large extent mirrored each other. 45 Both were opposed on 
political as well as theological grounds by their more powerful co-religionists, the 
High Church party in England and the Orthodox Calvinist Church in the United 
Provinces. In each case support for a wide toleration and a strict separation of the 
Church from the state placed them at odds with the deeply conservative and 
authoritarian dominant body of opinion within their national Church. Inevitably 
they were attacked for their advocacy of toleration, which it was claimed, perhaps 
not without foundation, encouraged the spread of heresies such as Socinianism. 
The long and close association between Latitudinarians and Dutch Armimans 
certainly opened up a wider area in which unorthodox ideas could cross-fertilise 
43As already noted, Trenchard and Gordon differed from their Grecian Inn colleagues in being more 
sceptical about man's capacity for reason. They were agreed, however, that man had reason, or 
common sense, enough to understand the fundamental tenets of Christianity. 
44See Norman Sykes, Church and State in England in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1934), pp. 21-2. 45For a fuller discussion of the relationship between Latitudinarianism and Dutch Arminianism, see 
chapter 5 of this thesis. 
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and germinate. The leading Arminian Limborch, who enjoyed a friendship with 
Locke, corresponded with both Tillotson and Stillingfleet and Le Clerc, another 
prominent Arminian, was also closely acquainted with noted Latitudinarian figures. 
If antecedents for the Grecian Inn freethinking circle must be found, therefore, they 
should be looked for amongst contemporary Latitudinarians, with whom they seem 
to have shared a common lineage. Even in matters of political doctrine, such as 
passive obedience, after the 1688 Revolution the freethinkers were now more in 
tune with the Cambridge Platonists than the Puritans, as it was no longer in the 
interest of the Protestant succession and `Revolution principles' to encourage 
rebellion. Tindal was not unusual in arguing: 
[I]f paying obedience to the present Government be for the Good and 
Happiness of the Nation, it must be a Duty in every one to do it ... The 
paying obedience to those in Possession, is a Doctrine which tends so much 
to the Interest of human Societies, and of all the particular Members 
thereof, that even they who oppose it, did they consult their own Happiness, 
must wish it were true 46 
Contrary to the arguments put forward by Pocock and Jacob, therefore, there would 
appear to be no meaningful correlation in the early eighteenth century between 
political radicalism and deism and, similarly, no distinct line of continuity with 
Puritanism. Moreover, there is some considerable difficulty in even defining deism 
in this period. Although there are a set of beliefs commonly understood to 
constitute `deism', in practice in the early eighteenth century few of those labelled 
46Matthew Tindal, `An Essay Concerning Obedience to the Supreme Powers, and the duty of 
Subjects in all Revolutions', Four Discourses, p. 24. 
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deists subscribed to every point or indeed acknowledged themselves to be deists. 7 
Toland, who titled himself a pantheist, never admitted the charge and Collins was 
equally reluctant to publicly accept a designation that was commonly used as a 
term of abuse synonymous with that of atheist, although he is said to have privately 
owned himself a speculative atheist 48 The only one of this circle to have 
confessed himself a deist, and that almost at the end of his life, was Tindal 49 
In the case of Trenchard, his brand of deism, although he never applied the term to 
himself, was of a type most unlike that of any of his associates and resembles most 
closely the thought of another questionable deist, David Hume. S° While both 
rejected revelation neither placed any confidence in reason as a final authority and 
47Modern historians disagree on whether Toland and his circle should be considered deists at all. 
Sullivan considers the term too general to have any real value when attributed to the diverse views 
of freethinkers and Latitudinarians alike. See John Toland and the Deist Controversy, pp. 204-34. 
Similarly, David Berman has questioned the validity of the term and, in particular, has argued that 
Anthony Collins should be regarded as a speculative atheist rather than a deist. On the other hand, 
Günter Gawlick has suggested, with some justification, that deists of the eighteenth century should 
be considered on the terms set by their own works, which reveal a number of shared objectives, 
rather than on the terms set by the criticisms of their opponents. The resulting definition, however, 
is so wide that it lacks clarity. See 'Hume and the Deists', 133. Eighteenth century deists and their 
opponents appear to have been equally uncertain in their definitions. John Leland observed that all 
deists agreed in rejecting revealed religion and professing a regard for natural religion, yet they 
were far from agreed in their notion of what constituted a natural religion. All deists, he insisted, 
were united in attempting to subvert revealed religion but disagreed on what should be substituted in 
its place. See A View of the Principal Deistical Writers, 3 vols. (London, 1754), I, pp. 40,387. In 
acknowledgement of the difficulties involved in reaching a definition of 'deism' the term 
'freethinker' has generally been adopted throughout this chapter, except when referring to other 
historians' use of the term. 
48The term 'atheism' was usually employed not actually to signify a disbelief in God but rather a 
belief in a diminished, non-interventionalist Creator, which effectively meant a belief in a God who 
was no God at all. For Collins' admission of speculative atheism see David Berman, `Anthony 
Collins and the Question of Atheism in the Early Part of the Eighteenth Century', Proceedings of 
the Royal Irish Academy, 75 (1975), 85-102, at 89. 
49See John Toland and the Deist Controversy, pp. 213-15. "Later in the century, both in France and in America, Trenchard and Gordon were widely renowned 
for their deistic beliefs and their anti-clerical writings were praised and much quoted by radicals. 
Günter Gawlick has also noted the similarity between Trenchard's peculiar form of deism, if it can 
be classed as such, and that of Hume. He has rightly observed that Trenchard's Natural History of 
Superstition, virtually ignored by historians of philosophy, invites comparison with Hume's Natural 
History of Religion, 'Hume and the Deists', 138. 
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arbiter of religious truth. Trenchard, as a fellow admirer of Bayle, would probably 
have agreed with Hume's contention that Christianity must rest on faith, not on 
reason. Hume's comment, which comes at the end of his attack on revelation in 
`On Miracles', was perhaps not entirely ironic and seems indicative of both his 
own sceptical approach and that of Trenchard. 5' Both men employed 
characteristically deistic terminology to discuss the universe. 52 However, 
Trenchard's repeated insistence that man can know nothing of God, that His 
essence is unknowable and His supposed attributes mere human projections, 
indicates an acceptance that man can not even know if God exists and that belief 
therefore must rest on faith alone. Trenchard's admission of this is apparent from 
his argument against Trinitarianism, which occurs amidst the repeated insistence 
that man can form no distinct idea of God. For, he argues, `when we say, that we 
believe there are three persons in the Trinity, and but one God, we must have 
distinct ideas to the Words person, Trinity, and God'. The obvious implication is 
that since man can have no distinct idea of God there was no more compelling 
511t is notoriously difficult to theorise on the spiritual beliefs of controversial eighteenth century 
writers, given their need to resort to contradictory statements and dissimulation in order to protect 
themselves from the social and penal penalties attached to the expression of unorthodox religious 
views. Toland gives an indication of the problems freethinkers, ancient and modern, experienced in 
the dissemination of their work and the strategies they adopted to overcome them. In order to 
circumvent censorship laws designed as a garrison against truth and erected to protect the power of 
ecclesiastical and tyrannical civil authorities by keeping the people in ignorance, he argued: `The 
Philosophers therefore, and other well-wishers to mankind in most nations, were constrain'd by this 
holy tyranny to make use of a two-fold doctrine; the one Popular, accommodated to the Prejudices 
of the vulgar, and to the received CUSTOMS or RELIGIONS: the other Philosophical, conformable 
to the nature of things, and consequently to TRUTH; which, with doors fast shut and under all other 
precautions, they communicated only to friends of known probity, prudence, and capacity. These 
they generally call'd the Exoteric and Esoteric, or the External and Internal Doctrines. ' On the 
contradictions writers were forced to resort to, he quotes Cicero: 'There are two sorts of books, 
says he: the one popularly written, which they call'd Exoteric; the other more perfectly written, 
namely the Esoteric, which they left in their Commentaries, or finish'd Pieces. Hence he rightly 
concludes, that the same Philosophers do not always seem to say the same thing, tho they continu'd 
of the same opinion; which is as true as Truth itself, of many writers in our own time. ', 
'Clidophorus', Tetradymus (London, 1720), pp. 65-6,77. 
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reason for him to believe in such a Being than there was for him to assent to the 
idea of the Trinity. Trenchard went on to argue that the very word `God' was 
meaningless, so lost was it in subjectivity: 
All the differences amongst mankind, as to their belief of the deity, are 
owing to their different conceptions of him; as they disagree in his 
attributes, in the modes of his operations, and worship him under various 
images and representations. As to his substance, essence, the manner or 
sensorium of his existence, we neither know nor can know any thing, nor 
can have any conception about it, and consequently can believe nothing 
concerning it; and therefore all that we can believe (besides what I above 
said every man agrees in ['that he has existed from all eternity, and must for 
ever exist; and that he has made or produced everything else']) is 
concerning his attributes, and the modus wherein he has communicated or 
represented himself to us: That is, we can only believe in the ideas which 
we have annexed in our minds to the word god; and if we annex different 
images to the word, we are of a different religion, or rather are atheists to 
one another, though we call the object of all our worship by the same name. 
For since, as I have said, we can only worship our own conceptions or 
images of the deity, or (by new placing the words) the deity under our 
conceptions and images, if those images be false, we worship only an idol 
of our own imaginations, and pay divine homage to nothing. 53 
52As already noted (see chapter 3 of this thesis), Trenchard employed the classic 'watchmaker' 
analogy. However, he did not use it, as Paley was later to do, as an argument for God from design. 
53 CL, II, no. 120, p. 836; II, no. 137, pp. 947-8. Elsewhere, in discussing some of the different 
notions of God held by men through the ages, Trenchard compares the Epicureans and the Stoics. 
Although he does not say explicitly that he agrees with Epicurus' views, to do so would have laid 
him open to a charge of atheism, it is clear from what he says in previous letters that his own 
understanding of the nature of God was close to that which he believed Epicurus to have held: `The 
Epicureans thought the deity to be sufficient in his own felicity; and that he did not concern himself 
with our affairs here below ... 
They had no notion of what was meant by wise, merciful, and just, 
when applied to the deity; and thought that these could not be analogous to what was meant by the 
same qualities in men ... they said, that the 
deity had no organs, but saw all things intuitively from 
all eternity, and could not err. So they said, that mercy in men was a passion caused by the feeling 
or apprehension of the sufferings of others: But they believed that the divinity could have no 
passions, because no agent could operate upon him, he himself being eternal, and before all things, 
and producing all things; nor could suffer temporary anguish and uneasiness, always produced by 
compassion. In like manner, they said, that justice was an adherence to certain rules, dictated by 
superior powers, or agreed upon by men for their mutual convenience; but no rules could be set to 
the divinity ... 
They therefore said, that when those attributes were applied to the deity, nothing 
could be meant by them, but to express our reverence for him, our admiration of his power, and to 
sacrifice to him our best conceptions; not that we pretend to define his essence, nor the modus of his 
actions, which are wholly incomprehensible to us. ', ibid., II, no. 138, p. 949. Of course, Trenchard 
did not subscribe to the notion of a plurality of gods and it is interesting that he glosses over this 
obviously unfortunate aspect, as it would have seemed to him, of Epicurus' thought. He may have 
concurred with the view expressed by one of the commentators on Epicurus: 'I have observ'd, in my 
Remarks on the Translation of the First Book of Lucretius, and in those on the Fifth, that Epicurus's 
Weakness was such, as to own a Plurality of Gods, tho' he was inwardly convinc'd of the contrary 
Opinion. Socrates's Death and the Fear he had of the Athenians, had made him speak after this 
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Trenchard's lack of confidence in man's ability to find God through reason 
derived, like Hume, from a naturalistic concept of human nature. Arguing from the 
sensationalist philosophy of Hobbes and Locke, Trenchard pointed to the 
subjective `irrational' nature of what men call reason. The mind and body were 
inter-related, he argued, and therefore both man's reasoning processes and the 
actions which followed from them were shaped by the impressions formed by his 
senses. Free will was an illusion because man's actions were governed by his will 
and that in turn was directed by his body and his environment. Consequently men 
reasoned differently from one another, and even from themselves over time, as a 
result of their different constitutions and circumstances. 54 The idea, common to 
Toland and most other freethinkers of the period, that there were fundamental 
truths accessible to all intelligent men through the exercise of reason was not one 
which held any credibility for him. Like Hume, he believed men were essentially 
the playthings of their passions. Experience showed, in Trenchard's opinion, and 
here he followed Hobbes, that men were not guided to religion by reason but by 
ignorance and fear, that `something innate in our Constitution made us easily to be 
susceptible of wrong Impressions, subject to Pannick Fears, and prone to 
Superstition and Error'. 55 
Significantly, for both Trenchard and Hume, as for Bayle and Locke, the fact that 
the truth of Christianity or any other religion was not subject to demonstration was 
manner. ', Epicurus's Morals with Comments and Reflections Taken out of several Authors [trans. 
John Digby]. Also Isocrates His Advice to Demonicus, to which is added, an ESSAY on Epicurus's 
Morals. Written by Monsieur St. Evremond And made English by Mr. Johnson (London, 1712), p. 
82. As to Epicurus' theory of the atomic structure of matter, Trenchard refers to it but does not 
venture an opinion as to its validity. See CL, II, no. 123, pp. 850-1. 
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a telling argument in favour of toleration. Gawlick is partly correct when he argues 
that deists were characterised by the aim of sweeping away superstition and 
priestcraft, intolerance and religious persecution and by placing morality on a 
footing independent of revelation. 56 Yet one has only to look at Bolingbroke to see 
that this will not suffice as a meaningful definition of deism and, if accepted, it 
would include in its ambit not only Latitudinarians but Bayle, an ardent adversary 
of deism. Interestingly, the most thoroughgoing advocates of toleration, extending 
it even to atheists, were not the deistic writers who celebrated reason but Bayle, 
Trenchard and Hume. 57 All three argued reason and religion were insufficient to 
the task of rendering men virtuous, as they were too deeply in thrall to their 
passions. However those very passions, manifestations of pride, could be operated 
upon in order to produce a simulation of virtue, which was all society required - 
religious belief being a matter of individual conscience. As atheists too were men, 
and shared the nature common to all men, they were no less capable of displaying a 
socially constructed virtue equal to that of Christians. Indeed all three writers 
indicated their disgust for centuries of blood spilt in religious conflict by implying 
a society of atheists would be more virtuous than one composed of Christians 
S8 
It would seem, therefore, that there was no necessary correlation in the early 
eighteenth century between those identified as `neo-Harringtonians' and deism and 
54Ibid., 1I, no. 110, p. 775. 
55 The Natural History of Superstition, p. 9 
56'Hume and the Deists', 133. 
57Toland, Collins and Tindal all believed atheists, like Catholics, should not be afforded the 
protection of the state because their views were destructive of society. 
SSee Pierre Bayle, Miscellaneous Reflections on the Comet, 2 vols. (London, 1708), I, pp. 281-2, 
294; CL, II, no. 108, p. 766; David Hume, The Natural History of Religion (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1976), IX, pp. 58-62. 
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that the terms themselves are so imprecise as to render any attempt to establish 
such a connection invalid. In respect of political belief, none of the freethinkers 
discussed fit the mould of `neo-Harringtonianism' and the description `deist' can 
only be applied to them with qualification, remembering that Toland deemed 
himself a pantheist, Collins privately admitted to being a speculative atheist and 
Trenchard, who omitted to commit himself to any creed beyond the conventional 
declaration of adherence to the Church of England, retained at least the appearance, 
and probably was in effect, a sceptic. Rather, what is noteworthy is that these 
`commonwealthmen' all shared a deep and abiding commitment to toleration and 
were prepared, when necessary, to set aside their `republican' principles in order to 
attain that goal. Qualified support for the Whig establishment, which offered the 
most promising prospect of achieving a wide toleration, is therefore the unifying 
feature of this group of freethinkers and not neo-Harringtonian opposition. 
Chapter V 
`Cato' and Mandeville - Independent Whigs 
If a clearer understanding of the ideas which shaped Cato's Letters is to be 
achieved it is necessary to look beyond the classical allusions to be found there and 
to examine other lines of thought in the Letters and the way in which these are 
connected. It is also necessary to examine other writings by Trenchard and 
Gordon, especially those contemporaneous with the Letters, in order to retrieve a 
less distorted image of `Cato' and to gain a fuller understanding of wider attitudes 
in the period towards commerce and virtue. It is particularly illuminating to 
examine the relationship between `Cato', canonised as chief proselytiser of civic 
humanist doctrine, and a figure generally considered his antithesis, Mandeville, 
characterised as Walpolean England's philosopher and apologist for a corrupt age. l 
Only one historian, H. T. Dickinson, has hinted at any similarities in the thought of 
`Cato' and Mandeville, suggesting that on some issues - such as charity schools, 
Societies for the Reformation of Manners and the political pretensions of the clergy 
- the author of The Fable of the Bees can be found in the same camp as `such 
eminent Country Whigs as John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon'. Yet this is a 
connection roundly repudiated by M. M. Goldsmith who, whilst agreeing with the 
general accuracy of Dickinson's description of Mandeville as an `independent 
'See, for example, Kramnick, Bolingbroke and His Circle: `Mandeville may also be read in the 
intellectual context of his own age as an important formulator of new values for post-Revolution 
England 
... [his] achievement was the expression of values that supplanted humanism, appropriate for the emerging social structure. ' Whereas, Kramnick goes on to argue, 'one of the overriding 
themes of Cato's Letters is a rejection of the new economic order. ', pp. 201-46. See also Gunn, 
Beyond Liberty and Property, pp. 116-19. 
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Whig', is dismissive of the `infelicitous verbal connection with Trenchard and 
Gordon', and argues that a dislike of charity schools and the clergy was `almost all 
that Mandeville shared with the protagonists of virtue and opposition to the 
government: John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon'. 3 It will be argued in the course 
of this chapter, however, that, contrary to Goldsmith's contention, and going 
beyond the tentative link made by Dickinson, there is considerable convergence of 
thought in the work of Mandeville and that of Trenchard and Gordon. 
Dickinson's attempt to counter the common image of Mandeville as a Court Whig 
by associating him with Trenchard and Gordon, renowned `commonwealthmen', is 
supported by more recent scholarship, which indicates that as a young man the 
author of The Fable of the Bees was prepared to act upon his republican 
sympathies. In 1690 he was resident in Rotterdam when the Costerman riots 
broke out, an outburst of violence triggered by the execution of a respected citizen 
who had been arrested by a tax farmer's agents and was subsequently convicted, 
unjustly it was claimed, of smuggling. The tax farmer's house was looted by 
rioters and then, in an escalation of events which appears to have taken on a 
political dimension, calls began to be made in widely distributed pamphlets for the 
city's bailiff also to be brought to book for his part in the affair. 
2H. T. Dickinson, `Bernard Mandeville: An `independent Whig", Studies on Voltaire and the 
Eighteenth Century, 152 (1976), 559-70, at 565. 
3Goldsmith is referring to the fact that Trenchard and Gordon styled themselves 'independent 
Whigs' and collaborated on the similarly entitled and widely read periodical, The Independent 
Whig. See Private Vices, Public Benefits, pp. 104,122. It has already been argued in previous 
chapters that Trenchard and Gordon were emphatically not `protagonists of virtue and opposition'. 
4See Rudolph Dekker, "`Private Vices, Public Virtues" Revisited: The Dutch Background of 
Bernard Mandevillle', trans. G. T. Moran, History of European Ideas, 14 (1992), 481-98. See also 
Jonathan Israel, The Dutch Republic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 857-8. 
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The bailiff, Jacob van Zwijilen van Nievelt, was a supporter of the House of 
Orange and deeply unpopular with the anti-Orangist opposition, which included 
Michael Mandeville and his son, Bernard. Both Mandevilles were mentioned in 
official reports as having been involved in the outbreak of civil disorder and it was 
Bernard Mandeville's pamphlets, cruelly lampooning van Zwijilen, which ignited 
the second round of rioting on 5th October. As well as levelling various scurrilous 
accusations at the bailiff, Mandeville accused him of being a `Sanctimonious 
Atheist', a reference to his religious convictions. Van Zwijilen was an elder in the 
orthodox Calvinist Reformed Church and the charge recalled the violent and, 
particularly in Rotterdam, still simmering animosities provoked by the 
confrontation between the Remonstrants and Counter-Remonstrants earlier in the 
century. Central to the dispute between the two groups were the issues of religious 
toleration and the location of sovereignty within the state. 
The Remonstrants' appeal to the States of Holland in 1610 for protection from 
persecution by the Reformed Church, which enjoyed official status within the state 
and upheld the authority of the House of Orange, was generally supported by the 
regents. As chief administrators of the Republic's religiously diverse cities, the 
regents tended to appreciate the benefits of toleration in maintaining civil order and 
contributing to commercial prosperity and were inclined to resent attempts by both 
the stadholderate and the Reformed Church to exercise power arbitrarily. 
As a result of the riots and of calls that van Zwijilen be prosecuted for corruption, 
the provincial government bowed to popular pressure and put him on trial. 
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However before a judgement could be delivered the stadholder, William III, 
intervened and removed the case from provincial jurisdiction, ensuring that the 
bailiff was acquitted and reinstated to office. Having triumphed, van Zwijilen then 
took revenge on his opponents, including Michael Mandeville and the printer of the 
`Sanctimonious Atheist' pamphlet, both of whom were banished from the city 
without trial. Dekker concludes that it was this reversal of fortune, arising from the 
Costerman affair, which led Bernard Mandeville to settle in England and that the 
episode shaped his pessimistic view of human nature. 5 Be that as it may, more 
importantly, it would seem, is that this account of Mandeville's young life is 
instructive in that it indicates a political perspective which remained present in his 
later work and which was shared by Trenchard and Gordon. 
At first it might appear surprising that once established in his adoptive country 
Mandeville should have turned from being a critic of William of Orange to a 
supporter. 6 Yet to do so might be seen as perfectly logical within the framework of 
concerns which were of over-arching importance to him. He saw that where a 
Church, be it Roman Catholic, Calvinist, or any other Protestant denomination, 
enjoyed exclusive privileges and status within a state, and in return reinforced the 
power of the secular authority, it was individual liberties which suffered. 7 In the 
5"`Private Vices, Public Virtues" Revisited', p. 495. 
6Neither Dickinson or Goldsmith, nor indeed Kramnick, suggests that Mandeville was not a 
supporter of William. As Goldsmith notes, Mandeville's first known English publication, The 
Pamphleteers, was a defence of William, in verse form, against the carping of those who belittled 
his achievements. In the poem Mandeville celebrated William's personal virtues and a life spent in 
opposing French tyranny. See Private Vices, Public Benefits, p. 79. 
7See Mandeville's An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour and the Usefulness of Christianity in War 
(London, 1732), p. 98. Gordon also regarded Calvinism to be as dangerous as Catholicism, in that 
it sanctioned resistance to an ungodly government, defined as one which failed to suppress and 
expunge heresy within its borders. `It is the power of the Clergy, 'tis their long claws that constitute 
Popery, render Popery terrible, and are Popery, real Popery, whatever else it be called ... in the 
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Dutch Republic it was the orthodox Calvinist Church, with its doctrine of religious 
intolerance and endorsement of passive obedience to a godly prince, which 
threatened freedom of belief and action. 
As stadholder, William was the beneficiary of the Reformed Church's support, a 
mutually advantageous relationship which enhanced the power of both at the 
expense of the individual. In England the polarities of power were different. The 
Anglican Church had been a chief pillar of Charles II's reign and in turn Royalists, 
and later Tories, saw themselves as the Church's defender. After the Glorious 
Revolution, and the Whigs' fudged invitation to William to accept the `vacant' 
throne, the Church was divided in its support for the new monarch. Nine bishops 
and over four hundred members of the clergy refused to take the oath of allegiance 
to William and Mary. High Church Tories were seen as posing a danger to 
freedom, perceived, or at least portrayed by Whigs, as crypto-Catholics and 
Jacobites, bound body and soul to the doctrines of apostolic succession and rule by 
divine right. Moreover, while in the Dutch Republic William shared the same 
brand of Protestantism as the majority of the population, this was not the case in 
Anglican England. It makes sense, therefore, that Mandeville should have thrown 
his support behind William and the Whig party. 8 
proceedings against SERVETUS, CALVIN was a Pope, nay a popish Inquisitor, if it be true, that he 
was the author of those proceedings. ', Thomas Gordon, The Works of Tacitus, 2 vols. (London, 
1728), p. 132. See also CL, II, no. 131, pp. 907-8. 8So whilst Mandeville's Free Thoughts on Religion, the Church, and National Happiness (London, 
1720) might be seen as a propaganda piece for George I's Whig government, and includes a 
reference to the 'Genius of William the Third', equally it is a restatement of Arminian beliefs: a 
rejection of predestination and a plea for religious tolerance and less preoccupation with outward 
forms of worship. 
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In an irony of relativism that could hardly have been lost on Mandeville, one might 
see that William could in the circumstances of one national context take the part of 
despot and in another play the role of defender of liberty. Indeed Mandeville's 
politics appear perfectly in keeping with his philosophy, a Pyrrhonian utilitarianism 
which held that men should be permitted the maximum freedom society could 
allow in order to live their lives according to their chosen creed, both spiritual and 
material. 9 Like Trenchard and Gordon he favoured a republican form of 
government, or limited monarchy in the case of England, which was less dependent 
for its legitimacy on the Church, because it allowed men a greater degree of liberty 
than any other type of rule. Liberty, that is, not in its classical, positive sense but 
negatively, freedom from constraint. 
It would seem a great error, therefore, to trivialise the attitude of Mandeville and 
`Cato' towards the clergy as simple `dislike' and to make light of the suggestion 
that they might have shared a political perspective. Their anti-clericalism goes to 
the heart of an ideological concern they held in common, the liberty of the 
individual. Too often `Cato's' classical references are taken unquestioningly as an 
endorsement of a classical concept of virtue. 10 
9Mandeville was a sceptic in that he believed there was no `ultimate good', no determining principle 
discoverable to human reason which would show men how to live their lives. For him, this meant 
that men should, therefore, be allowed to follow whatever route to happiness best suited them. See 
The Fable of the Bees, I, pp. 330-1; also: `it is manifest, that when we pronounce Actions good or 
evil, we only regard the Hurt or benefit the Society receives from them, and not the Person who 
commits them. ', I, p. 244. For the argument that men are differently motivated and that there is no 
single good life for all, see The Female Tatler, 15th, 20th and 24th March 1720. The life of a 
country gentleman and that of a money-driven merchant are, Mandeville suggests, equally valid. 
1°See Private Vices, Public Benefits, p. 142. Goldsmith includes Tacitus as one of the ancient 
writers frequently invoked for this purpose by exponents of the "'civic humanist" ideology'. Also 
see The Origins of American Politics, p. 56. Bailyn argues the interpretative discourses prefacing 
Gordon's translations of Sallust and Tacitus `were "country" tracts as flamboyant as his periodical 
pieces'. This is a somewhat odd analysis since the translations were published at a time when 
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Significantly it is Gordon's championing of a non-classical figure, Oldenbarnevelt, 
in his translation of Sallust which gives an indication that his political opinions 
were coloured by concerns which place him, like Mandeville, in the Dutch 
Hobbesian republican tradition, rather than within the civic humanist paradigm. " 
He singled out for praise as an exemplar of virtue `John Barnevelt', by whom he 
meant Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, effectively chief minister of the United Provinces 
under the stadholderate of Prince Maurice and patron of Grotius, calling him that 
`good Dutchman and Patriot to whom his Country owed so much. 912 
Oldenbarnevelt's administration had come into conflict with Prince Maurice over 
its policy of greater religious toleration. The issue became bound to questions of 
sovereignty in 1609 when one of Arminius' supporters, Johannes Uyttenbogaert, 
argued that the various provincial authorities, rather than the synod of the 
Reformed Church, should control worship, preaching, the administration of 
sacraments, poor relief and the appointment of preachers. The following year 
ecclesiastical authority suffered a severe blow when, in response to the 
Remonstrants' petition, the States General resolved that Arminians should be 
allowed to practice their beliefs free from persecution. Matters came to a climax in 
1616 when Oldenbarnevelt refused to accede to the demand of the Counter- 
Remonstrants that a synod be called in order to reassert the authority of the 
Gordon had supposedly sold his services to the Whig administration. Vol. I of his Tacitus was 
dedicated to Walpole. See chapter 7 of this thesis for a fuller discussion of Gordon's use of Tacitus. 
"See chapter 3 for Trenchard and Gordon's Dutch connections and links with Hobbes and the de la 
Courts. Trenchard referred to the Dutch Republic, rather than Rome or Athens, as `the most virtuous 
and flourishing state which ever yet appeared in the world ... a state which, ever since its institution, has been the champion of publick liberty', CL, II, no. 85, p. 618. '2Thomas Gordon, The Works ofSallust Translated into English with Political Discourses upon that 
Author to which is added a Translation of Cicero's Four Orations Against Catiline (London, 
1754), p. 29. 
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Reformed Church. When Prince Maurice seconded the demand, raising the 
possibility that his control of the Provinces' armed forces might be used as 
leverage in the dispute, Oldenbarnevelt effected the passage of a resolution by the 
States of Holland which aimed at stripping the stadholder of his military power. 
With the battlelines drawn, Oldenbamevelt's adversaries lined up against him 
behind Maurice in a confrontation which culminated in his trial and execution for 
treason. Grotius avoided a similar fate - for he stood in danger as a close associate 
of Oldenbarnevelt and as a result of the major role his polemics had played in the 
assault on ecclesiastical authority - although he was sentenced to life 
imprisonment, escaping two years later. 13 
For Gordon, Oldenbarnevelt was a heroic figure, sacrificed to the vaulting ambition 
of ecclesiastical authority and Prince Maurice's goal of achieving absolute rule 
over the Provinces. Parallels with the situation in Britain and the perceived threat 
posed by High Church Tories and Jacobites are obvious. It is these concerns which 
dominated the works of Trenchard and Gordon and which are also apparent in 
Mandeville's writings. Clearly it was not a `neo-Harringtonian' ideal of liberty 
Gordon had in mind when he eulogised Oldenbarnevelt as `the best Protestant, and 
best Commonwealth's Man upon Earth'. 14 
It was a shared concern with popery, in whatever guise, and Jacobitism which also 
inspired the attack on charity schools made by Gordon and Mandeville, triggered in 
13See Richard Tuck, `Grotius and Selden', Cambridge History of Political Thought, pp. 499-529, 
esp. pp. 500-1,510-11. 
14The Works of Sallust, p. 150. 
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this instance by the discovery of the Atterbury plot. 15 Almost since their inception 
the schools had become the focus of party political strife and this intensified during 
the first quarter of the eighteenth century. Dissenting involvement in the schools 
had gradually decreased as the standing of the High Church party rose under 
Anne's reign and with the passage of the 1711 Act against Occasional Conformity 
and the Schism Act of 1714. The schools were widely regarded as seedbeds of 
disaffection, an apparently not unfounded belief and one supported by reports 
carried by newspapers of the involvement of `children with the badge of common 
charity on their backs' in the anti-Whig riots of 1715.16 During the rebellion the 
same year charity school boys, with the Pretender's favours in their caps and the 
cry of `High Church and Ormand' on their lips, joined the crowds who thronged 
the streets. Even internal reports of the Society for the Promotion of Christian 
Knowledge, an Anglican organisation which oversaw the charity school movement, 
expressed anxiety about the sympathies of some of the teachers and the trustees 
who had management of the institutions. Although many of the charges levelled at 
the teachers were merely part of the cut and thrust of party propaganda, there is a 
good deal of evidence that Jacobitism had made inroads into many of the London 
schools. " 
Mandeville contended that it was in response to his `Essay on Charity Schools' that 
the Grand Jury of Middlesex had decided in 1723 to present The Fable of the Bees 
to the Court of the King's Bench as a public nuisance, with the recommendation 
15See CL, II, no. 133, pp. 919-21 and The Fable of the Bees, I, pp. 284,309,310. 16The Flying Post, 26 April 1715, quoted in The Charity School Movement, pp. 112-13. 17See The Charity School Movement, pp. 113-14. 
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that its publisher be prosecuted. 18 The only other publication singled out in the 
presentation, with a like recommendation, was The British Journal, specifically 
numbers 26,35,36 and 39, the last of which carried Cato's letter `Of Charity 
Schools'. 19 No. 26,16 March 1722, called into question belief in the Trinity (one 
of the charges brought by the Grand Jury was that of Arianism) and nos. 35 and 36, 
18 and 25 May, attacked the influence of the clergy. 20 However these essays were 
not merely an excoriating criticism of the clergy, they were also forcible 
expressions of support for the government. Both Trenchard and Gordon made 
clear that they were ready to be less rigorous in their commitment to traditional 
tenets of Whig faith when those very tenets became cant words in the mouths of 
High Church Tories, who covered treason with the gloss of patriotism, and when 
they allowed liberty to a few who would deprive the whole nation of its liberties: 
To whom, as I have observed in a former paper, do we owe standing 
armies, such frequent suspensions of the habeas corpus bill, and so many 
consuming pensions? Even to those, who by their constant plots 
conspiracies, and rebellions, have given occasions, or pretences, for these 
great evils and excesses. And now that they have brought all these 
mischiefs and many more, upon us, and forced the government upon 
measures which perhaps would not have been thought of, certainly would 
not have been complied with, they would imprudently throw upon his 
Majesty the burdens of imputations, which they alone ought to be, or 
impiously dethrone him, and undo their country, for their own crimes. 21 
'$The Fable of the Bees, I, p. 409. 
"Numbered 120,129,130 and 133 in the Liberty Fund edition of Cato's Letters. 
20Trenchard and Gordon's main target was Frances Atterbury. 
21 CL, II, no. 129, p. 895. No. 129 was penned by Gordon but Trenchard had argued in similar vein 
in the previous letter: `Look back, Gentlemen, once more, to later reigns: What testimony did they 
bear against the barefaced encouragement of popery, and the persecution of Protestants, in Charles 
II's reign; against his fatal treaties and leagues with France, his unjust wars with the United 
Provinces, and his treacherous seizure of their Smyrna fleet, to destroy the only state in the world 
that could be then called the bulwark of liberty and the Protestant religion? What did they say 
against the terrible excesses, the arbitrary imprisonments, the legal murders, and violation of 
property, during his reign? Did they not encourage and sanctify all the invasions and encroachments 
of the court, and cursed all who opposed them, or complained of them? Can they have the forehead 
to complain of armies, of taxes, or any sort of oppression (however just such complaint may be in 
others), they who have never shewn themselves for any government, but what subsisted by armies 
and oppression? They have been always mortal foes to popular liberty, which thwarts and frustrates 
all their aspiring and insatiable views', CL, II, no. 128, pp. 887-8. 
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Mandeville was notably less explicitly supportive of Walpole's administration in 
his `Essay on Charity Schools', confining himself to a biting attack on High 
Church Tories. However, this may have been due to some personal distaste he felt 
for the first minister. Mandeville's friend and patron, Lord Macclesfield, had been 
the subject of an investigation for corruption, carried out at Walpole's instigation, 
which resulted in his removal from the Bench and the imposition of a £30,000 fine. 
George I promised to reimburse Macclesfield to the value of the fine and had 
repaid him £1,000 before he died. However after George's death Walpole, as 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, refused to make any further payments. 22 
Nevertheless, Mandeville had been extremely fulsome in his support for the 
previous Whig administration, in Free Thoughts on Religion, the Church, and 
National Happiness, and he was almost certainly correct in asserting that his 
prosecution was politically motivated. Membership of the Grand Jury was largely 
determined along party lines. Its officers were nominated by two sheriffs, who 
themselves were elected by the City livery companies. The Jury which sat in 
judgement on Mandeville and `Cato' had been chosen by two Tory sheriffs, Child 
and Parsons, and of the seven jurors whose political affiliations are known, five 
have been categorised as Tories and two as Country Whigs. 23 The Jury's decision 
22See Kaye's comments, The Fable of the Bees, I, p. 327. As Gunn notes of the quarrel between 
Macclesfield and Walpole: `This left Mandeville in the uncomfortable situation of a pro- 
administration Whig who may have felt no admiration for the most powerful Whig. ', Beyond 
Liberty and Property, p. 105. 
23See W. A. Speck, `Bernard Mandeville and the Middlesex Grand Jury', Eighteenth Century 
Studies, 11 (1978), 362-74. Speck's argument that the Jurors proceeded against Trenchard in order 
to remove the stigma of Jacobitism from themselves and his portrayal of Trenchard as a Country 
Whig fails to make sense. The numbers of Cato's Letters which formed the subject of the 
prosecution condemned Jacobitism and expressed support for the administration. It is difficult to 
see how by condemning the authors of such opinions the Jury would have cleared itself from 
suspicion of Jacobitism. It would surely have produced the opposite effect. 
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to indict `Cato' and Mandeville therefore appears to have been a partisan one. It 
was an attack on figures it regarded as united in their support of Walpole's 
administration. Moreover, there is arguably a possibility that the Jury may also 
have been reacting to Gordon's condemnation, in the journal Pasquin, of the 
conduct of the elections for the posts of sheriff at the end of June 1723. In the 
preceding weeks Gordon had railed against the candidature of Lockwood, who was 
then a member of the Grand Jury, accusing him of having raised large sums for the 
Pretender. Lockwood was nevertheless elected sheriff, although the results were 
contested and Gordon highlighted the alleged procedural irregularities in the July 
5`' issue of Pasquin, three days prior to the Jury handing down a judgement against 
the accused. 
The last of five charges levelled at Mandeville and `Cato' by the Grand Jury was 
that they sought to `recommend Luxury, Avarice, Pride, and all kind of Vices, as 
being necessary to Publick Welfare'. 24 They were made the subjects of a similar 
accusation in a letter to `Lord C', written under the signature of `Theophilus Philo- 
Britannus', which appeared in the London Journal of 27th July 1723: 
This profligate Author of the Fable is not only an Auxiliary to Catiline in 
Opposition to Faith but has taken upon him to tear up the very Foundations 
of Moral Virtue, and establish Vice in its Room. 25 
As shown in chapter 3, Trenchard and Gordon were not consistently regarded by 
their contemporaries as critics of government and a number of them considered 
24The Fable of the Bees, I, p. 385. 
25Ibid., I, p. 397. As Kaye notes, the use of the epithet 'Catiline' by the author of the Letter to Lord 
C. was probably inspired by a pamphlet written against Cato's Letters, entitled The Censor 
Censur'd: or, Cato Turn 'd Catiline. Mandeville responded to both Lord C's letter and the 
presentment of the Middlesex Grand Jury in his 'A Vindication of the Book'. 
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their sensationalist philosophy made them apologists for ministerial corruption as 
well as general libertinism. Obviously, Mandeville's The Fable of the Bees is built 
on the premise that luxury and other `vices' are necessary to public welfare but, as 
the Middlesex Grand Jury recognised, Cato's Letters also puts forward a similar 
argument. Explicit references which Jurymen may have had in mind include 
Gordon's contention that `[a]mbition, avarice, revenge, are all so many virtues, 
when they aim at the general welfare'. 26 
If a connection between `Cato' and Mandeville was apparent to at least some of 
their contemporaries it has been missed by most modern commentators. J. A. W. 
Gunn notes that `Cato' was described as Mandeville's `humble Imitator and 
Follower' by a critic of both in a periodical of 1724 but argues this is `a claim 
contrary both to fact and to logic. Thomas Gordon did certainly use Mandeville on 
later occasions but Cato's Letters upheld resolutely antithetical opinions'. 27 Gunn 
seems incorrect in his analysis on a number of grounds. Firstly, although it is true 
Gordon adopted a more flamboyantly `Mandevillian' tone in his other writings, in 
Cato's Letters he also expressed views concerning religion and moral and political 
philosophy which appear strikingly akin to those of Mandeville. 28 Secondly, Gunn 
concedes that Gordon later `used' Mandeville in The Humourist (1725), while 
maintaining that this shift occurred after Trenchard's death and `Cato's' last 
26CL, I, no. 39, p. 276. The utilitarian definition of virtue given by both 'Cato' and Mandeville and 
the attempt to accommodate this with a rigorist definition of virtue is discussed in chapter 6. 
27Beyond Liberty and Property, p. 108. Goldsmith's views, which accord with those of Gunn in this 
matter, have already been cited. 28 Even so, Cato's Letters are replete with statements, such as that quoted in the preceding 
paragraph, which are as provocative as anything written by Mandeville. 
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farewell. Here Gordon expressed his debt of gratitude to Mandeville, though the 
tone he adopted to do so was heavy with irony: 
I am obliged to a Book, intitled, The Fable of the Bees, or private Vices 
publick benefits, for another good Argument in Defence of my Clients in 
this particular, which is contained in this following Paradox, viz). That if 
every Body paid his Debts honestly, a great many honest Men would be 
ruined: For, as it is learnedly argued in the aforesaid Book, that we are 
indebted to particular private Vices for the flourishing condition and 
Welfare of the Publick; and as, if Luxury ceased, great part of our 
Commerce would cease with it; and if the Reformation of Manners should 
so far prevail as to abolish Fornication, Multitudes of Surgeons would be 
ruined. 29 
Yet these remarks were first made not in 1725 but at the same time as Cato's 
Letters were appearing. The second volume of The Humourist largely reproduces 
unsigned letters which appeared in St. James's Journal and Pasquin, pro- 
government publications set up, respectively, in May and November 1722 to 
counter attacks from the opposition press. 30 The lines Gunn refers to first appeared 
in Pasquin on 13th May 1723, some months before `Cato' bid his readers adieu. 
Gordon also employed another of Mandeville's arguments from The Fable of the 
Bees, an idiosyncratic one, in relation to luxury. He followed Mandeville in 
condemning the slaughter of multitudes of animals for human consumption, 
insisting: `it is very unreasonable that the whole Creation should be lavished away 
in this profuse Manner'. They both argued man was capable of subsisting perfectly 
adequately without meat and that nature had intended him to be vegetarian. 
Gordon also echoed Mandeville's claim that as meat was not man's natural food 
29The Humourist, pp. 114-15. 30P. B. Anderson draws attention to the fact that Gordon reused some of his material from Pasquin in 
The Humourist. See `Cato's Obscure Counterpart in The British Journal 1722-25', Studies in 
Philology, 34 (1937), 412-28, at 425; see also The Radical Whigs, p. 170. 
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nothing but `long Custom (that second Nature)' could have persuaded him to 
overcome his distaste for it and for the cruelty inflicted on animals in their 
slaughter. Surprisingly, there is no trace of irony in Mandeville's attack on meat- 
eating and he appears to have been quite sincere in his condemnation of `this 
Barbarity of eating Flesh'. Gordon conveys the impression that he gave serious 
weight to the arguments in favour of vegetarianism but that ultimately he was more 
disgusted by man's gluttonous appetite than his carnivorous habits. 31 
Gunn also mentions William Arnall, a Walpolean publicist, who `sometimes 
employed Harringtonian arguments in defence of Walpole' but who `also found 
opportunities to argue in the manner of Mandeville. '32 Arnall's Clodius and Cicero 
(1727) is cited by Gunn as an example of the influence of Mandeville on Court 
writers. Yet according to an anonymous contemporary source, Walpole employed 
Gordon to edit and revise the pieces produced by Arnall and, particularly in 
Clodius and Cicero, it is the influence of Gordon rather than Mandeville that can 
be discerned. 33 In this pamphlet Arnall used the same defence of corruption as that 
employed by Gordon, that some evils are so deeply entrenched in society that to 
uproot them would be more dangerous than to suffer them to remain. Arnall also 
resurrected Gordon's example of Galbo and he is made to serve, as he does in 
Cato's Letters, as a witness to misplaced virtue. 34 Gordon's approving quotation 
31See The Fable of the Bees, I, pp. 173-81 and The Humourist, II, pp. 91-6. Obviously the same 
arguments could be found in classical sources, such as Epicurus and Porphyry. However, the idea 
that man was by nature non-carnivorous was sufficiently unusual in the eighteenth century for 
Mandeville's comments to be cited by vegetarian writers later in the century and through into the 
nineteenth century. 
32Beyond Liberty and Property, p. 109. 33See An Historical View of the Principles, Characters, Persons, etc. of the Political Writers of 
Great Britain, pp. 16-17. 
34See chapter 7 of this thesis for Gordon's judgement on Galbo. 
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of Tacitus' judgement on the emperor was echoed in Arnall's assertion that 
`Publick Frugality is an excellent virtue; yet that Virtue, excellent as 'tis, was the 
Bane of the Emperor Galbo, and involv'd the Empire in a terrible Series of Battles 
and massacre. '35 Mandeville never employed Galbo as an exemplar in his work 
and he generally did not resort to allusions from classical history, that was 
Gordon's terrain. Internal evidence and contemporary testimony, therefore, suggest 
that Arnall was indebted to Gordon rather than to Mandeville for his arguments. 
However, in light of the similarity of the two writers' views it is not surprising that 
Gunn should have mistakenly identified Gordon's influence in Clodius and Cicero 
for that of Mandeville, although it does undermine Gunn's insistence that the 
authors of Cato's Letters and The Fable of the Bees held diametrically opposed 
opinions. 
There is also evidence that Mandeville and Gordon may have both worked on The 
British Journal at the same time. After signing off for the last time in the Journal, 
`Cato' returned for six issues in the guise of `Criton'. 36 In addition to Triton' 
there were two other significant contributors to The British Journal in the period 
35See Pasquin, no. 56,13 August 1723; CL, I, no. 41, p. 283; and William Arnall, Clodius and 
Cicero (London, 1727), pp. 8,26,28. Gordon may well have been influenced by Mandeville but it 
is also likely, as is argued in chapter 6, that similar influences shaped the work of both men. At his 
satiric best Gordon does read remarkably like Mandeville but he lacks his honesty, imagination and 
spark of originality. P. B. Anderson similarly mistook 'Criton', the pseudonym Gordon adopted in 
The British Journal, for Mandeville. See 'Cato's Obscure Counterpart', 412-28. 
36See `Advertisement to the Reader', CL, II, p. 957. Gordon states in the Advertisement that it had 
been his intention, and that of Trenchard before his death, to publish occasional papers, principally 
on religious subjects but also to include several on political matters. In fulfilment of that aim 
Gordon wrote the six Triton' letters, later subjoined to Cato's Letters because he considered their 
political nature made them naturally part of that collection. The Advertisement also states that 
Gordon intends to publish the papers on religious matters as a third volume of The Independent 
Whig. As McMahon points out, this strongly suggests Gordon continued to contribute to The British 
Journal under the name of Triton' up until June 1724, evidence which McMahon says is usually 
overlooked by scholars. See The Radical Whigs, p. 97. However, quite apart from Gordon's 
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from mid 1723 to 1725, `Diogenes' and `Philanthropus'. 37 P. B. Anderson argues 
that all three were pseudonyms used by Mandeville. 38 There would seem a strong 
possibility this is true of some of the letters of `Philanthropus'; those covering 
issue numbers 128-133 and 136-137 would appear to have to be assigned to 
Mandeville because they give in advance of publication the text of his An Enquiry 
into the Causes of the Frequent Executions at Tyburn. 39 However, in the case of 
Triton' the evidence is less convincing and seems rather to support the argument 
that Gordon continued with the pseudonym he adopted after laying `Cato' to rest. 
Anderson sees the literary devices used by the pseudonymous writers as 
characteristic of Mandeville, yet most if not all of these were also employed by 
other authors of the period and certainly Gordon himself used amusing sketches of 
character and manners in The Humourist and occasionally made use of dialogues. 
Anderson is nearer the mark when he argues that `Cato's counterpart' found his 
inspiration and his models either in Mandeville or Bayle, Mandeville's favourite 
author. 40 Bayle was also a great favourite of Gordon and is cited on numerous 
occasions in both Cato's Letters and in some of his other works. 1 Anderson also 
draws attention to the resemblance between Triton's' comment on Bayle's strange 
admiration for Louis XIV and the character of Antonia's remark to the same effect 
testimony the subject matter of the Triton' letters lends credence to the argument that he was the 
author. 
37During the time `Cato' was in residence at The British Journal, `Diogenes' made an appearance on 
ten occasions, nine of these letters were subsequently claimed for 'Cato' by Gordon and published 
as part of complete editions of the Letters. 
381 Cato's Obscure Counterpart', 414. 
39G. S. Vichert, however, refutes Anderson's claim that 'Pilanthropus' was a pseudonym used by 
Mandeville. See Vichert's unpublished doctoral thesis, A Critical Study of the English Works of 
Bernard Mandeville (London, 1964), p. 327. 40'Cato's Obscure Counterpart', 414. 
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in Mandeville's The Virgin Unmask'd (1714). Yet Gordon makes precisely the 
same observation in his Tacitus 42 As both men were great admirers of Bayle it is 
quite likely that each was struck by his lapse of judgement, although it is 
conceivable that Gordon had read The Virgin Unmask'd and repeated Mandeville's 
observation in The British Journal and Tacitus. 
It is Triton's' attack on standing armies, however, which strongly indicates that 
his letters were penned not by Mandeville but by Gordon. Mandeville had no 
qualms about standing armies and in The Fable of the Bees made light of the idea 
of a citizen militia and argued, along division of labour lines, that a professional, 
salaried army was more efficient. 43 Gordon's position on standing armies, it will 
be remembered, was that as a matter of principle he was opposed to them but he 
was prepared to compromise on that when it conflicted with the larger principle of 
safeguarding liberty. By the end of 1723, when Triton' was writing, the Jacobite 
threat had receded and Gordon may have felt it timely to remind Walpole's 
administration that it held no mandate to maintain a standing army in the absence 
of any danger, unless perhaps the ministry regarded a people jealous of its liberties 
as its real foe. 44 
Although, therefore, Anderson appears correct in identifying `Philanthropus' as 
Mandeville, he would seem mistaken in assigning the Triton' letters to the same 
4'The question of the influence of the French moralistes and Bayle on both Mandeville and Gordon 
is discussed in chapter 6. For Gordon's references to Bayle in Cato's Letters see I, preface, p. 28; 
no. 25, p. 183; no. 27, pp. 195-6; no. 44, pp. 298-9,301-5; no. 52, p. 349. 42 See Tacitus, I, p. 23 and 'Cato's Obscure Counterpart', 417. 43The image he conjures up is that of an eighteenth century version of the WWII British 
Homeguard, a 'Dad's Army' militia. See The Fable of the Bees, I, pp. 119-120. 44See The British Journal, 9 November 1723. 
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author. Given Gordon's statement in the Advertisement and the content of the 
letters, the strong likelihood is that he continued to contribute to The British 
Journal as Triton'. However, as previously observed, the error is one which is 
easily made, since the work of Mandeville and Gordon is so similar both in content 
and stylistically. 
There is one further documented connection betwen Mandeville and Gordon. As 
already noted, Gordon was acquainted with, and drew on, The Fable of the Bees 
and it is possible he had read, and rated highly, another of Mandeville's work, Free 
Thoughts on Religion, the Church, and National Happiness. In a letter to Triton', 
in The British Journal, which may have been written by Gordon himself, or indeed 
by Mandeville, the book is praised lavishly. 45 Triton's' correspondent, `AB', asks 
leave to enclose an extract from Free Thoughts, which he presents as a further 
salvo in the battle against persecution and bigotry instigated by `Criton' in earlier 
numbers of the Journal. The warmth of the recommendation, and the slight hint of 
pique at the book's less than enthusiastic reception by the establishment, suggests 
Mandeville may have been the letter's author: 
Give me, therefore, leave to present you with a very good Paper out of an 
excellent Book, too little known. It is Dr. Mandeville 'S Free Thoughts on 
Religion, &c. To the Reproach of our Taste, it has been twice translated 
into French, and yet is scarce known in England. It was written for the 
Interest of the establishment; and yet the Friends of the establishment have, 
for want of reading it, not promoted it. It is a masterly Book, abounding in 
fine Thoughts and Strong Matter, animated throughout with a honest, 
discerning, and beneficent Spirit, and diversified with curious and agreeable 
Quotations 46 
'Apparently in the early eighteenth century it was a `common modem practice' for a newspaper 
writer to pen letters to himself under a different pseudonym. See Frances Hutcheson, On Human 
Nature, ed. Thomas Mautner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), Appendix 15, p. 
163. 
'The British Journal, 30 May 1724. 
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The letter indicates Mandeville, or whoever it was who sheltered behind the 
signature `AB', obviously believed the sentiments expressed in Free Thoughts 
were shared by Gordon's `Criton'. As Mandeville's book attacks the clergy, 
supports toleration and the present administration and represents human nature as 
inherently selfish and self-serving, all views Gordon subscribed to, `AB' was 
undoubtedly correct in his assumption. Equally, if it was Gordon who penned the 
glowing commendation of Free Thoughts, it represents an open acknowledgement 
on his part of how much he and Mandeville were at one in terms of their analysis 
of man and society and in their over-arching concerns. 
Nor indeed was Trenchard's thought so very different to that of Mandeville and, 
although he lacked the satirist's wit, in terms of religious, moral and political 
philosophy he was at one with Gordon and Mandeville. 7 If, therefore, modem 
critics can confuse the work or influence of Mandeville and Gordon in this way it 
does call into question the civic humanist paradigm itself, which pits Mandeville 
on the side of the `moderns', as champion of the new economic age, against `Cato', 
on the side of the `ancients' and as defender of classical virtue. 8 
However, Trenchard and Gordon's concept of virtue, like that of Mandeville, was 
not tied to the civic humanist model of an arms-bearing citizen freeholder. They 
defined virtue in precisely the same utilitarian terms as Mandeville: 
Morality, or moral virtues, are certain rules of mutual convenience or 
indulgence, conducive or necessary to the well-being of society. Most of 
47See, for example, CL, II, nos. 109,110,11,15,116,122 and 124. 48Pocock, Kramnick, Goldsmith and Gunn all subscribe to this interpretation. It has to be restated 
that these confusions relate to a period prior to what is seen in the civic humanist analysis as 
Gordon's fall from grace. See, for example, Beyond Liberty and Property, p. 23. 
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these are obvious; for every man knows what he desires himself; which is, 
to be free from oppression, and the insults of others, and to enjoy the fruits 
of his own acquisitions, arising from his labour or invention. And since he 
can have no reason to expect this indulgence to himself, unless he allow it 
to others, who have equal reason to expect it from him, it is the common 
interest of all, who unite together in the same society, to establish such rules 
and maxims for their mutual preservation; that no man can oppress or injure 
another, without suffering by it himself. As far as these rules are 
discoverable by the light of reason, or that portion of understanding which 
most, or all men have, they are called morality ... I 
have often read, with 
pleasure, pretty speculative discourses upon the intrinsick excellence of 
virtue, and of its having a real existence independent of human 
considerations, or worldly relations: But when I have been able to forget, or 
lay aside the dalliances and amusements of fancy, and the beautiful turns of 
expression, I could consider it philosophically, only as an empty sound, 
when detached and separated from natural, national, or religious politicks 49 
Similarly, like Mandeville, Trenchard and Gordon did not share the neo- 
Harringtonian veneration of England's Gothic past and viewed life then as a 
brutish and mean existence. In direct contrast to neo-Harringtonian doctrine, 
Trenchard and Gordon perceived liberty to be the product of a consumer society 
rather than an agrarian one. As Adam Smith was later to argue, Trenchard 
contended that man possessed more liberty in a consumer society because it 
allowed him to sell the products of his labour within the marketplace rather than 
selling his person to a feudal overlord. Moreover, in typically Mandevillian 
manner, he reasoned that the luxury of the rich produced social benefits, providing 
work and therefore a living for the poor: 
Now in countries where no other arts are in use, but only husbandry and the 
professions necessary to it, and to support those who are employed about it; 
all the other inhabitants have no means of purchasing food and raiment, but 
by selling their persons, and becoming vile slaves and vassals to their 
princes, lords, or other proprietors of the land; and are obliged, for 
necessary sustenance, to follow them in their wild wars, and their personal 
and factious quarrels, and to become the base instruments of their ambition 
49CL, II, no. 108, pp. 761-2. The letter is written by Trenchard. For Mandeville's view see The Fable of the Bees, I, p. 244. 
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and pride ... This is the forlorn condition of mankind, 
in most of the wild 
empires of the East; this was their condition in all the Gothick 
governments; and this is the condition of Poland and of the highlands of 
Scotland; where a few have liberty, and all the rest are slaves. And nothing 
can free mankind from this abject and forlorn condition, but the invention 
of arts and sciences; that is, the finding out of more materials and 
expedients to make life easy and pleasant; and the inducing people to 
believe, what they will readily believe, that other things are necessary to 
their happiness, besides those which nature has made necessary. Thus the 
luxury of the rich becomes the bread of the poor. 50 
Mandeville, like Trenchard and Gordon, built on the sensationalist philosophy of 
Hobbes and Locke in order to present commercial society as natural to man, a 
product of his ceaseless desires. Adopting an anti-Cartesian view of man, all three 
authors conceived of him as a machine like any other animal, merely one more 
intricately made. sl Man is presented as a flesh and blood machine which endlessly 
responds to and seeks out new forms of stimulation. So that when the most basic 
of his desires have been met, those of food and shelter, he seeks new forms of 
stimulus. Once he is in no danger of starving or suffering from exposure to the 
elements, his desires turn to more palatable food and more commodious habitation 
and in order to satisfy those desires men are driven to industry and to trade. 
2 
Mandeville, however, was considerably more sophisticated in his analysis than 
`Cato' and described how in the process of civilisation man's psychological needs 
and desires take on as great a force as those which are physical. Man's self-liking, 
his natural sense of superiority distinct from his instinct of self-love, becomes more 
501bid., I, no. 67, pp. 472-3. The author of this letter is Trenchard. For Mandeville's anti-nostalgic 
analysis of the wide-spread material benefits of modernity compared to the drudgery endured by the 
majority of men in the past, see The Fable of the Bees, I, pp. 169-172. For comparison with Adam 
Smith see, for example, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 3 vols. 
(London, 1791), H, pp. 82,88; III, 42-3,183-192. 5'See CL, II, no. 104, pp. 735-6, and nos. 116 and 122; The Fable of the Bees, II, pp. 174,139-40. 52See CL, I, no. 40, p. 278. 
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highly developed and the need to be admired and to feel validated in his judgement 
of himself becomes his motivating force. 53 
Yet both Mandeville and `Cato' were at one in seeking to understand man 
`scientifically' and, like Hobbes, saw him as essentially selfish. He was a creature 
governed by his `darling passion' of pride, which was insatiable in the tribute it 
demanded: 
The world is governed by men, and men by their passions; which being 
boundless and insatiable, are always terrible when they are not controuled. 
Who was ever satiated with riches, or surfeited with powers, or tired with 
honours? " 
Hence, Mandeville and `Cato', following similar lines of thought to the de la 
Courts, believed a `republican' form of government, incorporating a series of 
checks and balances, was best framed to restrain man and thereby render society 
stable and secure. Far from being a champion of true civic virtue, as proponents of 
the neo-Harringtonian thesis would have it, `Cato', like Mandeville, considered 
this attribute not only contrary to what was known of human nature but 
unnecessary: 
[T]he making of laws supposes all men naturally wicked; and the surest 
mark of virtue is, the observation of laws that are virtuous: If therefore we 
would look for virtue in a nation, we must look for it in the nature of 
ss government. 
S3See The Fable of the Bees, I, pp 346-7; II, pp. 129-137. 54 CL, I, no. 33, p. 238. 
"Ibid., I, no. 31, p. 222. Also see II, no. 108, p. 762. As argued in chapter 3 of this thesis, in this 
Trenchard and Gordon were more Harringtonian than neo-Harringtonian. 
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Virtue was considered by Trenchard and Gordon, as it was by Mandeville, in 
strictly functional terms and they viewed it as an artificial construct rather than as a 
fixed and intrinsic quality of man: 
We do not expect philosophical virtue from them; but only that they follow 
virtue as their interest, and find it penal and dangerous to depart from it. 
And this is the only virtue that the world wants, and the only virtue, that it 
can trust to 56 
All three men were also slightly equivocal about how men's passions might be 
made to serve the public interest. Mandeville, in `An Enquiry Into the Origin of 
Moral Virtue, suggested that moral codes were devised originally by those in 
power, in order to safeguard their positions and to deceive the people into meekly 
accepting their lot 57 Similarly, Gordon insisted that those who urge men to mortify 
their appetites often meant nothing but `Make your passions tame, that I may ride 
them. '58 Yet at the end of `A Search Into the Nature of Society', Mandeville 
explained the paradox contained in the title of his book, `that Private Vices by the 
dextrous Management of a skilful Politician may be turned into Publick 
Benefits. '59 In like fashion, Trenchard argued: 
[Man's] passions, which direct and govern all the motions of his mind, 
seems to me to be purely mechanical ... and whoever would govern 
him, 
and lead him, must apply to those passions; that is, pull the proper ropes, 
and turn the wheels which will put the machine in motion 60 
The suggestion in both the case of Trenchard and Gordon and in that of Mandeville 
seems to be that it was in the interest of the nation for governors not to attempt to 
keep the people timidly virtuous but to allow their passions a wide scope, such as 
56CL, I, no. 40, p. 282. See also CL, I, no. 33 and The Fable of the Bees, II, pp. 323,335. 17The Fable of the Bees, I, pp. 41-57. S1CL, I, no. 39, p. 276. 59 The Fable of the Bees, I, p. 369. 
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was offered by modern, as opposed to ancient, society. Laws and constitutional 
mechanisms were there to restrain men, and their governors, when those passions 
threatened to become detrimental to the nation. 
It would seem very much the case, therefore, that contrary to general opinion 
Mandeville and `Cato' do not constitute polar opposites within a civic humanist 
paradigm. In terms of their religious, moral and political philosophy there are, as 
has been shown, major convergences. Mandeville, who detested hypocrisy and 
whose political heritage differed form that of his adopted land, eschewed the 
`Roman language' which Trenchard and Gordon sometimes employed in order to 
criticise the abuses of power, yet this should not obscure the fact that their 
underlying beliefs and concerns were remarkably similar. All three men endorsed 
the new commercial age, and the financial structures which underpinned it, because 
it promised increased material and religious liberty for the individual. Equally, 
none of them felt overly enamoured of the man who was leading the nation into 
this new age. In the case of Trenchard and Gordon their support for Walpole 
depended on their perception of the degree of danger posed by High Church Tories 
and Jacobites to the nation's liberty. The same to some extent was true of 
Mandeville but his personal feelings towards Walpole, coloured by the first 
minister's treatment of his friend Macclesfield, may explain why his support for 
the ministry was less enthusiastic. If Trenchard, Gordon and Mandeville have to 
be categorised, it is perhaps more correct therefore to consider them not as 
adversaries, representatives of opposing Court and Country ideologies, but as 
`independent Whigs', however limited that description might be. 
60CL, IT, no. 105, p. 742. 
Chapter VI 
The Influence of the French Moralistes 
in the work of `Cato' and Mandeville 
In the previous chapter it has been argued that Mandeville and `Cato' can not be 
viewed as representative of the polar oppositions which constitute the civic 
humanist paradigm. Instead it has been suggested that rather than being 
diametrically and fundamentally opposed to one another, the authors of the Cato's 
Letters and Mandeville shared a similar perspective in terms of their moral, 
political and religious philosophy. Indeed it is possible to trace a number of 
common, and mutually reinforcing, influences which appear to have shaped the 
distinctive viewpoint expressed by all three writers. 
A number of commentators have noted that Mandeville's work owed much to 
Bayle, La Rochefoucauld and the French Catholic moraliste tradition. ' However 
what has not previously been observed is that Gordon's work reveals a similar 
debt. Obviously the view of man put forward in this French tradition, of human 
nature defined in terms of its psychological egoism, is one with which both 
Trenchard and Gordon would have been familiar from their knowledge of Hobbes' 
work. However, what appeared to interest both men, and Gordon in particular, was 
the way in which the moralistes and their successors elaborated on Hobbes' 
naturalistic study of man in order to offer a sophisticated analysis of the operation 
of self-love and, specifically, its ability to produce socially beneficial results. 
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The Jansenist conception of man as a creature motivated entirely by self-love 
complemented that presented by Hobbes and others in the modern natural law 
tradition. It was dominated by an awareness of the weakness of reason, of the 
strength of the passions and of the power of pride and vanity. However, at the 
same time as it insisted on the unregenerate nature of man, of his inability to act 
except on the basis of self-love, Jansenist doctrine upheld a rigorous morality, in 
the knowledge that it could never be achieved without divine aid. Salvation, it was 
argued, could only be obtained as a gift from God and could not be won, as the 
Jesuits held, in part through man's own efforts. The combination of such 
pessimism about human nature and such an unyielding morality produced in the 
work of the Port Royalists an excoriating psychological examination of man. The 
aim was to tear from men the public disguises they wore in order to deceive others 
and, more insidiously, to deceive themselves into a belief in their virtue. The 
theme of unmasking or dissecting the layers of man's deception, which also figures 
largely in Mandeville's work, was therefore prominent in Jansenist texts: `We are 
nothing but lies, duplicity, contradiction, and we hide and disguise ourselves from 
ourselves. i3 
At the same time, in the last half of the seventeenth century a strong current 
developed in Jansenist thought which saw the many manifestations of self-love, in 
all its subtle and ingratiating forms, as a necessary component of social cohesion. 
'See especially F. B. Kaye's Introduction to The Fable of the Bees; and T. A. Home, The Social and 
Political Thought of Bernard Mandeville (London: Macmillan Press, 1978), pp. 20-25. 
2The doctrinal difference at issue was that of efficacious grace as opposed to sufficient grace. 
'Blaise Pascal, Pensees (London: Penguin, 1966), fragment 655. 
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In the absence of natural sociability self-love was seen to bind men together in civil 
society. In order to garner the admiration and validation necessary for self-love to 
thrive it compelled men to rein in, and cloak in different guise, this ruling passion 
which would otherwise render them intolerable to one another: `Social life would 
not last long if men were not taken in by each other. '4 Self-love remained 
reprehensible but in its operation it might be seen as evidence of God's mercy, so 
that even man's fallen nature could be turned to good effects It could therefore be 
considered under two aspects, the rigoristic and the utilitarian, and judged 
according to these criteria. In strict moral terms self-love was always to be 
condemned; however, in some instances, where it conduced to an improvement in 
the general welfare of mankind, the effects, if not the motive, might be approved. 
This concept of duality was perhaps most clearly, and enthusiastically, expressed 
by Nicole. In conventional Jansenist fashion he called men to recognise their sinful 
nature and, in De la crainte de Dieu, likened human existence to a nightmarish 
masque, where a facade of sociability and comeliness hid from public view the 
rank depravity which lurked beneath. Yet he also described how man's ambition to 
satisfy his own desires propelled him to satisfy the desires of others. Men gratified 
their psychological needs in a quid pro quo which involved the exchange of 
civilities and favours, a system of mutual flattery, and similarly in gratifying their 
4La Rochefoucauld, Maxims (London: Penguin, 1959), no. 87. SJean Domat, a close friend of Pascal and a fellow Jansenist, described how God ameliorated the 
worst effects of self-love: `From this very principle of division He has made a tie that binds men 
together in a thousand ways and supports the greater part of our engagements. ', Traite des loix, 
quoted in N. O. Keohane, Philosophy and the state in France, the Renaissance to the Enlightenment 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 305. For a general discussion of Jansenism see 
also pp. 283-311. 
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material needs they served the material needs of others, through the process of 
commerce. So it was that avarice brought benefits and an improvement in human 
happiness which exceeded by far anything that might be effected through the 
exercise of mere charity: 
Men being void of Charity, by the disorder of Sin, nevertheless remain full 
of wants, and in an infinite number of ways depend one upon another. 
Concupiscence therefore hath taken the place of Charity that it may supply 
these wants; and the means it uses are such that one cannot enough admire 
them; vulgar Charity cannot reach so far. Going in the Country we meet 
almost every where People that are ready to serve those that pass on the 
Road, and who have Houses furnisht to entertain them. These are at the 
Traveller's dispose, he commands, they obey. They seem to believe that we 
do them a tenderness in accepting their service, they never seek to be 
excis'd from lending that assistance which is requir'd. What would deserve 
our wonder more than these People, were they animated and set on work by 
Charity? But it is Concupiscence that does it, and does it so well and 
gracefully, that they would even have us to think that they take it for a 
courtesie that we employ them in our service. 
What a piece of Charity would it be to build for another an intire House, 
furnish it with all necessary Houshold-stuff; and after that to deliver him up 
the Key? Concupiscence does this cheerfully. What Charity would it be to 
go and fetch Drugs from the Indies, to Submit ones self to the meanest 
offices, and serve others in the most abject and painful commands? And 
this Concupiscence does without ever complaining. 6 
Since judged by outcome the results produced by charity were no different to those 
of `enlightened' self-love, which identified its own interests with those of others, 
Nicole proposed that instead of attempting the hopeless task of persuading men to 
practice charity, they should be encouraged to recognise how each man's interest 
was tied to that of his fellow. However, he was conscious that enlightened self- 
love would not suffice alone, man's fallen nature necessarily prescribed the limits 
6Pierre Nicole, `Of Grandeur', Moral Essays, 2 vols. (London, 1677), II, p. 167. Nicole made 
explicit what was implicit in Pascal, who chose to combine brevity with biting irony: 'Man's 
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of his capacity for enlightenment, and that therefore it required to be circumscribed 
by strict laws and firm government. Like Hobbes, he believed that government had 
to be absolute and unlimited in order to exert the control necessary to restrain 
man's selfish passions. Equally he realised that a sovereign power could not 
depend on the use of sheer brute force as a means of coercion, it was too blunt and 
ineffective an instrument, and instead he argued that naked power was best decked 
out in pomp and finery in order to dazzle and inspire men with awe, thereby 
rendering them willingly submissive. Pride led the powerful to regale themselves 
in 
splendour, and was therefore reprehensible, but it also served a useful purpose, by 
eliciting a deference from inferiors which maintained the social order. Writing of 
the external marks of respect given by inferiors to the great, Nicole argued: 
[T]hough these perhaps in their origin be but the inventions of Man's 
pride, which perchance enjoys its Greatness better by seeing the abjection 
of others; yet ought we to acknowledge that these respects and deferences 
are in themselves both useful and just; and that though Pride had not, yet 
Reason ought to have brought them in fashion. 7 
Nicole's thought in many respects followed or elucidated that of Pascal, although 
the fascinated enthusiasm revealed in the former's account of the economic 
prosperity generated by self-love is not to be found in his fellow Port Royalist. In 
Pascal, approval of the social benefits produced by the indulgence of men's 
passions is never allowed to dull his penetrating exposure of human corruption. 
This qualified approval extended to the greatest benefit afforded to men, that of 
civil stability and peace. He regarded the constitution of society as merely the 
greatness even in his concupiscence. He has managed to produce such a remarkable system from it 
and make it the image of true charity. ', Pensees, fragment 118. 7'Of Grandeur', Moral Essays, II, p. 158. 
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result of a Hobbesian struggle for power and viewed its codes as signifying nothing 
more than the will of the strong. Whilst these codes should still be respected, not 
only because the strong had the power to punish but also because there was so 
much disagreement between men as to what was right, Pascal reminded men that a 
distinction remained between human justice and God's justice. However, the 
common people, he argued, needed the illusion that laws were just because they 
would not otherwise submit themselves to a fabricated justice, lacking as they did 
the ability to comprehend that as man was incapable of true justice if he wished for 
8 
peace and security he had to make do with what his masters called justice. 
It is certain that Gordon knew and admired Pascal's work and, in view of the 
persistent moraliste themes which occur in Cato's Letters, it is not unlikely that 
this was true of Trenchard also. Gordon recommended to his readers `the 
Reflections of the excellent Monsieur Pascal', as one of the `most useful and 
entertaining Books' produced in the later ages and elsewhere had one of his 
fictional interlocutors second this praise by declaring `Monsieur Pascal, a learned, 
Candid, and acute Writer, as any of his Age' .9 The extent of 
Gordon's familiarity 
with the work of other Jansenist writers is not so easily established. Certainly 
Nicole's Moral Essays were available in translation in England and were widely 
read and the warmth of Gordon's admiration suggests more than a superficial or 
narrow acquaintance with the Port Royalists: 
8See Pensees, fragments 103,520,525,645,828. 
9The Humourist, p. 130, also printed in St. James Journal, 4 May 1723; Thomas Gordon, 'A 
Dialogue between a Noble Convert and his late Confessor', Essays Against Popery, Slavery, and 
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The Gentlemen of Port Royal were, for their Learning and Writings, for 
their Religion and Virtue, an ornament to the learned world as well as to the 
Kingdom of France. '° 
Cato's Letters also refer to La Rochefoucauld, La Bruyere and Fontenelle, who 
although not Jansenists shared the Jansenist view of human nature and the role 
played by self-love. La Rochefoucauld has in recent years undergone a re- 
evaluation; once seen as a sceptic and libertin, it is now argued he should be 
understood within the context of Jansenism. l It is within that framework that 
Gordon seems to have considered the author of the Maxims. On the two occasions 
that he quotes La Rochefoucauld directly it is in relation to religious toleration. 
Like many other Protestants, Gordon regarded Jansenism as the acceptable face of 
Roman Catholicism and viewed the Port Royalists as victims of Jesuit persecution, 
the latter being seen not only as bigots but meddlers in state affairs, the two 
cardinal sins in Gordon's eyes. The Jansenists had come under attack from the 
Jesuits over their insistence on the efficacious nature of grace and Pascal had 
launched a scathing counterattack in his Les Provinciales. Gordon defended the 
Port Royalists, arguing: 
[A]11 this merit [that of the Port Royalists] saved them not from contumely 
and persecution, because they had defended the eternal laws of Morality 
and the Gospel against the execrable maxims of casuistry of the Jesuits, 
who in their voluminous writings had confounded all Morality and 
Conscience. For this the Gentlemen of Port Royal were represented as 
Atheists, Heretics, and enemies of the Church, nay as enemies to the 
Arbitrary Power Published during the late unnatural Rebellion in the Years 1745 and 1746 
(London, 1750), p. 195. 1 °The Works of Tacitus, II, p. 137. The first English translation of Nicole's Moral Essays was 
printed in 1677. Bearing in mind the similarities between the Jansenist and natural law tradition, it 
is perhaps not surprising that Locke was sufficiently impressed by Nicole to produce a translation of 
three of the Essays for the Countess of Shaftesbury, later published in 1828. See Philosophy and 
the state in France, p. 294. 
"See ibid., p. 289. 
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Government, and thence exposed to all injustice, ill usage and the frowns of 
power. 12 
Gordon's use of La Rochefoucauld illustrates how deeply he was influenced by 
Jansenist thinking. The Maxims, in conventional Jansenist manner, condemn self- 
love but they also adopt a second, utilitarian criterion in judging man's abiding 
passion. Under this second heading self-love might be considered neutral, neither 
good nor evil but judged to warrant the name of virtue under some circumstances 
and vice under others. 13 The standard for judging conduct virtuous or vicious for 
La Rochefoucauld was whether it facilitated sociability, whether it made men more 
or less agreeable to one another. 14 So it was that men counted a quality, such as 
moderation, virtuous which should properly be termed a vice, being a 
manifestation of self-love in the form of love of ease and the absence of 
disturbance: `Moderation has been declared a virtue so as to curb the ambition of 
the great and console lesser folk for their lack of fortune and merit. ''s 
Gordon can be seen to have employed similar Jansenist distinctions. Although, 
drawing on Hobbesian and Lockean sensationalism, he naturalised self-love or 
12The Works of Tacitus, II, pp. 137-8. A common view, then as now, was to see Jansenism as a 
Catholic version of Calvinism. Hume's opinion seems typical of that of British Protestants: '[T]he 
Jesuits, are great friends to superstition, rigid observers of external forms and ceremonies, and 
devoted to the authority of the priests, and to tradition. The jansenists are enthusiasts, and zealous 
promoters of the passionate devotion, and of the inward life; little influenced by authority; and in a 
word, but half catholics. The consequences are exactly conformable to the foregoing reasoning. The 
Jesuits are the tyrants of the people, and the slaves of the court: And the Jansenists preserve alive the 
small sparks of the love of liberty, which are to be found in the FRENCH nation. ', David Hume, `Of 
Moral Prejudices', Political Writings, ed. S. D. Warner and D. W. Livingston (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
1994), p. 189. 
'3Maxims, nos. 253 and 305. However in strict moral terms self-love always remained evil: `To 
punish man for original sin, God has let him turn his self-love into a god to torment him in every act 
of his life. ', no. 509. 
14 See Maxims, nos. 273 and 156. La Rochefoucauld, whose life was that of the Court, was less 
concerned than Nicole with moralising economic activity. The virtues he discussed were those 
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self-interest, he also adopted the role of moralist and sought to unmask man in 
order to bring him to a better understanding of himself and to effect a reformation: 
to rid men of their bigotry and intolerance. "' He argued amour propre was the root 
of all passions and that `all the different passions are only several names for the 
operations of self-love. ' 17 All activity labelled virtuous, the authors of Cato's 
Letters held, was in effect motivated by self-love, however much men sought to 
deceive themselves and others to the country: 
A good humoured man, when he pities another, gratifies a natural passion, 
in having a fellow-feeling of the calamities of others, and a desire to see all 
men out of pain or trouble. A generous man pleases his vanity, ostentation, 
or temper, in doing good to others; or by it intends to gain friends or 
dependants. An indulgent parent takes pleasure to see that his children 
(whom he esteems parts of himself) live happy, contented, and make a 
figure in the world; and derives credit and reputation to himself from their 
doing so. A beneficent patron, or a man in love, reaps great personal 
satisfaction in obliging the objects of his kindness, and by making them 
more devoted to himself. 18 
Gordon's description of self-love was taken straight from La Rochefoucauld but 
could equally have been supplied by Pascal: 
Of all the passions which belong to human nature, self-love is the strongest, 
and the root of all the rest; or, rather, all the different passions are only 
several names for the several operations of self-love. Self-love, says the 
Duke of Rochefoucauld, is the love of one's self, and of every thing else for 
one's own sake: It makes a man the idolater of himself, and the tyrant of 
appropriate to an honnete homme, such as valour, moderation and civility and friendship and 
generosity. See nos. 1,16,21,81,83,144,264. 
'5Maxims, no. 308. 16It will be remembered that, in The Independent Whig, Trenchard and Gordon had stated that their 
project was to bring about a reformation by attacking 'priestcraft and tyranny'. See chapter 3 of this 
thesis. They, like Mandeville, were not in favour of conventional movements to reform manners. 17CL, I, no. 31, p. 222. This, of course, also echoed the image of human nature presented by the de 
la Courts. Pieter de la Court argued: `Every man finds in himself, and observes in others, the 
Passion of Self-love prevails so far over our Reason', Fables, Moral and Political, II, p. 42. So too, 
the idea of self-deception and the practice of `masking', which is a constant theme of Jansenist 
literature and appears in the work of Trenchard and Gordon, as well as in Mandeville's work, also 
occupied the de la Courts. 
18CL, II, no. 117, p. 815. 
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others. He observes that man is a mixture of contrarieties; imperious and 
supple, sincere and false, fearful and bold, merciful and cruel: He can 
sacrifice every pleasure to the getting of riches, and all his riches to a 
pleasure: He is fond of his preservation, and yet sometimes eager after his 
own destruction: He can flatter those whom he hates, destroy those whom 
he loves. 
This is a picture of mankind: and they who say it is a false one, ought to 
shew that they deserve a better. '9 
Gordon was here exposing religious intolerance as the operation of self-love, the 
desire to have others believe and practice as oneself, and continued: 
Whatever men think or do, especially if they have found a good name for it, 
be it ever so foolish or bad, is wisest and best in their own eyes: But this is 
not all; we will needs be plaguing our neighbours, if they do not quit upon 
our authority their own thoughts and practices for ours ... Everything 
is so 
perverted and abused, and the best things most, that a very wise man [La 
Rochefoucauld] had but too much reason to say, that truth did so much 
good in the world, as the appearance and pretence of it did evil. Thus the 
saving of men's souls is so universally understood to be a great and 
glorious blessing, that for the sake of it men have suffered, and do suffer, 
the highest misery and bondage from the imposters who pretend to bestow 
it, in the dark parts of the world which are by far the greatest parts of the 
world. 20 
In unmasking man Gordon made the Jansenist distinction between actions titled 
virtuous by society, in consequence of the benefits to the general welfare they 
produced, and the inner motive of the agent of the action. Following La 
Rochefoucauld, he also made play of the chance nature of whether a man was 
19CL, I, no. 31, p. 222. 201bid., no. 31, pp. 223-4. The maxim referred to by Gordon is: `Truth does not do so much good in 
the world as the semblance of truth does evil', Maxims, no. 4. It does not explicitly mention 
toleration, as that would perhaps be an inappropriate subject for an honnete homme, although that 
meaning could be implicit given that the age in which La Rochefoucauld lived was one beset by 
religious wars. However Gordon may have been thinking of Bayle's comments on toleration: `[T]o 
comprehend how a Man may be very Zealous and very Vicious at the same time, we need only 
consider, the love of Religion in the greatest Part, is no way different from their other Passions for 
common Objects. ', Pierre Bayle, Miscellaneous Reflections on the Comet, 2 vols. (London, 1708), 
II, p. 317. 
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considered virtuous or vicious, depending on the outcome of his actions. Man was 
so much a slave of his passions that he was incapable of choosing virtue freely and 
if society called him good it was merely because his passions chanced to serve the 
good of society: 
For men to act independently of their passions, is a contradiction; since 
their passions enter into all that they do, and are the source of it: and the 
best actions which men perform, often arise from fear, vanity, shame, and 
the like causes. When the passions of men do good to others, it is called 
virtue and public spirit; and when they do hurt to others it is called 
selfishness, dishonesty, lust, and other names of infamy. The motive of 
every man's conduct is fetched from within, and has a good or an ill name 
according to its effects upon others; and sometimes the great difference 
between an honest man and a knave, is no other than a piece of humour, or 
a piece of chance. 21 
In The Humourist, in typical Jansenist mode, Gordon `unmasked' man's self-love 
and revealed him as a creature whose second nature was that of a dissembler and 
who not only deceived others but succeeded in deceiving himself: 
Mankind is ever mask'd without knowing it. We learn to disguise 
ourselves in Childhood. Good Breeding is nothing but putting on the 
Vizard well, and good Manners is only wearing it handsomely. We seldom 
lay it aside, even when we are alone, as though we were afraid of seeing 
ourselves naked. We never speak what we think; and there are some 
Thoughts we [hide] from with a studied Dexterity. 22 
21CL, I, no. 40, pp. 279-280. See also Maxims, nos. 1,57,58,380,631. Gordon also repeated in the 
same letter, without attribution, one of La Rochefoucauld's most persistent criticisms, that virtue 
was often the result of laziness: 'Disinterestedness is often created by laziness, pride, or fear; and 
then it is no virtue', p. 279. A similar point is made in The Humourist, this time citing La 
Rochefoucauld. See also Maxims nos. 16,169,398,512. 22The Humourist, p. 201. The title of The Humourist suggests a light-hearted piece of entertainment, 
an impression belied by the biting satire on human nature contained in this collection of essays. 
Because the net of Gordon's satire was cast so wide at first sight it is not always clear who 
his main 
target was. He defends Walpole's ministry, the `great men' charged with the nation's welfare, from 
the criticism of opposition journalists and the `rabble', whom he abuses mercilessly. Yet at the same 
time the compliments he pays those same great men are heavy with irony. It should perhaps be 
noted that some of the essays in The Humourist also appeared in St. James's Journal, a pro-ministry 
paper set up at a time when Walpole's administration was coming under intense attack from the 
opposition press. In response to this offensive, Gordon seems to have been prepared to lend his 
support to Walpole against the Tories and, in his view, the misguided Old Whigs who he believed 
were in danger of opening a breach in the nation's defences which would allow in the Pretender. 
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Even as he criticised man's self-love, however, Gordon acknowledged its social 
utility. By adopting masks men made themselves bearable to one another and in 
the absence of virtue and natural sociability self-love bound society together: 
Were we not to endeavour to throw a Veil over our more secret and retired 
Actions, we should appear more ridiculous and mischievous than Apes and 
Monkeys and be intolerable even to one another, for we can almost at first 
View discern the least Spot or Blemish in another, tho' it is with exceeding 
Difficulty we are brought to discover one in ourselves, for this Reason 
Hypocrisy has such a share among the Ingredients of which we are 
composed; it is given to supply the Place of Virtue. 23 
It is possible, therefore, that like Mandeville and Jansenist writers Gordon 
maintained a dual morality, one which was rigoristic, concerned primarily with 
motive, and the other utilitarian, concerned to a greater extent with consequence. 24 
However at the same time, Gordon was not ready to let Walpole off the hook entirely. It seems a 
case of my enemy's enemy is my friend; Gordon was vehemently anti-Jacobite so almost inevitably 
he sometimes found himself on the same side as Walpole. See The Humourist, p. 207. 23See ibid., p. 155. 
24It needs to be reiterated that 'utilitarian' is used here, as elsewhere in this thesis, in the broad sense 
and not to denote an ethical theory. Individual utilitarians, in the strict sense of the word would, of 
course, place varying degrees of emphasis on the motive element of an action. Whilst it might 
appear unnecessarily confusing to ascribe the term utilitarian to Trenchard and Gordon's thought, it 
would perhaps generate greater confusion to describe them as Epicureans. One of the problems of 
attaching this label to Trenchard and Gordon, or indeed to Mandeville, is that Epicureanism, as they 
would have understood it via Gassendi and other sympathetic commentators, would have seemed a 
too severe and idealistic creed. From Gassendi, or from translations of his work, they would have 
learnt: 'Epicurus 
... makes Happiness to consist in the Ease of the Body, and the Tranquility of the Mind, teaching at the same time, and maintaining, That the efficient Causes of this Felicity, are 
neither the delicious Wines, nor the delicate Meats, nor any such thing; but a sound, just and 
enlightened Reason assisted by Vertue, from which it is not to be separated, and which duly weighs 
and examines the Causes and Motives that induce us, either to embrace or shun any thing. ' 
Epicurus taught that men should distinguish between lusts or desires that are natural and necessary 
and those that are vain and superfluous `for the Happiness of Life depends upon the denial of the 
latter, and our being content with the enjoyment of the former. ', Three Discourses of Happiness, 
Virtue, and Liberty. Collected from the Works of the Learn 'd Gassendi, pp. 13,39. They would not 
have subscribed to the idea of a hierarchy of pleasures. True happiness, as defined by Epicurus, 
would have seemed to them beyond the attainment of ordinary men. Mandeville was emphatic on 
this point: `That the highest Good consisted in Pleasure, was the Doctrine of Epicurus, who yet led a 
Life exemplary for Continence, Sobriety, and other Virtues, which made People of the succeeding 
Ages quarrel about the Signification of Pleasure. Those who argued from the Temperance of the 
Philosopher, said, That the Delight Epicurus meant, was being virtuous; so Erasmus in his 
Colloquies tells us, That there are no greater Epicures than pious Christians. Others that reflected 
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Yet at the same time, his adoption of Jansenist sentiments and motifs might equally 
be seen as a misanthropic device rather than as an expression of sincere belief. 
Indeed this is a charge which has sometimes been directed at Mandeville, that his 
insistence on applying rigorist criteria in tandem with the utilitarian when judging 
men's actions was not only logically untenable but insincere. F. B. Kaye argues that 
Mandeville's juxtaposition of, in Kaye's opinion, these contrary standards resulted 
in a reductio ad absurdum of rigorism. 25 However, M. J. Scott-Taggart has 
disputed Kaye's conclusion and contends, correctly it would seem, that it is 
perfectly consistent to hold to both standards, as `loosely' defined by Kaye. Scott- 
Taggart argues that: 
[T]here is nothing paradoxical about this mixing as such. We might 
analogously be interested both in the dexterity and effectiveness of an 
action, and discover that, although connected, the two were not exactly 
correlated to one another. To infer from this that one of them must be 
dropped as in some way impossible would be absurd: we select between 
them according to the purposes we want served. 26 
J. C. Maxwell takes a similar view to Scott-Taggart; however, he contends that it is 
in Mandeville's distinction between morals and politics that a genuinely utilitarian 
doctrine can be found in his work. Maxwell traces Mandeville's position to Bayle 
and the Calvinist segregation of grace and nature. Bayle's argument, in his 
on the dissolute Manners of the greatest Part of his Followers, would have it, that by Pleasures he 
could have understood nothing but sensual Ones, and the Gratification of our Passions. I shall not 
decide their Quarrel, but am of Opinion, that whether Men be good or bad, what they take delight 
in is the Pleasure, and not to look out for any further Etymology from the learned Languages, I 
believe an Englishman may justly call every Thing a Pleasure that pleases him, and according to this 
Definition we ought to dispute no more about Mens Pleasures than their Tastes: Trabit sua quemque 
Voluptas. ', The Fable of the Bees, I, pp. 147-8. As will be seen later in this chapter, those in the 
French Epicurean tradition, such as Saint-Evremond, were more elastic in their definition of virtue 
than were Trenchard, Gordon and Mandeville. uIbid., I, pp. xlviii-lxvi. 
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Miscellaneous Reflections on the Comet, taken up by Mandeville in The Fable of 
the Bees, was that as human nature was inherently corrupt a legislature could never 
prevent sin and its sole business, therefore, was to prevent sin being harmful to 
society. 27 As already indicated, this dual morality of rigorism and utilitarianism 
was also present in the work of Jansenist writers, who applied this distinction to all 
the social and political relationships which bound men together and absented it 
only from the realm of man's relationship with God. Whether or not Mandeville 
and Gordon seriously subscribed to this dual morality is a difficult question to 
answer conclusively and is perhaps one which they themselves would have had 
some trouble in answering. They both appear to have been influenced by a 
Calvinist or Jansenist theological distinction but they certainly did not accept that 
distinction on theological grounds, and neither man endorsed the doctrine of 
efficacious grace. Nor does it seem that either used the distinction merely as a 
cipher for the expression of his disgust with mankind. Instead it would appear that 
as arch-pragmatists, but arch-pragmatists in the cause of principles such as 
religious toleration, they saw no difficulty in judging actions by a dual set of 
criteria. In arriving at this position they were almost undoubtedly influenced by 
Bayle, whom both greatly admired, particularly for his views on toleration, despite 
his absolutist sympathies. 
M. J. Scott-Taggart, 'Mandeville: Cynic or Fool? ', The Philosophical Quarterly, 16 (1966), 221- 
232, at 228. See also Malcolm Jack, `Religion and Ethics in Mandeville', in Mandeville Studies, ed. 
1. Primer (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), pp. 34-42. 
27See J. C. Maxwell, `Ethics and Politics in Mandeville', Philosophy 26 (1951), 242-252. 
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Like his Jansenist forerunners, Bayle's scepticism about man's capacity for virtue 
went hand in hand with a marked political conservatism. In his entry on Hobbes in 
the Dictionary he commended the philosopher's absolutist doctrine, demurring 
ostensibly on the grounds of the system's impracticability, and, as previously 
noted, his admiration for Louis XIV evoked surprise from both Mandeville and 
Gordon. Nor was he reluctant to countenance morally dubious actions when 
carried out for reasons of state: 
Now to know how these Politicks agree with the Eternal Laws of Morality, 
and how such a contrariety between the Duties of Private Reasons and the 
Duties of Sovereigns does not destroy the Certainty of the immutable 
Notions of Honesty and Virtue, is another Question. 'Tis enough to say, 
that as Humane Societies are now constituted, Publick Interest is a Sun, 
with respect to general Virtues; and that these Virtues are Stars, which 
disappear in the Presence of the Sun. 28 
Mandeville and Gordon were at one with him in accepting that those who held 
power had sometimes to resort to measures inconsistent with accepted moral 
standards and, indeed, on occasion had a duty to do so. 29 
At the same time, Bayle sought to show that it was in the interest of a ruler to 
uphold a policy of toleration on matters of religion, since religious principles and 
reason played so little a part in determining men's actions, while the opposite 
course, persecution, conferred only odium on a governor. In his Miscellaneous 
Reflections on the Comet, he rejected the view that religion was the bond which 
held society together and kept men in check, as witnessed by the many examples of 
28Pierre Bayle, An Historical and Critical Dictionary, 4 vols. (London, 1710), II, p. 1169. See also 
Philosophy and the state in France, pp. 413-15. 
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believers who behaved more immorally than unbelievers. 30 This being the case, a 
governor could safely leave men to act as rulers of their own consciences since, 
Bayle argued, it was possible that even a society of atheists would observe all the 
civil and moral duties that other societies did, provided crimes were severely 
punished and honour and infamy were annexed to certain conduct. 31 Gordon took 
this as an article of faith and argued throughout his life that loyal subjects who 
professed a faith other than that of the established Church, and specifically 
Dissenters, should be allowed all the civil rights and access to public office enjoyed 
by Anglicans, since they posed no threat to the nation: 
For the Life of me, I cannot find how any Man's believing or not believing 
the Christian Religion, make the Foundation of his Majesty's government (I 
suppose they mean his Title to the Crown) a Bit the better or the worse. I 
take it, his present Majesty reigns over us by a better Title than any one 
Prince in the World has to reign over his Subjects: For he was called in by 
the united Consent and Desire of all Orders and Degrees of Men, for the 
Protection, as I observed before, of our Religious and Civil Rights and 
Liberties, which, before the late happy Revolution, we had no Security that 
we should enjoy an Hour: And it being one of those Liberties, that every 
Man should serve God his own way (not prejudicial to Society) and he 
having a Right to exercise this Liberty, I can by no means understand how 
his using it can at all alter the King's Title to the Crown, altho' it should 
carry him even to a Disbelief of the Christian Religion. 
He usually, like most other advocates of freedom of conscience of his day, 
excluded `papists' when making a plea for toleration. However, he did so on 
political rather than theological grounds, believing that popery instituted a parallel 
29See The Works of Sallust, p. 91-8 and The Fable of the Bees, II, pp. 333-4. All see chapter 7 of 
this thesis. 
30Bayle was also concerned in Miscellaneous Reflections with exposing the folly of superstition and 
the way in which temporal and spiritual authorities exploited men's superstitious beliefs in order to 
enhance their power. As already seen in chapter 4, this was an issue which appeared as a persistent 
theme in Trenchard's writing and may possibly have been influenced by Bayle. It features in a 
number of Cato's Letters, see for example nos. 77,78 and 79, as well as the subject of separate 
pamphlets, including his The Natural History of Superstition. 
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power structure which both rivalled the temporal authority and worked in tandem 
with absolute rule. He defined papists, therefore, as all those, such as High Church 
Anglicans, who subscribed to this idea of a rival hierarchy of power. Theoretically 
this meant that Catholics who acknowledged only one authority, that of the state, at 
least in so far as it related to their status as subjects rather than as communicants, 
should be allowed the same freedom of worship as their Anglican neighbours. 
Gordon conceded this in one of his pamphlets and even argued that atheists should 
be free from persecution: 
[Man] has a Liberty to receive the Sacrament according to the way of the 
Church of England, or according to the way of the Church of Rome, or not 
at all, but he may serve God without either Bread or Wine; and it is his 
Right to be protected in the Exercise of this Liberty, provided that in so 
doing he hurt no Man 32 
Elsewhere he criticised Henry III for his punitive taxation of English Jews, 
defending them as prime movers in the creation of the nation's prosperity and 
decrying the fact they had fallen victim to the evil of bigotry: 
Nor do I find that they [Jewish merchants] were ever more exacting, or in 
greater haste for wealth, than most other Traders generally are: It was no 
crime in them to be more knowing. But they were the Objects of religious 
33 hate, which never shews mercy, nor speaks truth 
Gordon's sentiments and reasoned arguments are ones which obviously echo 
Bayle, as do those expressed by Mandeville. The author of The Fable of the Bees 
borrowed from Bayle when asserting that a society of atheists would live no worse, 
3'Miscellaneous Reflections, II, p. 349. 32 Thomas Gordon, `Remarks upon two late Presentments of the Grand-Jury of the County of 
Middlesex', A Cordial for Low-Spirits, 2 vols. (London, 1751), II, pp. 197-8. Gordon was 
responding to criticism from the Middlesex Grand Jury regarding his anti-clericalism, which the 
Jurymen interpreted as an indication of disloyalty to the Crown. 33 Thomas Gordon, History of England, BL, MS Add. 20780, p. 241. 
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and possibly even better, than a society of believers. Bayle, when he pressed this 
view, pointed in evidence to the regularity with which the principles of the Gospel 
were disregarded in Christian society. Although men paid lip service to these 
principles they conducted themselves according to a very different, and indeed 
contrary, code. War, he argued, was incompatible with the tenets of Christianity 
yet Christian armies were as bloodthirsty and rapacious as any others. Bayle was 
particularly disgusted by the savagery of the crusaders, a sentiment which was 
shared by Gordon who suggested the good done to the world by the conversion of 
pagans to Christianity was counterbalanced by the perversion of Christianity into 
popery: 
Did the Worst Follies and Inventions of Paganism, from its beginning to 
this Day, ever commit half the spoil, or shed half the blood that some Popes 
have shed. A single massacre proceeding from the spirit of popery can't be 
matched in cruelty or number with the whole of paganism, including pagan 
human sacrifices. 34 
Gordon agreed with Bayle that men were not restrained by religion because they 
were ruled by their passions rather than by fixed principles. Men bent their 
principles to serve their interests and they therefore bore scant relation to men's 
actions. Bayle pointed out that Christ's teaching gave no mandate to Christians to 
persecute either each other or pagans yet, both he and Gordon insisted, they did so 
purely in furtherance of their own selfish ends. One of Cato's Letters written by 
Gordon takes as its theme `Men not ruled by Principle, but by Passion' and, 
34 Ibid., p. 208. For Bayle see Miscellaneous Reflections, I, pp. 280-5. 
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quoting from Bayle's entry on Epicurus in the Dictionary, draws out an argument 
for toleration and against ecclesiastical authority. 35 
Both Mandeville and Gordon also seem to have followed Bayle in arguing that 
honour carried a dual meaning, one moral and true and the other socially 
determined and false and that the two were mutually incompatible. Bayle argued 
that atheists were as capable of worldly honour as Christians, since it was merely a 
product of human construction, erected on the foundations of natural temperament, 
self-love and education. His argument that male honour, honour of the sword, was 
repugnant to Christian precepts was taken up by Mandeville and used as the central 
premise of his An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour and the Usefulness of 
Christianity in War. 
Gordon and Mandeville made a further criticism, however, and attacked worldly 
honour not only on rigorist grounds but also on utilitarian ones, arguing that it was 
outdated and no longer relevant in its present form to a society transformed by a 
financial revolution. It arose because it met the needs of a feudal society, where 
the bonds which bound men together were those of arms. However in a 
commercial society, where the ties which united men were those of trade, a 
different sort of honour was needed, one which made it incumbent on men to 
35The quotation Gordon uses is 'Multitudes of Christians believe well, and live ill: But Epicurus and 
his followers had, on the contrary, very ill opinions, and yet lived well. ', CL, I, no. 44, pp. 298-9. 
The title of Gordon's letter paraphrases Bayle's pronouncement: 'You may call Man a reasonable 
Creature, as long as you please: Still it's true, he hardly ever acts by fixt Principles. ', Miscellaneous 
Reflections, I, p. 274. It was also cited by Mandeville, who observed: 'Mr. Bayle has endeavour'd 
to prove at large in his Reflexions on Comets: That Man is so unaccountable a Creature as to act 
most commonly against his Principle', The Fable of the Bees, I, p. 167. 
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honour their contracts and their debts. Laws already existed for this purpose but 
honour was a more compelling force than legal strictures, as shown, both 
Mandeville and Gordon pointed out, by the flouting of the proscription against 
duelling. They both derided those fashionable men who although as scrupulous as 
their 'polite ancestors' in paying their gambling debts, regarding it as a `point of 
honour', were without conscience when it came to settling their bills with honest 
tradesmen: 
False honour has more power over men than laws have; and those who 
despise all the ties of laws, and of religion and humanity, are often very 
exact in observing all the fantastical and wicked rules of false honour. 
There are no debts so punctually paid as those contracted at play: though 
there are express laws against play, and against paying of money won at 
play; nay, 'tis penal to pay such debts. And yet those that are thus exact in 
paying to their own ruin, and in defiance of law, whatever debts they 
contract to avowed sharpers, who live by cheating and picking pockets, and 
are the destruction of families, and a publick nuisance: I say, those men 
thus exact in unrighteousness and their own wrong, shall run in debt to 
honest tradesmen, without any purpose of paying them, and, unconcerned, 
see them broke, imprisoned and, undone, for want of such payment. So 
lawlessly just are they to rogues that ruin them, and so barbarously unjust to 
industrious and credulous men, who feed and clothe them! 36 
Bayle's work enjoyed a mixed reception in England. Initially the philosopher was 
celebrated on account of his condemnation of Catholic persecution of Protestants, 
yet when he later criticised Protestant persecution of Catholics he met with a 
different response. However a group of notable French exiles, which included 
Saint-Evremond, were instrumental in spreading Bayle's fame and defending his 
reputation from accusations of atheism. 37 Saint-Evremond, a contemporary of both 
36CL, I, no. 57, p. 390. For Mandeville see The Fable of the Bees, I, p. 222 and An Enquiry into the 
Origin of Honour, and the Usefulness of Christianity in War (London, 1732), p. 90. 
37 See L. P. Courtines, Bayle's Relations with England and the English (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1938), p. 41. 
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Bayle and the French Catholic moralistes already discussed, also figures 
significantly in the work of both Mandeville and Gordon. 38 He shared the sceptical 
outlook of Jansenist writers, that man's reason was inadequate to the task of 
acquiring final truth, whether of the external world, of himself or, most especially, 
of God. 39 However, although he deplored `infamous interest', or what might be 
called `unenlightened self-interest', he was equally critical of Jansenists such as 
Pascal who condemned man's attempt to lose himself and knowledge of his 
wretchedness and mortality in divertissement. 40 He believed both the inward life 
and a life spent on the single-minded pursuit of worldly pleasure were forms of 
self-absorption, in different guises, and found them equally distasteful. Instead he 
favoured a doctrine of moderation and he regarded this as the essence of a moral 
life. 4' 
He argued that Jansenists recommended too rigorous a morality and levelled at 
them the same criticism made of Mandeville by many of his contemporaries, that 
everything will be vice to us if `we frame to our selves an idea of virtue that the 
38Mandeville mentions Saint-Evremond in An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour, p. 119. F. B. 
Kaye suggests that Mandeville may have drawn on Saint-Evremond for his defence of luxury. See 
The Fable of the Bees, pp. xciv, cx. Gordon refers to Pierre Desmaizeaux's translation of Saint- 
Evremond's works in Cato's Letters, II, no. 71, p. 522 and in The Works of Tacitus, II, p. 138. 39See Saint-Evremond, The Works of Mr. de St. Evremond, 2 vols. (London, 1700), I, p. 301. 40Saint-Evremond 
argued: '[A] Man must make but very few Reflexions upon Life, if he designs to 
pass it happily; nay, he ought to use a quite different Conduct: He must often steal, as it were, from 
himself, and amongst the Pleasure that Foreign Objects give him, forget the Knowledge of his own 
Misfortunes', The Works of Mr. de St. Evremond, II, p. 123. 41See ibid., II, p. 417. Elsewhere, although Saint-Evremond agrees with those that say man can live 
with little, he does not commend a life of austerity. A middle way was best: '[T]he possession of 
Goods is not to be condemned, but our Slavery and Subjection to them; it is not Poverty will make 
us Wise, it may take from us, indeed, the Opportunity of committing some Faults; but there are 
others which it cannot remedy. ', 'An Essay in Vindication of Epicurus, and his Doctrine', 
Epicurus's Morals [trans. Mr. Johnson], p. 174. 
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World never practis'd' 42 Instead he urged a more moderate Christian ethic, 
`neither too Severe, nor too Indulgent', which acknowledged the reality of human 
nature but at the same time allowed that man was capable of virtue. In Epicurus 
however, whom he greatly admired, he found a philosophical system which both 
spoke of men as they really were, driven by their passions, and showed them how 
they might live better. 43 While Mandeville and Trenchard and Gordon drew on the 
sensationalism of Hobbes, Saint-Evremond, although he greatly esteemed the 
`genius' of the author of Leviathan, believed his doctrines to be a danger to 
society's morals. He looked instead to Epicurus, agreeing that `All our Actions 
have no real Object, but Pleasure ... 'Tis that alone which makes us active, and 
excites Industry: 'Tis that which gives Motion to all the Universe. '44 Epicurus, 
however, offered a moral context that was missing from Hobbes. He showed that 
pleasure was to be found in a life lived virtuously. Saint-Evremond complained 
people misunderstood the philosopher in believing that he taught that sensual 
pleasure was the end of man. He noted, however, that some had grasped Epicurus' 
meaning and he observed approvingly of these commentators: `They have fully 
proved his Pleasure to be as severe as the Stoicks Vertue'. 5 As a keen student of 
human nature, however, he realised that merely to declaim against vice and preach 
up virtue was an ineffectual method of attempting to reform man. Particularly 
since, as Mandeville and Gordon were later to do, he dismissed the arguments of 
The Works of Mr. de St. Evremond, I, p. 494. 43Speaking of Epicurus, Saint-Evremond claimed 'of all the Opinions of Philosophies concerning 
the sovereign Good, none appears to me so rational as his', ibid., I, p. 390. "Ibid., II, p. 315. 
' 'An Essay in Vindication of Epicurus', p. 164. Presumably it was to commentators such as 
Gassendi that Saint-Evremond referred when he commended their interpretation of Epicurus' 
philosophy. 
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those who extolled the virtue of the ancient world and insisted that corruption was 
as old as man himself. 46 He insisted that no-one venerated the works of the 
ancients more than he `but the Difference of Religion, Government, Customs and 
Manners, have introduced so great a Change in the World, that we must go as it 
were upon a new System to suit with the Inclination and Genius of the present 
Age. '47 
Given, therefore, that man was motivated purely by selfish concerns, Saint- 
Evremond argued that if he was to be brought to choose virtue over vice he had to 
be shown that it was in his own interest to do so; that, at small cost to himself, man 
would be the gainer either materially or in the opinion of others 48 Gordon was 
later to argue in similar terms, insisting that `virtue, to be followed, must be 
endowed, and her credit is best secured by her interest', not forgetting the advice 
that punitive laws were an effective mechanism for ensuring that men realised it 
was in their interest to restrain their selfish desires. 9A difference in tone, 
however, suggests that Saint-Evremond, who did not subscribe to the doctrine of 
efficacious grace, appears to have believed there was genuine merit in such virtue, 
since man was capable of no other. 50 This is the major point of divergence 
between Trenchard and Gordon on the one hand and Saint-Evremond on the other. 
Following Epicurus, Saint-Evremond believed that the passions could give rise to 
461 am very well satisfied, that the Corruption of Mankind has in all times of the World been as 
great as it is at present, that the first Ages beheld the first Adulterers, and the Vices of our times are 
nothing but Copies of the former', ibid., I, p. 449. For Mandeville see The Fable of the Bees, I, p. 
229 and for Trenchard and Gordon see The Independent Whig, p. 216. "The Works of Mr. de St. Evremond, I, p. 421; also see II, p. 47. 
48See ibid., I, pp. 490-2. 
49CL, I, no. 63, p. 436. 
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virtue. 51 He conceded, however, that it was not an easy task to reconcile the 
passions and virtue: `We ought to commend the Dexterity of those who know to 
accommodate them together'. 52 Trenchard and Gordon, in keeping with Jansenist 
thinking, believed self-denial, of which few men were capable, was the only route 
to true virtue. 53 They refused to attribute any intrinsic moral value to `virtuous' 
actions performed from motives of self-interest. Such actions had value but it was 
purely utilitarian. The passions could only give rise to a simulacrum of virtue. 
However, this was all that society required. 54 Like Mandeville, Trenchard and 
Gordon appear to have felt an aversion to blurring the difference between rigoristic 
and utilitarian standards. To do so, was to allow `a vast Inlet to Hypocrisy'. 
" 
Yet despite the different interpretations of virtue given by Trenchard and Gordon, 
on the one hand, and Saint-Evremond, on the other, they were agreed that to expect 
rigid virtue of men, especially the great, was extremely foolish. Saint-Evremond 
argued that men should be strict with themselves but show forbearance to others 
and he was particularly scathing about those who declaimed against everything that 
passed at Court but refused to quit it: 
SOSee The Works of Mr. de St. Evremond, II, p. 39. "He argued that Epicurus, unlike the Stoics and other philosophers, asserted that the passions were 
necessary to the soul and were the seeds of virtue, 'An Essay in Vindication of Epicurus', p. 170. 52The Works of Mr. de St. Evremond, I, p. 488. "However, neither Trenchard nor Gordon believed there was a true virtue of which only an elect 
number were capable. Like Mandeville, they rejected the doctrine of predestination. See, for 
example, CL, II, no. 110, pp. 776-7. In The Fable of the Bees, Mandeville evaded a pronouncement 
on predestination by dismissing it as an 'inexplicable Mystery', II, pp. 236,252. However in 
another work he argued nothing was so inconsistent with the idea of a just and good God than the 
idea that some men were predestined for damnation. See Free Thoughts on Religion, the Church, 
and National Happiness, pp. 92-3. 
See CL, I, no. 40, p. 282. "The Fable of the Bees, I, p. 331. 
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I know that Ingratitude and Avarice are abominable Qualities; but since 
they are so common in the World, either you must resolve to bear with 
them; or retire into a Desart, and carry that Virtue along with you into your 
Retirement which will make you hated at Court. 56 
Trenchard and Gordon were similarly pragmatic, accepting that a measure of 
corruption was an inevitable aspect of Court life. They believed that complaints 
against corruption were justified only when abuses became so gross that they 
exceeded the bounds of safety, that is when they threatened to subvert the 
constitution and when criticism was free of party bias. " Mandeville, no less a 
realist, also concurred with Saint-Evremond and considered that for men to 
suppose ministers should be virtuous betrayed `great Ignorance in human 
Affairs. '58 
However, it was not merely a similar moral philosophy which allowed Trenchard 
and Gordon, Mandeville and Saint-Evremond to countenance an element of 
corruption in government. They also had in common republican sympathies. The 
support of Trenchard and Gordon, and that of Mandeville, for the limited monarchy 
"The Works of Mr. de St. Evremond, I, pp. 490 and also 291. See too p. 293: 'As long as you are 
engaged in the World, you must comply with its Maxims, because nothing turns less to Account, 
than the Wisdom of those Persons, who set up for Reformers of the Age'. s7For example, for Gordon, see The Humourist, II, p. 117 and, for Trenchard, see `Seasonable 
Advice to the Electors of Great Britain', A Collection of Tracts by the Late John Trenchard, Esq., 
and Thomas Gordon, Esq., I, p. 335. 
In The Fable of the Bees, Mandeville has his mouthpiece, Cleomenes, argue: `If Virtue, Religion 
and future Happiness were sought after by the Generality of Mankind, with the same Sollicitude, as 
sensual Pleasure, Politeness, and worldly Glory are, it would certainly be best, that none but Men of 
good Lives, and known Ability, should have any Place in the government whatever: But to expect 
that this ever should happen, or to live in hopes of it in a large, opulent and flourishing Kingdom, is 
to betray great Ignorance in human Affairs ... The best of all then not being to 
be had, let us look out 
for the next best, and we shall find, that of all possible Means to secure and perpetuate to nations 
their Establishment, and whatever they value, there is no better Method than with wise Laws to 
guard and entrench their constitution, and continue such Forms of Administration, that the 
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enjoyed by Britain has already been discussed in the previous chapter. In the case 
of Saint-Evremond, although he had fought on the royalist side during the Fronde 
he was nevertheless suspected of republican leanings. However, the admiration 
displayed in his reflections on the history of the reign of the Emperor Augustus 
suggests he too favoured a limited monarchy. He commended Augustus for 
allowing the senate and the people a voice in government and for grasping what 
both Saint-Evremond and Trenchard and Gordon regarded as the secret of good 
government, that a governor served his own best interests by serving those of the 
governed. Human nature being what it was, unless whoever held power 
understood this he would inevitably pursue a path of narrow self-interest which 
was at odds with that of the public. For Augustus, Saint-Evremond wrote, `The 
Good of the State was his first Thought', by which he meant the benefit of those 
who composed the state: 
His own [benefit] first; for it is not reasonable that a Man shou'd quit the 
Pleasures of a private Life, to abandon himself to the Cares of the Publick, 
if he does not find his Advantage in the foot of the Account. And next, that 
of his People, which he imagined could not be absolutely separated from 
his own. 59 
Trenchard was later to second this judgement, arguing: 
The only secret therefore in forming a free government, is to make the 
interests of the governors and the governed the same, as far as human 
policy can contrive. Liberty cannot be preserved any other way. Men have 
long found, from the weakness and depravity of themselves and one 
another, that most men will act for interest against duty, as often as they 
dare. 60 
Common-Weal can receive no great Detriment from the Want of knowledge or Probity of Ministers, 
if any of them should prove less able or honest, than they could wish them. ', II, p. 335. 
The Works of Mr. de St. Evremond, I, p. 83. 
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Neither Trenchard nor Gordon shared Saint-Evremond's admiration for Augustus. 
They could hardly have been expected to endorse imperial rule no matter how 
benign but they agreed with his opinion that if there was a cost to be met in moral 
terms for securing a limited monarchy, and for barring the way to absolutism, it 
was a price worth paying. Paralleling the later practice of Trenchard and Gordon, 
Saint-Evremond answered those who clamoured for a more virtuous government 
by invoking classical precedent to show that it was better to suffer some evils in a 
free society rather than to seek to eradicate them and thereby perhaps destabilise 
the constitution and allow an inroad to tyranny: 
This just Cato, who might have saved his Country, if he cou'd have 
contented himself with making his Citizens less virtuous, destroy'd both 
that and himself, by endeavouring to no purpose to make them virtuous. A 
Man of a less perfect Probity, who cou'd have born with the Vices of some 
particular Persons, had hindred a general Oppression. It was necessary to 
connive at the Irregularities of some in Power to prevent Tyranny, for by 
that means the Republick might have been preserved; 'twould have been a 
corrupt one, I confess, but still it had been a Republick. 61 
So too, Gordon felt it preferable to bear with a corrupt Whig administration headed 
by Walpole rather than mount a moral crusade which might end in the demise of 
Britain" limited monarchy and the establishment of absolute rule under the 
Pretender. Echoing Saint-Evremond he argued that although Cato of Utica's virtue 
was proverbial, `Yet by carrying it further than the times would bear, he sometimes 
62 hurt what he loved beyond his Life, even Liberty, and his Country'. 
60CL, I, no. 60, p. 417. 
61 The Works of Mr. de St. Evremond, p. 489. 
62The Works of Sallust, p. 94. Gordon also cited the example of Galbo's unseasonable attempt at 
reviving the austere virtue of his ancestors, CL, I, no. 41, p. 283. It should be remembered that the 
adoption of the pseudonym `Cato' by Trenchard and Gordon did not necessarily imply a 
commitment to classical republican principles; the employment of classical pseudonyms was a 
literary convention. As already noted (see chapter 1 of this thesis) the name was also used by Whig 
184 
In his defence of luxury Saint-Evremond also prefigured some of the arguments 
fielded by Mandeville and Trenchard and Gordon. Countering those who lauded 
the frugality of the early Romans, he redrew this famous abstinence as the product 
of dullness rather than virtue. It was not freely chosen but merely the result of an 
unexpanded consciousness, so that the desires of the ancients, although as 
unrestrained as those of the moderns, settled on crude objects: 
As for that Frugality which is so extremely boasted of, it was not a 
retrenchment of Superfluities, or a voluntary Abstinence from things 
agreeable, but a gross use of what they enjoyed ... they were not ambitious 
after Riches, because they did not understand them; they were content with 
a little, because they conceived no more. 63 
Mandeville and Trenchard and Gordon in the same manner contrasted the material 
and intellectual impoverishment of former times with the riches enjoyed by men of 
the present day. Man had become a more complex creature, fashioned by his 
boundless desires, and he required more sophisticated forms of stimulation. In turn 
the satisfaction of more refined desires generated work for the common man, so 
that, in Gordon's words, `the luxury of the rich becomes the bread of the poor', 
thus contributing to the wealth, and therefore power, of the nation and its prestige 
abroad. M There was also agreement between Trenchard and Gordon, Mandeville 
and Saint-Evremond that frugality was only possible in small states and was 
incompatible with a large and thriving nation. So too they concurred in debunking 
the frequently cited model of Dutch frugality, arguing that it was borne of necessity 
ministry pamphleteers. The historical Cato stood against the imperial rule of Julius Caesar. By 
casting the Pretender as Caesar, Court Writers were able to allot themselves the role of `Cato', 
republican patriot. 
63 The Works of Mr. de St. Evremond, I, pp. 11-12. 64CL, I, no. 67, p. 473. See also No. 71, p. 514. For Mandeville's justification of luxury see The 
Fable of the BeesI, p. 355 and, particularly, Remarks P, Q and X. 
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and that the Republic was held together not by virtue but by fear of Spain and 
France. 65 
Trenchard, Gordon and Mandeville would also have been in accord with Saint- 
Evremond's views on religious tolerance, which were in line with his relaxed 
attitude towards the weaknesses of human nature and were characterised by an 
absence of concern with narrow doctrinal issues. He contended that Calvinism and 
Catholicism were differently grounded on the same good principles and called for a 
reconciliation between the two Churches, declaring he did not hate a heretic 
because he differed from him in religion, rather: `I Love him because he agrees 
with me in the Fundamentals'. 66 As stalwart opponents of bigotry, an evil they 
believed synonymous with the Society of Jesus, both Mandeville and Gordon were 
much taken by Saint-Evremond's witty satire on Jesuit pretensions to spiritual and 
temporal authority. Gordon considered the declaration of the Jesuit Father Canaye 
to the Marshal D'Hocquincourt, related by Saint-Evremond, to be `open and 
instructive' and Mandeville's reference to the tale suggests he shared this view. 
67 
65For `Cato' see CL, I, no. 85, p. 617; for Mandeville, see The Fable of the Bees, Remark Q; and for 
Saint-Evremond see The Works of Mr. de St. Evremond, I, pp. 30,147-8 66Ibid., II, p. 37 and also 42-3. 67The Works of Tacitus, p. 138. In An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour, p. 119, Mandeville has 
Cleomenes remark: `The Roman Pastors, who keep their Flocks in the Dark, teach them blind 
Obedience, and never vouchsafe to argue with 'em any more than if they were real Sheep. They 
don't advise Men to read the Bible, but such Books of Devotion as their Priests shall think proper 
for them; and are so far from appealing to their Judgment, that they conjure them, on Pain of 
Damnation, never to trust their Reason, but implicitly to believe whatever the Church shall require 
of them. ' To which Horatio replies: `You put me in Mind of Father Canaye, the Jesuit in St. 
Evremond. No Reason! No Reason at all! ' 
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Both Trenchard and Gordon and Mandeville found in Saint-Evremond what was 
also present in the French Catholic moralistes and Bayle, a pragmatic attitude 
towards human nature which appreciated that its weaknesses might, if properly 
understood and directed, supply the part of genuine public-spirited virtue. They 
too dismissed utopian systems founded on virtue as hopelessly unrealistic and 
looked instead to the enlightened self-interest of governors and governed alike as 
the basis of a society capable of allowing men the security and stability necessary 
for a good life. 68 Moreover, they found in these writers a shared commitment to 
religious toleration, particularly strong in the case of Saint-Evremond and Bayle, 
and an utilitarian rationale for its institution. 69 Indeed Gordon followed Bayle's 
lead in being outstanding for his day both for the explicitness of his expression and 
the degree of toleration he was prepared to urge, extending it even to atheists, Jews 
and, ultimately, loyal Catholics. That Mandeville was no less marked an advocate 
of toleration is obvious from his insistence on the moral parity of atheists and 
Christians, although his stance is more often implicit than explicit and less 
muscularly polemic than Gordon. It would seem apparent, therefore, that the 
authors of Cato's Letters and The Fable of the Bees were shaped by a number of 
common influences, writers who, despite their differences, were united by shared 
68See, for example, Bayle: 'Let a Man do the best he can, let him build better Systems than Plato's 
Republick, More's Utopia or Campanella's Common-wealth of the sun, &c. All these fine Ideas 
will be found short and deficient when they come to be reduc'd to Practice: The Passions of Men, 
that arise from one another in a prodigious Variety, would presently ruin the hopes that these fine 
systems might give us. ', Dictionary, II, p. 1679; Mandeville: `Then leave Complaints: Fools only 
strive/To make a Great an Honest Hive/T'enjoy the World's Conveniences/Be fam'd in War, yet 
live in Ease/Without great Vices, is a vain/EUTOPIA seated in the Brain. ', The Fable of the Bees, I, 
p. 28; and Trenchard: `We have an excellent constitution at present; and if not the best which can be 
formed in an utopian commonwealth, yet I doubt the best that we are capable of receiving. ', CL, I, 
no. 80, p. 584. 
69That is, they believed a wide toleration contributed to the wealth and well-being of society. 
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principles which are also fundamental to the thinking of Trenchard, Gordon and 
Mandeville. 
Chapter VII 
The Janus Face of Republicanism 
As already observed in chapter one of this thesis, the tunnel vision approach of 
focusing on the language used by a writer runs the risk of misunderstanding his 
intended meaning. This is particularly risky when the language invoked is 
ambiguous and open to different construction, as in the case of the `classical 
republicanism' of Machiavelli and Tacitus. It is necessary, therefore, to look at the 
variety of ways in which these two writers were interpreted historically in order to 
identify the range of meanings that were available to Trenchard and Gordon. And 
to understand how Trenchard and Gordon read Machiavelli and Tacitus it is 
necessary to see how these writers spoke to their main concerns. 
Clearly it is unnecessary to confine oneself to a reading of The Prince to realise 
that there are strong autocratic elements in Machiavelli's republicanism. Since the 
sixteenth century both monarchists and republicans in western Europe had studied 
Machiavelli's works for lessons in statecraft, even whilst many of them denounced 
him for his immorality and irreligion. Machiavelli may have favoured republican 
government but not at any price and not for every people. He appealed to men who 
were ideological opponents precisely because the goal of his doctrine was political 
stability rather than the establishment of a particular form of government. The 
latter, he suggested, was contingent on circumstance. So whilst in The Discourses 
he made it clear that republics, because of their greater tendency to stability, were 
to be favoured over principalities, he was equally adamant that there were times in 
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the life of a state which necessitated the imposition of princely rule. Adaptability 
was the solution he offered to the problem of sustaining the longevity of a state and 
its validity must have been immediately apparent to English commonwealthmen 
who had accommodated themselves to the political reality imposed by the 
Revolution Settlement. For admirers of Machiavelli, such as Trenchard and 
Gordon, who recognised that a revival of Roman virtue in eighteenth century 
England was not a realistic prospect, the authoritarian and `politic' elements in his 
work did not go unnoticed but rather contributed to his value as a political theorist 
to men who were essentially pragmatic supporters of a limited monarchy rather 
than republican idealists. ' 
The Roman historian and moralist Tacitus, of course, was also read as an authority 
by monarchists and republicans alike and his name was frequently coupled with 
'It must be noted that in late seventeenth century and early eighteenth century England the term 
`republican' did not necessarily signify, and indeed seldom signified, a doctrinaire rejection of 
monarchy. To be a republican meant merely to be an opponent of absolute monarchy. As already 
shown in previous chapters, 'classical republicans' of this period were by no means advocates of 
democratic republicanism or proponents of 'levelling' principles. For many 'republicans' a limited 
monarchy, which served the public interest rather than the private interest of one individual, was 
perfectly consistent with their political ideals. The same held true for the terms 'commonwealth' and 
`commonwealthmen', which were not incompatible with a commitment to limited monarchy. 
Indeed Robert Molesworth insisted Britain was a commonwealth under Queen Anne, since the form 
of government it enjoyed aimed at the good of all rather than just one or a few. In his opinion those 
who denied it to be a commonwealth, adopting the appellation 'limited monarchy' instead, were 
merely fearful of being suspected of harbouring an enmity towards the established order: 'A true 
Whig is not afraid of the Name of a Commonwealthman, because so many foolish People, who 
know not what it means, run it down: The Anarchy and Confusion which these Nations fell into near 
Sixty Years ago and which was falsly called a Commonwealth, frightening them out of the true 
Construction of the Word... For where in the very Frame of the Constitution, the Good of the Whole 
is taken care of by the Whole (as 'tis in our Case) the having a King or Queen at the Head of it, 
alters not the Case; and the softening of it by calling it a Limited Monarchy, seems a Kind of 
Contradiction in Terms, invented to please some weak and doubting persons. ' Molesworth's 
definition of a commonwealth comes in the preface to his English translation of the Franco-Gallia 
of the Huguenot historian Hotman, who himself drew on Tacitus' Germania in order to argue that 
the French or Frankish tradition of government was rooted in a system of elective monarchy and in 
rule by the consent of the people. First printed in 1711 and again in 1721, Molesworth's preface 
defends the government of the day and contrasts Britain's liberty and prosperity with the civil, 
religious and economic abuses suffered by the French under absolute rule. See Francis Hotoman, 
Franco-Gallia, trans. Robert Molesworth (London, 1721), p. viii. 
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that of Machiavelli, both in praise and in vilification. What they had in common 
was that both men were political pragmatists who preferred to consider men as they 
were, rather than as moralists might wish them to be, and who were primarily 
concerned with achieving and maintaining political stability rather than with 
visions of an ideal state. They offered men knowledge of the nature and operation 
of power and then stood back and left their pupils to decide whether to make use of 
that knowledge. 
Guicciardini was one of the first to draw attention to Tacitus' own ambiguous 
politics, to the fact that he might be read as other than a republican writer, and to 
his utility for both rulers and ruled alike: `Tacitus teaches those who live under 
tyrants the mode of life and how to govern oneself prudently, and he teaches 
tyrants how to establish tyranny. '2 After Machiavelli's name was placed on the 
Catholic Church's Index of prohibited works in 1559 many writers looked to 
Tacitus, whose newly discovered later books of the Histories and the Annals were 
first published in 1515, as a guide to politics and to questions of political morality. 
One modem historian has seen the growing popularity of Tacitus between 1580 
and 1680, when his maxims were widely used by writers on politics to illustrate 
`Machiavellian' tenets, as a ruse `to hide Machiavelli under the mask of Tacitus, 
and his prince under the figure of Tiberius. '3 Whilst in the 1920s Guiseppe 
Toffanin theorised, in an elaboration of Guicciardini's observation on the dual 
nature of Tacitus' lessons, that proponents of Tacitism could be divided into two 
2Guicciardini, Ricordi, quoted in Ronald Mellor, Tacitus (London, Routledge, 1993), p. 140. 3Benedetto Croce, Stbria della eta barocca in Italia, quoted in Tacitus, p. 140. 
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main camps, those of `red' and `black' Tacitism. The former, he argued, was a 
disguised form of republicanism and the latter a disguised form of 
Machiavellianism. Toffanin's argument however, particularly his account of `black 
Tacitism', has received criticism in recent years. One such critic, Alfredo 
Momigliano, has cautioned against viewing Tacitus as merely a safe alternative to 
the banned author of The Prince and The Discourses, as a sort of ersatz 
Machiavelli. Certainly the popularity of Tacitus with Renaissance and later 
political theorists can not be attributed to the idea that he offered an anodyne 
version of views officially condemned as poisonous. It is rather that the appeal of 
both writers appears linked to their attempt to provide men not only with a guide to 
living in the real world of politics but to accommodating this public life with a 
private life where different standards applied, where the dictates of accepted 
morality rather than state interest prevailed. Neither Tacitus nor Machiavelli 
sought to deny or disguise the inherent immorality of certain acts performed in the 
interests of the good of the state but showed that they were necessary. 
4 Machiavelli 
effectively acknowledged that what he shared with Tacitus was a political 
pragmatism that set them apart from other writers when he commended, as a 
`golden saying' of Tacitus, the historian's judgement that `men have to respect the 
past but to submit to the present, and, while they should be desirous of having good 
princes, should put up with them of whatever sort they may turn out to be. '5 
41t is a conscious duality that is perhaps not dissimilar to that found in Jansenist thought and in the 
ideas of those influenced by Jansenism, such as Mandeville, Trenchard and 
Gordon. Momigliano 
has noted the debt owed to Tacitus by French moralists from Charron to La Rochefoucauld, 
especially in the study of hypocrisy, and has claimed that modem Dutch literature was almost 
brought to life by contact with the ancient historian. See A. Momigliano, `Tacitus and the Tacitist 
Tradition', The Classical Foundations of Modern Historiography (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1990), 109-31. 
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Tacitus' sentiments were grounded in experience and his own life and career are an 
object lesson in adapting oneself to the times. While he lamented the loss of 
Roman virtue, which he like many others attributed to the demise of the Republic, 
his regret did not prevent him from accepting high public office under imperial 
rule. He owed his first public honours to Vespasian and during the reign of Titus 
he was elected quaester, a position which brought with it membership of the 
Senate. With the succession of Domitian, Tacitus saw himself advanced still 
further. The emperor appointed him first praetor and then gave him the command 
of a provincial legion. 6 He survived too the later years of terror when Domitian's 
rule descended into tyranny, emerging from that dark period with the prize of 
Rome's highest office, the consulship. It would seem from this that Tacitus' life, 
as much as his works, defies easy attempts to categorise him as an unequivocally 
republican writer and zealous advocate of civic virtue and, in a circular argument, 
to assume that it was these elements which drew Gordon to him. Equally, it is 
incorrect to say, as Herbert Benario does, that Gordon's `Discourses' have little to 
do with Tacitus and that the Roman historian's work serves merely as a convenient 
peg from which to hang a political essay and to furnish him with the characters of 
bad emperors. ' Tacitus was much more than this for Gordon. He was, in Gordon's 
words, `a masterly Historian, who draws events from their first sources ... a 
profound Politician who takes off every disguise, and penetrates every artifice'. 
Essentially what appealed to a political realist such as Gordon was that, in his 
5Niccol6 Machiavelli, The Discourses (London, Penguin, 1983), III, 6, pp. 398-9. 6'My official career owed its beginning to Vespasian, its progress to Titus and its further 
advancement to Domitian. I have no wish to deny this. ', Tacitus, The Histories, trans. K. Wellesley 
(London, Penguin, 1964) 1.1, p. 15. For an account of Tacitus' life and career see Tacitus, pp. 6-28. 7See H. W. Benario, 'Gordon's Tacitus', The Classical Journal, 72 (1976), 107-114, at 109. 
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words, `TACITUS describes things and men as they are'. 8 He mirrored Gordon's 
own views: qualified republicanism, political pragmatism based on a searing 
analysis of human nature and an equally pragmatic, if not to say highly sceptical, 
approach to organised religion. If one looks at Gordon one sees reflections of 
Tacitus. 
Nostalgia for a passed virtue did not blind Tacitus to the Republic's faults, which 
he suggested were greater than its advantages, or silence his criticism of its 
destructive forces, referring caustically to that anarchy `which fools call freedom'. 
He believed a wise man recognised that freedom had to be bound by authority and 
he praised the emperor Nerva for `having joined together the sovereign power and 
liberty', a union which appeared the basis of good government. Certainly he 
harboured few illusions about the likelihood, or desirability, of restoring the 
Republic, which, he noted, `was more easily praised than established and that, were 
it established, it could not possibly endure'. 9 
The Agricola might be seen as an indirect defence of Tacitus' own decision to 
distance himself from a factional and pointless opposition to Domitian and instead 
to attempt to weather the storm. A justification of his own path of caution and 
compromise can perhaps be marked in his eulogising of his father-in-law, Agricola, 
as a man of virtue who served Rome under both good emperors and bad, even one 
such as Domitian, and in his condemnation of the reckless actions and ostentatious 
$The Works of Tacitus, pp. 10,18. 9See Dialogue of the Orators, 40; Agricola, 3; Annals, IV, 33, quoted in G. Boissier, Tacitus and 
other Roman Studies, trans. W. G. Hutchinson (London: Archibald Constable & Co., 1906), pp. 130, 
127,136. 
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gestures of those who threw their lives away, without profiting the commonwealth, 
ostensibly in the cause of liberty but in reality to win renown. 1° In his life and in 
his work he counselled a middle course between rebellion and sycophancy. He 
despised the latter and believed the former to be futile, as it was to plunge the state 
into bloodshed and disorder to no good end, since the nature of power was that it 
corrupted and those who sought to overthrow corrupt rulers in time would very 
likely become corrupt themselves. Bad rulers, he taught, had to be suffered - the 
advice so admired by Machiavelli - but a man could avoid placing himself at the 
mercy of fortune by deploying his political skills in order to counter the worst 
excesses of autocratic government. Chronicling Tiberius' reign he praised the 
`wise and noble part' played by one senator and it is perhaps possible to see a 
parallel of sorts between Machiavelli's virtu, the possession of which enabled men 
to master fortune and halt the cycle of decay and disorder in a state, and the virtue 
Tacitus commends in Marcus Lepidus. 1l 
Tacitus was certainly no democratic republican, for in spite of his praise for the 
Roman people under the ancient Republic he was contemptuous of those he 
referred to as `the mob' of his own day. Nor can he accurately be characterised as 
an aristocratic republican. He had scant admiration for the senatorial class and 
viewed with distaste their collusive servility which had spurred on rather than 
reigned in the vicious tendencies of tyrannical emperors. 12 The recurrent image he 
evokes of a conflict ridden senate, riven by factionalism and petty jealousies, also 
1°In the Annals Tacitus is less dismissive of rebels and patriot martyrs but no less pessimistic about 
the outcome of rebellion. See Ronald Syme, Ten Studies in Tacitus (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1970), p. 131; Tacitus, p. 98. "See Tacitus, The Annals of Imperial Rome, trans. M. Grant (London: Penguin, 1956), IV, p. 367. 
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suggests he had little confidence that should the senate recover its power Rome 
might hope for wiser government. There is no trace of utopianism in his writing, 
nor even an outright declaration of his preferred form of government. Instead, he 
makes it clear that what he considered of primary importance was not an 
ideological commitment to one constitutional form but having a government 
capable of maintaining order and stability. The same virtue of ancient Romans that 
rendered them fit for republican government made them unfit to endure autocratic 
rule. Different ages, however, called for different forms of government and men 
had to adapt themselves to the times. Therefore, if the times demanded that 
ultimately authority should reside in the hands of a strong ruler then men owed him 
their loyalty, if not their love. It might be said of Tacitus, as he reported Eprius 
Marcellus had declared of himself `he remembered the age in which he was born, 
and the constitution devised by their fathers and grandfathers. Earlier times earned 
his admiration, the present his allegiance. He prayed for good emperors, but took 
them as they came. '13 In his own voice he justified imperial rule by contrasting it 
with the alternative, civil strife, observing that `the interests of peace demanded the 
concentration of power in the hands of one man'. 14 Later, in recounting Galba's 
speech adopting Piso as his successor, he has the emperor seek to validate the 
legitimacy of this act by contending: 
If it were possible for our gigantic empire to stand erect and keep its 
balance in the absence of a ruler, I should be the right sort of person to hand 
over power to a republican form of government. But in fact we have long 
ago reached a point where drastic measures are necessary. Hence my 
'2Tacitus' account of the conspiracy of Piso shows his contempt for a degenerate nobility. See 
Annals, XV, 48. 
13Histories, 4,8. It is a policy, this 'golden' maxim of Tacitus, which is a common theme of all his 
works. That he attributes it here to Marcellus, a figure he casts in a less than admirable light, 
perhaps suggests he retained an element of guilt about his own conduct under Domitian, despite his 
insistence on drawing a distinction between conciliation and collusion. "Ibid., I. 1, p. 15. 
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declining years can make Rome no greater gift than a good successor, nor 
your youth any greater gift than a good emperor. '5 
Moreover, despite Tacitus' regard for republican virtue he suggested that in current 
times it was a potentially dangerous anomaly. He was thus critical of Galba's 
frugality and severity in the context of his refusal to continue with the accepted 
practice of paying `donatives' to the Roman soldiery; to `buy' them with the lavish 
gifts of money to which they had become accustomed. Although these were 
traditional virtues they were out of step with the times and therefore proved ruinous 
to the state. 16 On the other hand, Otho is presented as a corrupt character, lavish 
and indulgent, who was nevertheless exemplary because his heroic suicide 
prevented Rome from again being thrown into civil war. '7 
If Tacitus combined respect for the republican virtue of previous generations with 
scepticism about the utility of Roman virtue in his own day, the opposite was true 
of his attitude towards the state religion. He never doubted its social utility but he 
displayed scant respect for the imperial cult and lacked the credulous belief in 
supernatural portents that was general amongst the patrician classes. His 
contemptuous view of Roman idolatry, symptomatic of the degeneracy that he 
contrasted with the untainted simplicity of the Germanic people in his Germania, 
provided inspiration in the sixteenth century to German Lutherans. The Germania, 
which played a significant role in the growth of a sense of national identity during 
this period, appealed to the desire felt by Luther's `German nation' for both 
1slbid., I. 16, p. 26. 
16See ibid., 1.5 and 18. 
17See ibid., II, 46-9 
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religious and political liberty. 18 Although Tacitus was notorious for his abhorrence 
of both Christians and Jews, the former could be read by Protestants as valid 
criticism of the depravity and duplicity of the Roman Catholic Church. 
19 In the 
`Discourses' which precede Gordon's translation of Tacitus, he defends the 
historian from charges of irreligion and argues that when religion is pure 
superstition - as he makes clear elsewhere he believes Catholicism to be - to 
adhere to it is a revolt from common sense. 20 
Like Tacitus, Gordon entertained little expectation that calls for a revival of ancient 
virtue would prove successful and, still less, that if revived it would prove anything 
other than a potentially destabilising anachronism. This is clear from the use he 
makes of a translation of Galbo's speech to Piso, which appears in Cato's Letters. 
The moral he sought to draw from Galbo's fate was that the restoration of ancient 
virtue was impossible and indeed should not be attempted once a people had grown 
accustomed to a life of plenty. A message which appears aimed at the zealous 
Tory `Patriots' he attacked elsewhere and one reinforced by his quotation of 
Tacitus' observation on Galbo: `He was ruined by reviving unseasonably the severe 
virtue of our ancestors'. 21 Similarly in Gordon's translation of Sallust he rejected 
the commonplace association of private and public corruption and argued `they are 
far from being universally the same; since sometimes the Public is helped, and 
even saved, by encouraging private Acts of Dishonesty; such as bribing secret or 
public Enemies with Money ... 
in the Casuistry of a State, the greater Good cancels 
18See D. A. Kelley, 'Tacitus Noster: 'The Germania in the Renaissance and the Reformation', 
Tacitus and the Tacitean Tradition, ed. T. J. Luce and A. J. Woodman (Princeton, N. J: Princeton 
University Press, 1993), 152-167. 
1 See Annals, XV, pp. 365-6; Histories, V. 1-13, pp. 279-88. 
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the smaller Evil. ' Governors, he argued, whose scruples were too refined did a 
disservice to their country and were unworthy of their position. Ministers were 
justified in employing any number of immoral practices, at least when directed 
against a foreign power, as `Without such Practices they could not serve their 
Country as they ought'. 22 And if civic virtue had faded under a venal ministry it 
was sometimes more expedient to allow matters to lie rather than throw the nation 
into turmoil by attempting to retrieve what was lost for ever and in all likelihood 
had never existed at all. Taken in this light, it seems extremely apt that Gordon 
should have dedicated his Tacitus to Walpole. 
Tacitus' lessons had also proved deeply resonant for a great many political thinkers 
in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, an age of civil strife, in the form of 
religious wars, and absolute monarchy. He was a man who spoke to the times and, 
as Montaigne observed: `Tacitus can more properly serve a sickly troubled nation 
like our own is at present: you could often believe that we were the subject of his 
narrating and berating. '23 Monarchists as well as republicans were able to claim 
him as their own. He both legitimised the concentration of power in one individual 
and criticised the abuse of that power. Equally, at a time when republican idealism 
had seen itself confronted by political reality, the idea that a strict morality on the 
part of those who governed was not only unnecessary but sometimes undesirable, if 
the interests of the state were to be best served, enjoyed widespread appeal 
amongst both monarchists and their ideological opponents. Tacitus painted human 
20See The Works of Tacitus, I, p. 23. 21CL, I, no. 41, p. 283. 
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nature in dark colours but he also rendered it predictable to a large. degree; men 
could be depended upon always to follow what they believed to be in their own 
interest. It was this insight that was central to the reason of state philosophy that 
developed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Tacitus' works played to the 
desire of political theorists, and those involved at the heart of government, to 
discover a science of politics and also provided a lesson in the skills necessary to 
survive and succeed at Court, whilst retaining at least a semblance of honour. It is 
not difficult to see why Gordon, like Montaigne, thought Tacitus so relevant to his 
own day and nor is it difficult to draw parallels between Gordon and earlier 
Tacitists. An analysis of how his own reading of Tacitus may have been affected 
by other readings is enlightening. For when one examines other interpretations it 
becomes clear that Gordon's republicanism was not as one dimensional as the civic 
humanist paradigm suggests. 
Tacitus was studied by those who sought a new science of politics, grounded in 
actual rather than an ideal human nature, because his doctrine was based on 
observed political realities and not a vision of the best form of government that 
could be imagined. Giambattista Vico pointed to Tacitus as one of the formative 
influences on his thought and believed he should be ranked with Plato: 
[F]or with an incomparable metaphysical mind Tacitus contemplates man 
as he is, Plato as he should be. And as Plato with his universal knowledge 
explores the parts of nobility which constitute the man of intellectual 
wisdom, so Tacitus descends into all the counsels of utility whereby, among 
22The Works of Sallust, p. 91. As popery was considered allegiance to a foreign power this was 
obviously intended to serve to legitimise the targeting of those regarded as crypto-Catholics or 
Jacobites. 
2'Montaigne, The Complete Essays, trans. M. A. Screech (London: Penguin: 1987), 111.8, p. 1066 
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the irregular chances of malice and fortune, the man of practical wisdom 
brings things to good issue. 24 
Utility and self-interest were central to Vico's concept of human development, 
constituting its driving forces, and in his New Science (1724) he argued monarchy 
was the form of government best adapted to civilised human nature, as it prevented 
men from descending into anarchy. He employed Tacitus as an authority in his 
interpretation of raison d'etat as a means of achieving just ends and the common 
good, of submitting the driving forces of politics to natural reason. 25 Bodin too, 
another monarchist admirer of the Roman historian, had drawn on the practical 
lessons taught by Tacitus, whilst rejecting the `vainely imagined' model 
commonwealths of Plato and Thomas More. 26 He criticised the lack of attention 
paid to Tacitus' observations on reason of state arguments and his re-evaluation of 
the ancient writer was significant in the development of raison d'etat theory in 
Renaissance political thought. `Nothing can appear contemptible', Bodin 
contended, `which is bound up with the safety of the State. '27 
Bodin's praise of Tacitus, however, contrasted with the condemnation he received 
from Giovanni Botero and it was the judgement of the latter which set the 
predominant tone of opinion on Tacitus in seventeenth century Europe, with the 
exception of England and, to a lesser degree, the Netherlands. Indeed, 
paradoxically, throughout the period that Tacitism was at its height, from the 1580s 
to the 1680s, Tacitus himself enjoyed a mixed reception. Men were receptive to 
24Giambattista Vico, The Autobiography of Giambattista Vico, trans. M. H. Fisch and T. G. Bergin 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1941), p. 138. 25See Gino Bedani, Vico Revisited (Oxford: Berg Publishers Ltd., 1989). 
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his tenets but more reticent about openly acknowledging their source, particularly 
after Botero succeeded in inextricably linking Tacitus' name to that of Machiavelli. 
Yet Botero himself displayed a less than fair or candid approach to Tacitus, 
commandeering his doctrine whilst inveighing against him. 28 In Ragione di stato 
he expressed disapproval at having found during his travels `Reason of State a 
constant subject of discussion and to hear the opinions of Niccolö Macchiavelli and 
Cornelius Tacitus frequently quoted. ' The purpose of his discourse, he contended, 
was to counter the corruption fostered by these two men in the policy and counsel 
of princes. 29 However, instead of repudiating the statecraft of Tacitus and 
Machiavelli he appropriated it, arguing `State is a stable rule over a people and 
Reason of State is the knowledge of the means by which such a dominion may be 
founded preserved and extended. 230 In this way Botero established an apparent 
distance between his own views and those of Machiavelli and Tacitus and was thus 
able to make reason of state doctrine palatable to the Catholic Church - which 
viewed both men as enemies of Christianity - whilst advising rulers to resort to 
secrecy, subterfuge and draconian measures, where necessary, in the interest of the 
state. 31 
In England, as in the rest of Europe, Tacitus was taken up as an authority by both 
monarchists and republicans alike. Milton praised him as the `greatest enemy to 
26See Bodin, Of the Lawes and Customes of Common-wealth Learnedly Discoursing of the power of 
soveraignety and majestracy, trans. Richard Cholles (London, 1606), 1.1, p. 3. 27Ibid., V. V, p. 891. 28Given that Botero was a cleric, and writing presumably for Catholic princes, it is not unlikely that 
to avoid censure he adopted similar tactics to Toland and earlier unorthodox authors, cloaking his 
advocacy of Tacitus with criticism. 29See Giovanni Botero, The Reason of State, trans. P. J. and D. P. Waley (London, Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1956), pp. xiii, xiv. 3olbid., p. 3. 
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Tyrants' yet he was also invoked by James Ussher, Archbishop of Armagh, and 
throughout the period 1610-60 he was commonly cited in the debates between 
monarchists and their opponents. 32 Whilst on the continent his reputation suffered 
somewhat in the seventeenth century from the blow inflicted on it by Botero, 
Englishmen continued to regard him with admiration and views of him seem to 
have been coloured more by commentators such as Lipsius, Bodin, Boccalini and 
Malvezzi. 33 
To a considerable extent Trenchard and Gordon's reading of Tacitus was similar to 
that of the Netherlander Justus Lipsius. They too found in him a pragmatic 
approach to politics, based on a realistic appraisal of human nature, and a non- 
dogmatic and tolerant stance towards religion which struck a chord with their own 
views. It is likely that Gordon, if not Trenchard also, had read Lipsius. He was 
famed throughout most of Europe as an authority on Tacitus and his Six Bookes of 
Politickes or Civil Doctrine had been available in an English translation from 
1594. Gordon certainly implied that he knew Lipsius' writings - he mentioned the 
Dutch author in the review of previous commentators and translators in the 
prefatory discourses to his own translation of Tacitus' works. 4 
In addition to playing a leading role in reviving interest in Tacitus by republishing 
his works in the 1570s, Lipsius gained a wider audience for the historian's lessons 
3'Ibid., pp. 47,111,112. 
32 See K. C. Schellhase, Tacitus in Renaissance Political Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1976), pp. 161-5. 
33Schellhase has observed that the possible influence of Tacitus on Englishmen via Boccalini, 
Lipsius and other continental writers has not been analysed. It should become clear however, in the 
course of this chapter, that in the case of Gordon there is a good deal of evidence to suggest that his 
reading of Tacitus may have owed much to Boccalini. 
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in political realism through his own Six Bookes of Politickes or Civil Doctrine. 
The text, which its English translator claimed `containeth matter of pollicie, and 
especially concerneth the establishment of Principalitie', draws heavily on Tacitus 
and offers advice to kings and princes. Observing that it had long been in doubt 
which form of government Tacitus favoured, and that he had never explicitly 
endorsed any one, Lipsius noted the historian's dismissal of a commonwealth 
composed of all three forms before declaring himself in favour of principalities, 
which he inferred was also the opinion of Tacitus. Echoing Tacitus, he dismissed 
government by the many out of hand as breeding anarchy, the people being fickle, 
cowardly, lacking in reason and commitment to the public good and incapable of 
preserving liberty. However, Lipsius did not commend all principalities, only 
those which were lawful, that is `the governement of one, imposed according to 
custome, and lawes, undertaken, and executed for the good of the subjects. '35 
Lipsius also proved himself a Tacitist in combining a sceptical view of religion 
with an appreciation of its social utility. Although he paid lip service to 
Christianity, he undermined the idea of true religion by suggesting that men 
adhered to the faith they were born into more out of habit than as a result of a 
reasoned choice and a search for truth. Because of the misery experienced by 
Europe as a result of its religious wars, he believed that only one faith should be 
observed in a state. However, should men differ from the state religion Lipsius 
advised princes to show toleration and argued that men who practised their faith in 
34See The Works of Tacitus, I, p. 8. 
35Justus Lipsius, Six Bookes of Politickes or Civil Doctrine, trans. William Jons (London, 1594), p. 
19. 
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tical of private should never be punished 36 Like Tacitus he was also highly cri 
superstition, regarding it as the means by which the clergy enriched and 
empowered themselves at the expense of the laity and with the connivance of the 
great, who knew that superstition exerted the greatest force in governing the 
multitude. 
Alluding to Machiavelli, Lipsius criticised those who counselled princes that it was 
permissible to break oaths and act dishonestly in order to gain the upper hand. 
However, the denunciation would seem merely defensive because later in the text 
he goes on to advise precisely such a course. Distinguishing between three types of 
deceit - light, middle and great - he discussed each one and proceeded to allow a 
prince recourse to all three. A form of light deceit such as dissimulation, although 
morally reprehensible in ordinary terms, was most necessary to a prince, he argued: 
`I advouch it ought not to bee amongst privat persons, but in a state I utterly denie 
it. They shall never governe well, who know not how to cover well, and those to 
whom the charge of a commonwealth is committed. '37 So too, he insisted, middle 
deceits, such as winning men over by bribery, ought to be tolerated: `And as in the 
application of medicines, they do with approbation, mingle venomous drugs for the 
good of the patient, so these things do seeme profitable as it were a medicine. 
38 
Citing St. Augustine, he argued there were some lies which carried no great offence 
yet were not without fault, although he inferred the fault was for God and not man 
36 Lipsius himself, although born a Catholic, changed his faith to conform with his place of 
residence and the religion established there by law. In Germany he turned Lutheran, in Louvain a 
Catholic again and in Leyden a Calvinist, before returning to the fold to die a Catholic. 
37Six Bookes of Politickes, p. 117. 
38Ibid., p. 119. 
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to judge. 39 Among these `inoffensive lies' Lipsius counted great deceits such as 
treachery, as in the breaching of oaths, and injustice. Like Tacitus, he suggested it 
was ridiculous to expect that justice should always be done and that all individuals 
should receive their due. Different, more fluid, standards applied to the direction of 
a state than to the direction of a man's private life. Ultimately the end, the good of 
the state, justified the means, making right and wrong relative terms, so that 
Lipsius was able to observe that `A happie and prosperous mischiefe is called 
vertue. ' The only absolute imperative was that the state should continue in being 
and that it should thrive, allowing a ruler wide licence: `the Prince in desperate 
matters, should alwaies follow that which were most necessarie to be effected, not 
that which is honest in speech ... 
For necessitie which is the true defender of the 
weakenesse of man, doth breake all lawes. '40 Where licence overstepped its 
bounds and princes acted in their own interests rather than those of the state, 
Lipsius followed Tacitus in advising forbearance in the hope of better times: 
For while there are men, there be vices: neither yet doth this last alwaies, 
and recompence is made by the change of those that are better. Wherefore I 
conclude, the disposition of kings is to be borne withall, neither are often 
changes profitable. 4' 
Lipsius' countrymen, the Dutch republican de la Court brothers were also admirers 
of Tacitus and were read by Gordon and, probably, Trenchard. In their work the de 
la Courts drew on Tacitus directly and indirectly, via the German jurist and Tacitist 
Clapmarius, who reworked the `good' reason of state of Italian theorists into a `ius 
39Montaigne too argued the laws of justice cannot subsist without some admixture of injustice and 
approvingly quoted Tacitus' view that every case of exemplary punishment is unfair to individuals 
but that is counterbalanced by the public good. See Essays, 11.20, p. 766. 
40Six Bookes of Politickes, p. 123. 
4'Ibid., p. 202. 
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dominationis . 42 In the opinion of Clapmarius, this right allowed a government to 
violate the established law when confronted by a crisis that threatened the general 
interest. Like Clapmarius, the de la Courts enumerated a series of circumstances 
which they believed gave rise to the exercise of such right, on the basis that 
`nothing ought to be allow'd to be politickly Good or Bad, but what conduces to 
the Advantage, or tends to the Oppression of the whole Community, that is, of the 
most part of the Inhabitants of the State. '43 It should be remembered that both the 
de la Courts and Trenchard and Gordon used reason of state rationale to support 
their call for religious and commercial freedom, arguing that these were the twin 
pillars of a nation's wealth and greatness 44 
Another commentator on Tacitus and proponent of ragion di stato, whom Gordon 
in particular would seem to echo and cited with approval, is the Italian political 
theorist Boccalini 45 They both might be described as pink Tacitists, a term coined 
by Toffanin to distinguish a supplementary category of men who were neither red 
Tacitists nor black Tacitists but who were supporters of limited monarchy in an era 
of absolutism 46 Even if a republican, it is clear that Boccalini had no time for a 
42See Haitsma Mulier, The Myth of Venice and Dutch Republican Thought in the Seventeenth 
Century, pp. 121-2. 
43Fables, Moral and Political, I, p. 81. "See The True Interest and Political Maxims of the Republick of Holland and West-Friesland, pp. 
65-6,70-76,81,87-92,388. 
45Gordon was somewhat less warm in his estimation of Boccalini when, in seeking to recommend 
the superior merits of his own commentary and translation of Tacitus, he gave his predecessors' 
efforts, including those of the Italian writer, short-shift. 46See Peter Burke, `Tacitus', ed. T. J. A. Dorey, Tacitus (London; Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), 
pp. 149-71. The apparent difficulty in categorising Boccalini's political beliefs would seem to arise 
from his refusal in Advertisements from Parnassus to identify himself consistently with one voice 
and from his heavy use of irony, an opaqueness he shared, of course, with his political master, 
Tacitus. In the case of Apollo, who presides over the Court of Parnassus, the god sometimes 
appears to speak for Boccalini and at others he could be said either to play the part of devil's 
advocate or else to argue, in seeming good faith, on the side of monarchy and royal prerogative, 
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pure democracy, viewing the people as a dangerous force capable of destroying the 
state. His sympathies seem to have lain with the form of government enjoyed by 
Venice, an aristocratic republic and the model that is praised repeatedly in his 
Advertisements from Parnassus. 47 For Boccalini, like many so called `republicans' 
from Tacitus to Trenchard and Gordon and beyond, the people occupied an 
ambiguous position, they were both victim, the subject of anti-absolutist rhetoric, 
and villain, in the form of the ever-present spectre of mob rule. 8 Like Tacitus, 
Boccalini believed that it was a feature of human nature to be corrupted by power 
and the people were no less impervious to its influence than great men. To 
safeguard the commonwealth, therefore, from a dangerous imbalance and abuse of 
power he sought to educate both governors and governed in Tacitus' lessons of 
state. 49 The ancient writer, Boccalini explained, had through his Annals and 
Histories fashioned for the people `politick spectacles' which allowed them to 
penetrate the outward show of statesmen and discover their secret motives and 
guiding passions. Dismissing the accusation levelled by Tacitus' critics, that the 
historian's intention was to provide governors with a pattern to enable them to 
establish a tyrannical form of government, Boccalini insisted that Tacitus taught 
rulers that it was sound policy to make the well-being of the state their prime 
concern and `to let the Senators of Commonwealths see, into what deplorable 
thereby perhaps embodying Boccalini's moral that all monarchs, however enlightened, are driven by 
the desire for power. 47Boccalini leaves his readers in no doubt, however, that he did not favour hereditary aristocracies. 
It is also clear that he did not believe the Venetian form of government could be easily, if at all, 
replicated. See Trajano Boccalini, Advertisements from Parnassus, trans. Henry, Earl of Monmouth 
(London, 1656), pp. 141,208. 
Gordon, for example, could when occasion demanded play with the age-old contrast between 
`populus', those with a political voice, and `vulgus', the crowd or mob. 49Boccalini even ironically portrayed his fictionalised Tacitus succumbing to the corrosive affect of 
power. Invited to be prince of Lesbos Tacitus, Boccalini writes, began with the design of serving 
the people but ended by governing tyrannically, finding his resolutions 'grub'd up and eradicated by 
the curbed power of Rule', Advertisements from Parnassus, p. 50. 
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calamities they run, when preferring the hatred of their privat[e] passions, and their 
own self-interests before the publick good'. 5° 
A traditional analogy for the relationship between governors and governed, that of 
shepherds and their flocks, was much favoured by Boccalini - it appears frequently 
in the Advertisements from Parnassus - and used to ironic effect it seems to reflect 
his less than exalted view of political society. The people, like sheep, he 
suggested, were too stupid and blinkered to govern themselves and those who 
governed them frequently shared those faults, failing to understand, like bad 
shepherds, that a well-tended population was less troublesome and more 
productive than one that was ill-treated. Boccalini thus acknowledged that the 
people needed rulers to direct them. However, he distinguished between those 
rulers who used moderation and those who ruled arbitrarily. Like good shepherds, 
the former applied to their flock `the shears of discretion, instead of those of meer 
interest. ' They were careful when shearing their sheep to `not onely not slea them, 
but not so much as touch a bit of their skin'. 51 In one `Advertisement' a shepherd 
advises the lady Roman Monarchy: `That Princes should be happy if they used the 
same charity in governing their subjects, as Shepherds do in feeding their flocks, 
and the people most happy if they would imitate sheep in their obedience to their 
Princes. '52 Elsewhere the same observation is attributed to the Venetian political 
theorist Paolo Paruta, accompanied by the argument that God taught princes to 
allow subjects to increase in wealth and to keep them compliant because poverty 
bred desperation. Learning from this lesson, `the ancient Romans, who were true 
soIbid., p. 249. s'Ibid., p. 211. 
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masters of the reason of state, found no better means to make the warlike French, 
whom they had newly conquered, quiet and obedient to their Republike, then by 
affording them all possible means of growing rich'. 53 Deaf to this advice, 
however, were those bad shepherds who looked only to immediate profit from their 
flock. They were necessarily outraged by the teaching of Machiavelli, whom 
Boccalini has the judges of his fictitious state of Parnassus arraign on a charge of 
arming sheep against their shepherds, of providing sheep with `breast-plates and 
gauntlets, when they [shepherds/governors] would milk or shear their sheep ... and 
that it was impossible so great numbers of them should be governed by one only 
shepherd, unless they were totally deprived of horns, teeth, and will. '54 
Boccalini would have the people equipped with the necessary means to protect 
themselves from arbitrary rulers and to form a check on a power which, if 
unrestrained, would grow to know no bounds. He would not, however, see the 
people possessed of any real political power or role in government. To be 
forewarned was to be fore-armed and Tacitus and Machiavelli, he held, armed men 
with knowledge of the hidden motives of rulers and the true, corrosive nature of 
power and cautioned them against being so trusting as to be led like sheep to the 
slaughter. They need not follow, sheep-like, a bad shepherd but could demand to 
be treated like men and not as dumb beasts. They could ensure princes realised that 
if they used men as brute animals they in turn might make use of their brute 
strength and follow the example of those `skittish Mules, who have driven their 
52Ibid., p. 94. 
53Ibid., p. 131. 
54thid., p. 176. 
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indiscrete Shepherd out of the fold with a kicking'. 55 Boccalini relates the tale of 
Aupuleius' golden ass, who received a severe beating from his master after 
delivering him a seemingly unprovoked kick that left Aupuleius almost for dead. 
The ass later explained to his groom that in kicking his master he had acted with 
premeditation, to teach Aupuleius to treat him with greater respect and thereby 
escape, at the price of one beating, a thousand such blows in a year. The moral is 
clear, the people should administer a similar lesson to masters such as Aupuleius, 
4 who delights to dominier over such as I am', for this is the way `to make them 
wiser. And wo unto him who living in all submissiveness with an humorous 
master, hath not heart enough so to resent himself once a year, as may turn injuries 
into better observances'. 56 
For Boccalini, the political role of the people was limited to its ability to act as a 
deterrent force against tyranny, in exerting a counterbalance to absolute power 
through the threat to rulers that they could be unseated if they chose to govern 
arbitrarily. Yet he feared that this threat could be levelled at good governors as 
well as bad, since he believed the people to lack judgement and the wisdom to 
know that to be well governed was not to be permitted complete licence. Gordon at 
times exhibited a similar lack of confidence in the people's powers of 
discrimination. At the height of the South Sea scandal he and Trenchard lauded the 
nation's ability to judge the government, on the basis of its handling of the affair, 
and Gordon argued `Every ploughman knows a good government from a bad one, 
"Ibid., pp. 211-2. 
56Ibid., p. 385. 
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from the effects of it'. 57 Yet when the Atterbury plot was discovered the people 
were berated for failing to grasp that extraordinary measures were needed to meet 
an extraordinary danger. 58 
The form of government that came closest to Boccalini's ideal was an elective 
aristocratic republic, as exemplified by Venice, which he believed represented true 
government by the best. Those who had a hand in the government of Venice, he 
argued, had been bred up to value honour above personal aggrandisement and they 
therefore did not seek to enlarge their power, either at the expense of those they 
governed with or those they governed. The people in turn were content to play no 
part in government, knowing themselves well governed and possessed of as much 
individual liberty as was consistent with the liberty of the state. However 
Boccalini did not believe this, the best form of government possible, was best for 
all states. In an age of absolute monarchy, where power was everywhere abused, 
all power became a matter of contention and suspicion. In nations accustomed to 
monarchy, therefore, it was almost impossible to establish a lasting aristocratic 
republic, since the people lacked the habit of voluntary obedience and the nobility 
were in want of the virtue necessary to maintain a republic such as Venice. 
Boccalini's perspective is illustrated by his tale of the island of Mitilene. On the 
death without issue of their prince, the people of the state debated whether to 
choose a new ruler or instead to set up as a free country. One of the chief citizens, 
"CL, I, no. 38, p. 267. SS See for example CL, II, no. 134, p. 926: `It is surprising what minute and contemptible causes 
create discontents, disorders, violence, and revolutions amongst men; what a small spring can 
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who would seem to be Boccalini's mouthpiece, argued that those habituated to 
servitude were incapable of being free and that liberty only flourished where it was 
a native growth and it was fruitless therefore, if not dangerous, to attempt to 
transplant it to a foreign soil. In countries inured to monarchy `the ambition of the 
Nobility' and `the sedition of the common people' were `capital enemies to living 
free' and strangled liberty, supplanting it with division and disorder. 59 Examples of 
free states were irrelevant since their circumstances differed from those of Mitilene 
and although, he argued, it must be conceded princes were sometimes insolent, 
`very beasts', yet `there is not a more phantastical, insolent, or bestial Government, 
in the world, then that of an ill-ordered Commonwealth, of a free tumultuous 
State. '6° Disregarding the advice of Boccalini's chief citizen, however, the people 
of Mitilene sent to Venice for a copy of its laws. Yet when this code arrived the 
common people were dissatisfied with it, because it excluded them from 
government, and the nobility were equally displeased, since it prevented them from 
buying places and allowed censors the authority to examine strictly into every 
man's behaviour and, consequently, all cried out for monarchy. Trenchard and 
Gordon, like most radical as well as establishment Whigs in the early eighteenth 
century, came to the same conclusion about Britain. They believed its people were 
incapable of supporting a republic on the classical model and that in the 
circumstances a limited monarchy was the only alternative to tyranny or anarchy. 61 
Drawing directly on Tacitus, Trenchard argued: 
actuate a mighty and many-headed multitude; and what mighty numbers one man is capable of 
drawing into his disgusts and designs. ' 59Advertisements from Parnassus, p. 79. 60Ibid., p. 79. 
61Toland, one such 'radical', writing to Harley in December 1711, noted that although the minister 
had encouraged him to produce a new edition of Harrington's Oceana 'neither of us imagined the 
model of it self to be practicable. ', Miscellaneous Works, II, p. 227. 
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Tacitus observed of the Romans in his time Nec totam libertatem nec totam 
servitutem pati posse; That they could neither bear full liberty, nor perfect 
slavery. This is certainly the case of England at present, if by liberty be 
understood what I presume he meant by it, a republican form of 
government. But I conceive that liberty may be better preserved by a well 
poised monarchy, than by any popular government that I know now in the 
world, whatever forms may exist in imagination. However, whether this be 
true or not, it is certainly true that no man in his wits will lose the benefit of 
a very good present establishment, and run infinite hazards, to try to get one 
a little better, if he could have any prospect of attaining it: And I shall 
endeavour to shew, that the effecting such a project is impossible; and that 
during the present distribution of property, we can preserve liberty by no 
other establishment than what we have; and in the attempt to alter it, must 
run great hazard of losing what we are in possession of, or perhaps of 
'62 falling into an absolute monarchy ... 
Gordon, like Trenchard, understood that modem men did not possess, and were not 
capable of acquiring, the virtue which was a prerequisite for liberty in its ancient 
form. Uncoupled from virtue liberty was dangerous, descending into licence, and 
in the present day laws and institutional structures had to supply this want of virtue 
if the liberties held to be fundamental by society were to be safeguarded. In tune 
with both Tacitus and Boccalini, Gordon argued: `It is with Liberty, as 'tis with 
Power. It is always unsafe when it is excessive ... Unbounded 
Liberty is as 
dangerous as unbounded Power; dangerous to the People, as well as to the Prince; 
and there is as much an End of Liberty when the People can do what they please as 
when the Prince can. '63 
Echoing Tacitus, Boccalini suggested that the best that could be hoped for in an 
age of absolute monarchy, when men were incapable of supporting liberty, was that 
62CL, II, no. 85, p. 613-14. 63Thomas Gordon, A Collection of Papers All Written, some of them published, During the Late 
Rebellion (London, 1758), no. 39, pp. 14-5. Boccalini concluded his tale of Mitilene with the ironic 
advice that 'if any one would set up Liberty in Mitilene, let them burn all Laws an Statutes, for such 
[men] understood that to be perfect Liberty, where none obeyed, all commanded, and every one did 
what he list. ', Advertisements from Parnassus, p. 82. 
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monarchs should govern with moderation and not arbitrarily. It was proper that 
they, like good shepherds, should use their subjects but not that they should abuse 
them. It was right, but also politic as Tacitus had shown, that monarchs should 
attend to the interests of their people because in this way they forwarded their own 
interests. Trenchard and Gordon sought throughout their careers to convince Whig 
ministers of the truth of this advice. Gordon warned those in power that to 
sacrifice public interest to private interest was `poor Policy, and a narrow View, as 
well as very wicked'. Trenchard concurred, insistently declaring: `How much it is 
the Interest of Governors to use the Governed well' , 
64 
Again following Tacitus, Boccalini argued that subjects in turn, when well 
governed, were best advised to obey their masters and accept in them those faults 
or vices which were common to all but the most virtuous of men. It is, of course, 
an argument that both Trenchard and Gordon employed in defence of Whig 
ministers under attack from Tory critics: 
It is better to bear some Inconveniences, and even very palpable Faults, then 
to introduce worse, by endeavouring to remove them. Most Reformations 
as certainly imply future Danger as they infer present Defects and 
Depravity. Whoever has Power to mend a State, hath Power to hurt it, and 
may do so without designing it. The Populace, particularly, are very 
insufficient, very rash Reformers; nor can any State be steady or tolerable, 
where the Populace can sway the State: For, besides their own rapid and 
incompetent judgment, they are eternally liable to be charmed, and roused, 
and seduced, by some dangerous and selfish Prompter. 65 
64 The Works ofSallust, p. 40; Trenchard, CL, II, no. 97, p. 693. 6sThe Works of Sallust, p. 167; also see p. 94. Gordon later contends: 11 would rather see many 
Abuses subsist, then a Cromwell, a Pisistratus, a Cesar, or (if you will), a Gracchus, assuming 
lawless power to redress them', p. 79. See also The Humourist, II, p. 148; Pasquin, LXXIV, 18 
October 1723. For Trenchard's views, see `Seasonable Advice to the Electors of Great Britain', A 
Collection of Tracts by the Late John Trenchard, Esq. And Thomas Gordon, Esq., II, pp. 274-5. 
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Similarly, Boccalini argued, rulers were foolish, and courted danger, if they 
imagined they could effect a reformation in manners in a people who had long been 
strangers to virtue. Men who had become habituated to their vices were not likely 
to brook any check on them. Boccalini has Solon repeat Tacitus' dictum that `when 
vice and corruption hath got deep rooting, it is wiselier done to tolerate the evil, 
then to go about to remedy it out of time, with danger to worse inconveniences'. 66 
He then himself observes, quoting Tacitus, that wise men know `As long as there 
be men, there will be vices' and `That men live on earth, Though not well, yet as 
little ill as they may; and that the height of human wisdom lay in being so discreet 
as to be content to leave the world as they found it'. 67 Undoubtedly Trenchard and 
Gordon shared the same dark view of human nature as that held by Tacitus and 
Boccalini and indeed Gordon's cautious counsel is reminiscent of the form of 
words used by Boccalini. Men, he advised, should `take the World in the main just 
as he finds it, excepting only in cases of extreme Necessity, where the Oppression 
is notorious and universal'. 68 
Knowing both from their study of Tacitus and from their own observation of 
human nature that it was impossible, and potentially perilous, to seek to eradicate 
vice, Trenchard and particularly Gordon had, like Boccalini, little patience with the 
efforts of reformers. Besides doubting their motives, they believed reformers 
misdirected their zeal and aimed at easy targets, condemning lesser criminals 
whilst remaining silent on the gross crimes and abuses of power committed by 
66 Advertisements from Parnassus, p. 157. 67Ibid., p. 162; for Tacitus, see Histories, 4. 68Pasquin, LVI, 13 August 1723. See also CL, II, nos. 70 and 90 pp. 504,643. 
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absolute princes, whose ambitions and greed were boundless. 
6' Boccalini and the 
authors of Cato's Letters believed it was better to suffer governors who were no 
less corrupt than those they governed, rather than by opposing the government, and 
thus weakening it, allow in a foreign power in comparison with which former 
governors would appear as veritable paragons of virtue. At all costs absolute 
monarchy had to be excluded and, they held, almost inevitably this meant 
accepting limited monarchy. For Boccalini, the only alternative to the absolutism of 
France and Spain, and in Trenchard and Gordon's eyes the only alternative to the 
Jacobite Pretender, was the constitutional rule enjoyed by nations such as England, 
the Low Countries, Germany and Poland, whose people, in Boccalini's words, 
`were born to a kind of Liberty, and who might be said to be sheep, which giving 
their shepherds a little milk by way of recognition or Fealty, in a certain little 
mark'd measure. And who will not suffer themselves (as is usual elsewhere) to be 
milked at discretion. 270 
In their condemnation of empire-building and military expansionism, Boccalini and 
Trenchard and Gordon were at variance with Tacitus. The only empire deserving of 
praise in their view was a commercial one, as a flourishing trade, they argued, was 
incompatible with absolute rule. The interests of a commercial people, ambitious 
of wealth, were opposed to those of an absolute prince, ambitious of power and 
glory. 7' Because commerce allowed men to grow rich it made them desirous of 
peace and greater profit, rather than war and military honours. Also, the same 
69Advertisements from Parnassus, p. 155. 
701bid., p. 323. None of these states, of course, was a republic. Two were actual monarchies and the 
other two, in the office of stadholder and elector, resembled monarchies. 71See ibid., pp. 293-4. 
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desire for the untroubled enjoyment of their wealth made them unlikely to disturb 
the peace with such seditious actions as would topple the state into either the 
anarchy of pure democracy or the tyranny of absolute rule. In arguing thus, 
Boccalini, like Trenchard and Gordon, recognised that in the modern age a republic 
based on virtue was an utopian dream. Instead they believed that in the absence of 
virtue self-interest, rightly directed, was the only sure foundation of a free state. 
They realised that self-interest, channelled through commerce, could fulfil in the 
modem world the same role as virtue had in the ancient, the defence and 
preservation of liberty. 
In the direction of a state both Boccalini and Gordon, and to a lesser extent 
Trenchard, followed Tacitus in believing governors were justified, and indeed 
duty-bound, to use subterfuge and unorthodox means where the end aimed at was 
the public good. At bottom they believed, as Gordon's emphatic assertion 
indicates, `whatever is necessary to the Publick Safety is just. '72 Although both 
authors accepted the conventional condemnation of raison d'etat they believed it 
was too useful a weapon to discard in defence of the commonwealth, especially 
since it featured in the armoury of most arbitrary princes. Boccalini thus portrayed 
the literatti of Parnassus agreeing unanimously, after long disputation on whether 
Tacitus was fit company for men such as they, who abhorred tyranny, `that the 
familiar acquaintance of so politick, and so wise a Writer, was more requisite for 
72Pasquin, XVI, 11 March 1722. As already noted, in the wake of the Atterbury plot, Trenchard 
excused standing armies, suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act and pensions as necessary evils, 
provoked by conspiracies. Similarly, although he inveighed against corruption in elections he also 
excused it in cases where a 'man of virtue' uses it in 'self-defence' against a candidate who 
employed corruption to beat him See `On Elections', pp. 52-3. 
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Commonwealths, than for Monarchies'. " Boccalini and Gordon, therefore, 
distinguished between raison d'etat stratagems employed by arbitrary rulers, in 
furtherance of their private interests, and the use of the same devices by governors 
in defence of their people's liberties, the latter being the true reason of state just as 
the former was false. That, seemingly paradoxically, some of these devices were 
practised secretly and without the people's knowledge was a necessary 
consequence of the commonality of man's inability to see beyond his own 
immediate and selfish interests. Not, of course, that either Boccalini or Gordon 
believed governors were any less devoted to their own selfish interests, merely that 
being more practised in the art of statecraft they might with greater ease be brought 
to understand that their private interests were tied to those of the public. Indeed, 
ostensibly both authors wrote with this aim in mind. 
Too much openness left a state vulnerable to the ambitions of other states that 
played a closer game, as Boccalini illustrated by having the Lady of Venetian 
Liberty reveal as the key to her longevity that `secrecy is no less necessary for the 
well governing of States, than good councel. '74 Gordon agreed on the need for 
secrecy, that is, if it served to protect the nation's liberty rather than merely the 
liberty of criminally corrupt ministers and Court favourites. He employed this 
reason of state rationale in his defence of Walpole's allegedly unconstitutional 
response to Jacobite intrigue. When an apparently grave threat to liberty arose in 
the form of the Atterbury plot, Gordon told his readers that men should not enquire 
into the secrets of government and that all truths, both philosophical and religious 
73Advertisements from Parnassus, p. 249. 
"Ibid., p. 14. 
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as well as political were not fit to be told, or told only to those capable of free and 
independent thought. " Secrecy in government was therefore warranted when it 
shielded the nation from its enemies. 
This two tier conception of knowledge is also apparent in John Toland's emphasis 
on the division, in philosophical understanding, between the penetrating knowledge 
available to the few and the superficial form grasped by the many, in his distinction 
between the esoteric and the exoteric. Not that Toland endorsed the strategy of 
reason of state, despite carrying out secret missions on behalf of Robert Harley and 
soliciting for further such employment. He spoke disparagingly of those who 
justified, on the grounds of expediency, allowing the people to believe falsehoods 
and shared the `republican martyr' Algernon Sidney's view of reason of state as a 
practice damned by association with absolute monarchy. This difference in 
perspective between `commonwealthmen' such as Sidney and Toland on the one 
hand and Gordon on the other would seem, in part at least, to reflect differing 
degrees of confidence in the idea that governors could themselves be governed in 
their actions by reason and virtue, rather than by self-interest. Indeed it could be 
argued that in his conception of the function of virtue in civil society, Sidney 
conforms more closely to the role Pocock ascribes to Harrington in the civic 
humanism paradigm than does the author of Oceana. Whereas Harrington looked 
to structural institutions rather than virtue as a bar to the abuse of power, for 
Sidney morality was an important feature of his political thought 
76 Unlike 
75Gordon insisted: `Secrets of State ought not to be published to the vulgar', St. James' Journal, 30 
March 1723. See also The Humourist, p. 159. 
76Harrington, like Gordon, viewed raison d'etat as a necessary weapon in the battle against tyranny. 
Reason of state in democracy and in the domestic context, he argued, `consists not of any more than 
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Harrington, he was not greatly impressed by Venice, with its system of political 
checks and balances, because he placed his faith in a government guided by a 
virtuous `natural aristocracy', effectively the descendants of England's old 
feudal 
or `Gothic' nobility. It followed, in Sidney's analysis, that good governors had no 
need to resort to reason of state stratagems, since their reason and virtue enabled 
them to create order out of the competing interests of a diverse mankind. 
7 For him 
this was the true `science of policy' and not that 'wicked malicious craft, exercised 
with perfidy and cruelty, accompanied with all manner of lust and vice, directly 
and irreconcilably contrary to virtue and piety, honesty or humanity, which 
is 
taught by Machiavelli and others. '78 
Sidney was well versed in the language of `interest' that became widespread in the 
political discourse of seventeenth century western Europe. 
79 His own doctrine, 
although it took as its starting point an acceptance of the mechanical laws of classic 
French interest theory, denied an identity of interest between absolute monarchy 
and the people. Instead he insisted there existed an irreconcilable contrariety of 
interest between the two. In his Court Maxims, which takes the form of a dialogue 
between the `commonwealthman' Eunomius and the `Courtier and lover of state 
truth' Philalethes, Sidney presented the case that it served a prince's interests to 
keep his people low and in poverty. 80 As already shown, Gordon took a contrary 
view, despite his admiration for `the great Algernon Sidney'. When in Cato's 
giving such a stop in accumulation that the State comes not to be Monarchical. ', Oceana, p. 513. 
Gordon would, however, have defined it as a defence against 'absolute' monarchy. 77Algernon Sidney, Court Maxims, ed. H. W. Blom, E. Haitsma Mulier, R. Janse (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 23. 
7: Ibid., p. 24. 
79See Jonathan Scott, Algernon Sidney and the English Republic 1623-77 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), pp. 208-9. 
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Letters Gordon quoted extensively from Sidney's Discourses he did so in order to 
attack abuses of government power and the South Sea scandal. 
8' In that context 
Sidney's moralistic rhetoric was useful. However, Gordon's commitment to the 
sentiments expressed in these sections is undercut by his more pragmatic stance 
elsewhere in the Letters and in his other writings. Because Gordon believed most, 
if not all, men incapable of true virtue he was content to sanction the practice of 
reason of state, as long as it served the interest of the commonwealth rather than an 
absolute ruler or a corrupt Court. He was therefore able, on the one hand, to 
condemn Walpole's cover-up of the South Sea scandal, which allowed prominent 
figures close to Court to escape prosecution whilst making vast profits at the 
public's expense, and later, on the other hand, to support Walpole's 
constitutionally suspect methods of dealing with the Atterbury plot, in the belief 
that the conspiracy had posed a danger to the nation's liberty. 
82 However in 
arguing that the end justifies the means, the essence of raison d'etat, neither 
Gordon nor Boccalini suggested as a corollary that this made the means morally 
right. Gordon would doubtless have agreed with Boccalini's definition of reason 
of state as `a Law useful for Commonwealths, but contrary to the Laws, both of 
God and Man. '83 Of course this is a view of statecraft that Machiavelli himself 
subscribed to, although not one Sidney would have countenanced. For Sidney, 
`true' reason of state was a policy consistent with Christian morality. Both 
Trenchard and Gordon differed from his, and from most English republicans of 
their own day, in following Boccalini's interpretation. Sidney used Tacitus and 
80See Court Maxims, pp. 71-8. 1See CL, I, nos. 25,26,27,37, pp. 179-80,188-94,196,262-6. :2 
Somewhat ironically, both Sidney and Atterbury were proceeded against by means of Bill of 
Attainder, a device criticised by some as unconstitutional. 
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Machiavelli as moral authorities, writers who portrayed the vice of the powerful in 
order to condemn rather than praise it. Trenchard and Gordon used them instead as 
authorities on `policy' but in the same `republican' cause. 
The distinction is an important one. Although Trenchard and Gordon used 
classical sources that does not make them `classical republicans'. Instead, their 
willingness to embrace the doctrine of reason of state marks them out as political 
pragmatists rather than as proponents of civic virtue. 84 Because they did not 
believe that virtue was the necessary prerequisite for the establishment and 
preservation of liberty they were able to view the two faces of Machiavelli and 
Tacitus, the republican and the monarchist, with equanimity. They believed that 
if 
liberty was to be preserved, in an age when virtue had become an obsolete and 
inadequate defence, authoritarian means, the monarchist weaponry of reason of 
state, had to be called into play. 85 So although undoubtedly Trenchard and Gordon 
recognised in Machiavelli and Tacitus the face of republicanism, what they saw 
there and admired was not what others have seen as its classical features but rather 
its cast of political pragmatism. It was essentially a face they recognised as their 
own. 
83Advertisements from Parnassus, p. 373. 
84In contrast, Sidney reveals an ambiguous attitude towards Machiavelli typical of his day. On the 
one hand, citing him as an authority for the immutable relationship between virtue and liberty and, 
on the other, condemning him as a master of reason of state. See, for example, Algernon Sidney, 
Discourses Concerning Government (Indianapolis: Liberty, 1996), II, p. 135; and Court Maxims, 
III, p. 24. In respect to Tacitus, Sidney employed him purely as a moral or historical source and 
ignored his justification of imperial rule on the grounds of expediency. 
85Trenchard and Gordon never seriously questioned at what point a government's violation of 
particular liberties, such as Habeas Corpus, under the justification of defence of national liberty 
undermined or endangered that very liberty. 
Chapter VIII 
The Reception of Cato Is Letters in America 
Whilst this thesis is not intended primarily as a contribution to the historiographical 
debate on the ideological origins of the American Revolution, its re-evaluation of 
the work of Trenchard and Gordon calls into question the validity of the position 
accorded to Cato's Letters by proponents of the civic humanist paradigm in their 
analysis of the political temper of colonial America. If revisionist historians have 
misread Cab 's Letters in their English context it is equally possible that they have 
misread them in their American context. In a circular logic that has not been 
questioned, it is taken as a given that Trenchard and Gordon were writers in the 
classical republican tradition and that ipso facto the influence they exerted on the 
American Revolutionary generation was in that direction. Yet the revisionist school 
fails to show that Trenchard and Gordon were read as `ancients' rather than 
`modems' by their American readers, as believers in virtue rather than interest as 
the means of establishing and preserving liberty. ' Even those revisionists who 
concede a liberal strand in Trenchard and Gordon's writings contend that they 
helped fashion a revolutionary consciousness that was classically republican in its 
origins. 
To various degrees revisionists have emphasised the oppositional element of 
Cato's Letters - the attacks made in the Letters on government corruption - at the 
expense of their strongly libertarian character and have presented them as a pattern 
for the political mindset that supposedly dominated the Revolutionary and post- 
224 
Revolutionary era. 2 Bernard Bailyn has acknowledged the `extreme libertarianism' 
of Trenchard and Gordon, yet although he has placed them in a liberal tradition that 
viewed liberty in terms of individual, inalienable rights and contract theory of 
government, he has insisted that only the `skeleton' of their thought was Lockean. 
3 
However, unlike Pocock and most of his followers, he would seem to allow that for 
the eighteenth century, if not the twentieth century, the languages of liberalism and 
civic humanism were not mutually exclusive. But by allying Cato's Letters with 
Bolingbroke's The Craftsman as anti-Walpolean opposition writings, Bailyn 
obscures the fundamental ideological differences between the two. One is criticism 
from within, from an `Independent Whig' but a Whig all the same, and the other is 
opposition from without, on the grounds of party. Indeed, both at the time of their 
original publication and afterwards, Gordon condemned the partisan use made of 
Cato's Letters by Tory supporters. Moreover, Bailyn's categorisation of Trenchard 
and Gordon as `left-wing' is misleading and contributes to the mistaken opinion 
that they were democrats. 
Also mistaken is the view which sees Anti-Federalists, regarded by Progressive 
historians as radical democrats, as the ideological heirs of Trenchard and Gordon. 5 
'The labels 'civic humanist' and 'liberal' are of course anachronistic. 2The term 'libertarian' carries different connotations for people of differential political complexions. 
It is, therefore, used here with some reservations. However, when taken to mean a commitment to 
individual liberty and limited government it does accurately convey Trenchard and Gordon's 
political beliefs. 
Bailyn, The Origins ofAmerican Politics, pp. 38-45. 
See Jacob, The Radical Enlightenment. Bailyn points out elsewhere that Trenchard and Gordon 
were radicals not democrats but it is not clear what he means by 'radicals'. See The Ideological 
Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 283. 5The Picture of Anti-Federalists as rustic, democratic levellers opposed by aristocratic merchant- 
capitalists emerged in the first half of the twentieth century with Progressive historians. Anti- Federalism in this reading is identified as 'agrarian democracy' and Federalism is seen as urban, 
aristocratic and commercial in character. In the 1950s/60s a consensus view of history began to 
challenge the Progressive interpretation, arguing that Federalists and Antifederalists shared the same 
economic interests. For the debate between Progressive and consensus historians see J. H. Hutson, 
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Jackson Turner Main, who subscribes to the Progressive analysis, has argued that 
the background to Anti-Federalist ideology is to be found in `what might be called 
the left wing of Whiggism' and that Cato's Letters was one of two works, the other 
being Burgh's Political Disquisitions, which were of particular relevance to the 
ideas of Anti-Federalists. 6 Not only would it appear a gross simplification to talk 
in terms which suggest a unified Anti-Federalist position that stood opposed to a 
clearly defined Federalist ideology but it is also incorrect to argue that Cato's 
Letters were the particular intellectual inheritance of the Anti-Federalists. As H. J. 
Storing has shown, there was no single Anti-Federalist perspective and although 
there were substantial and well formed differences between the Federalists and the 
Anti-Federalists, there were also diverse and contradictory opinions within both 
camps.? There is also much in contemporary writings to indicate that Trenchard 
and Gordon's work was equally amenable and serviceable to both Federalists and 
Anti-Federalists. 
When passages or entire numbers of Cato's Letters were quoted, or lifted without 
attribution, in American publications or correspondence before and after 
Independence, it was frequently in defence of such typically `liberal' principles as 
'Country, Court and Constitution: Antifederalism and the Historians', William & Mary Quarterly, 
38 (1981), 337-68. It is unhelpful to find the suggestion still current that the Federalists can be read 
as liberal modernists and the Anti-Federalists as nostalgic communitarians, seeking desperately to 
hold on to a virtuous moral order threatened by commerce and market society. See the introduction 
to The Federalist Papers, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, The Federalist 
Papers, ed. Isaac Kramnick (London: Penguin, 1987), p. 54. One need not be a proponent of the 
consensus perspective to agree with Cecilia M. Kenyon's criticism of the tendency to impose upon 
the Revolutionary period too simple a pattern of interpretation; to speak of the various parties as if 
they could be divided naturally into pairs of opposites. See Cecilia M. Kenyon, 'Republicanism and 
Radicalism in the American Revolution: An Old-Fashioned Interpretation', William and Mary 
Quarterly, 19 (1962), 153-182. 
6Jackson Turner Main, The Antifederalists (Williamsburg: The University of North Carolina Press, 
1961), p. 8. 
7See H. J. Storing, ed., The Complete Anti-Federalist, 7 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1981), I, pp. 5-6. 
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freedom of speech, freedom of the press and freedom of conscience. Moreover, the 
revolutionaries' thinking had not been so entirely colonised by `Country' ideology - 
which supposedly inspired their minds with visions of conspiracy and corruption - 
that they could not also invoke self-interest, the traditional refuge of `Court' 
apologists, in calling for colonial self-determination. In New York during 1765, 
letters were published in John Holt's Gazette, the principle organ of radical opinion 
in the period of the Stamp Act, which defended American rights by first appealing 
to legal precedent and then, secondly, by arguing that these rights were ultimately 
grounded in self-interest. Echoing Cato's Letters, `Freeman' argued that self- 
interest was fundamental to human nature and that it was the principle on which 
government should be judged: 
Self Interest is the grand Principle of all Human Actions; it is unreasonable 
and vain to expect Service from a Man who must act contrary to his own 
Interests to perform it. No Government therefore can be wise or good, 
unless the interests of Individuals is made co-incident with the Interest of 
the Publick. We may demonstrate this from the divine Oeconomy: We find 
the Creator has laid intelligent Creatures under such natural laws, that no 
individual can act contrary to the Interest of the Publick without injuring 
himself in the same Proportion. And the publick Happiness is then in the 
most perfect State, when each Individual acts the most agreeably to his own 
Interest. This ought to be the Model of all Human Government. 
$ 
The argument was continued in further letters and concluded two months later, in 
June 1765, with `Freeman' reasoning that since the interests of Britain and her 
American colonies could not be made to coincide the connection between them 
should be severed. In pressing this demand for the right to liberty based on the 
universal law of self-interest, Trenchard's essay `Of Plantations and Colonies' was 
quoted at length, to illustrate that it was natural for a colony to seek independence 
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from its mother country once it no longer derived any benefit from the relationship. 
This principle of overriding self-interest informed the frequent and unguarded 
allusions to independence which appeared in the colonial press in the ensuing 
months of the Stamp Act crisis. The New York Journal celebrated self-interest, or 
`self Preservation, self-love' as `tending in the highest degree to the general Benefit 
of the Whole and every Part'. 9 In doing so it endorsed the teaching of Cato 'S 
Letters, looking to self-interest, rather than self-sacrificing virtue, as the foundation 
of liberty. 
Public virtue, and the sacrifice of individual interests to the greater good of the 
whole, however, is meant to have formed the cornerstone of American political 
thinking throughout the Revolutionary era, or at least until the Constitution. 
Revisionist historians, who generally agree on the pre-eminent position occupied 
by the civic humanist paradigm in the political ideology of eighteenth century 
America, differ to some degree as to the point at which its dominance began to 
wane. 10 Yet even early in the century it would appear that many of the ideals 
which shaped the political thinking of the founding fathers had little to do with 
New York Gazette, 4 April 1765, quoted in Bernard Friedman's 'The Shaping of the Radical 
Consciousness in Provincial New York', The Journal of American History, 56 (1970), 781-801, at 
789-90. 
New York Journal, 19 March 1767, quoted in 'The Shaping of the Radical Consciousness in 
Provincial New York', 792. 
10Whereas Gordon Wood argues that the defeat of the Anti-Federalists saw the abandonment of the 
classical theory of politics, Pocock postpones its demise to some decades later and discovers it still 
alive and present as the animating force of Jeffersonian Republicanism Similarly, Lance Banning 
has argued: 'Most of the inherited structure of eighteenth-century political thought persisted in 
America for years after 1789. And this persistence was not a matter of a shadowy half-life of 
fragmentary ideas. A structured universe of classical thought continued to serve as the intellectual 
medium through which Americans perceived the political world, and an inherited political language 
was the primary vehicle for the expression of their hopes and discontents. ', 'Republican Ideology 
and the Triumph of the Constitution, 1789 to 1793', William and Mary Quarterly, 31 (1974), 167- 
188, at 173. See also Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (New 
York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969) and Pocock, 'Virtue and Commerce in the Eighteenth Century'. 
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classical republican principles and that these ideals, liberal in nature, were 
popularly transmitted in the work of Trenchard and Gordon. 
In July 1722 the young Benjamin Franklin, following the imprisonment of his 
brother for an article which had not met with the approval of the Massachusetts 
legislature, reprinted in The New-England Courant the fifteenth of Cato's Letters, 
entitled `Of Freedom of Speech; The same is inseparable from publick Liberty'. It 
included a stirring defence of freedom of speech and a definition of liberty that is 
in the tradition of Locke rather than Aristotle: 
Without freedom of thought, there can be no such thing as wisdom; and no 
such thing as publick liberty, without freedom of speech: Which is the right 
of every man, as far as by it he does not hurt and control the right of another 
... This sacred privilege is so essential to free government, that the security 
of property; and the freedom of speech, always go together ... 
11 
Some years later Cato's Letters were again marshalled in defense of the same 
liberties, in what is seen by some as a seminal case in the early development in 
America of a broad conception of freedom of the press. 12 In 1735 John Peter 
Zenger was prosecuted by the New York authorities after he had included in his 
newspaper quotes and entire numbers from Cato's Letters on freedom of the press 
and freedom of speech and on the perils of arbitrary rule. James Alexander, the 
principal backer of Zenger's New York Weekly Journal and `Cato's principal 
disciple in the colonies', spearheaded the defence. The main argument used by 
"CL, I, no. 15, p. 110. '2 See D. L. Jacobson, ed., The English Libertarian Heritage, (Indianpolis: Dobbs-Merrill Co., 
1965), p. Iii. 
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Alexander was taken from Cato's Letters, that the truth of a defendant's allegedly 
libellous statement should remove him from fear of Punishment- 
13 
In the same month that Franklin included a passage from Cato's Letters on 
freedom of speech in his Silence Dogood letters to The New-England Courant, in 
another contribution to the newspaper he again quoted at length that `ingenious 
Political Writer in the London Journal', from a letter entitled `Considerations on 
the Weakness and Inconsistencies of human Nature', which identified self-love as 
man's strongest passion and the root of all others. Yet, like Trenchard and Gordon, 
he saw that this tendency, manifested in the desire to purchase and enjoy luxuries, 
could be a force for good: 
I am not sure, that in a great state it [luxury] is capable of a remedy, nor that 
the evil is in itself always so great as it is represented ... 
Is not the hope of 
being one day able to purchase and enjoy luxuries a great spur to labor and 
industry? May not luxury, therefore, produce more than it consumes, 
if 
without such a spur people would be, as they are naturally enough inclined 
to be, lazy and indolent? 14 
As shown by his essay `A Modest Inquiry into the Nature and Necessity of Paper 
Currency', he did not see commerce as a threat to virtue and nor was he troubled by 
the spectre of credit. 15 Over a decade later, when he once again adopted the role of 
defender of freedom of speech, he looked to a familiar source for inspiration. 
Writing in support of a Presbyterian minister, Samuel Hemphill, censured by the 
Commission of the Synod of Philadelphia in April 1735 for propounding `Unsound 
13For an account of the Zenger controversy see L. W. Levy, Legacy of Suppression (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 130. 
"Benjamin Franklin, 'On Luxury, Idleness, and Industry', The Works of Benjamin Franklin, 10 
vols. (Boston: 1836), II, pp. 448-9. 
"The subject of paper currency is one that illustrates how inadvisable it is to draw close 
comparisons between English and American 'Court' and 'Country' attitudes in matters of national 
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and Dangerous' doctrines, he quoted extensively from Gordon's A Sermon 
Preached before the Learned Society of Lincoln's Inn on religious intolerance. 
16 
Cato's Letters and The Independent Whig also figured in a noted controversy 
between Anglicans and Dissenters in New York in the 1750s over control of a 
proposed college. William Livingston together with two friends, all of 
`independent principles' in politics and in religion, founded The Independent 
Reflector, which soon became embroiled in political and religious disputes and 
proved a thorn in the side of episcopal Churchmen. The Independent Reflector was 
actively modelled on The Independent Whig, its aim being to vindicate `the civil 
and religious RIGHTS of my Fellow-Creatures'. 
17 It paraphrased many of The 
Independent Whig's arguments and borrowed its tone and language in order to 
attack tyranny and the ambition and bigotry of the Anglican Church hierarchy and 
to defend the right to freedom of thought and freedom of expression. 
'8 
Thomas Jefferson was another admirer and so too, despite their political 
differences, was John Adams. Jefferson's library included copies of Cab 's Letters 
and The Independent Whig and in his correspondence he praised Gordon's 
finance. In America the 'Country' position would have been to be in favour of allowing states to 
issue their own paper currency and the 'Court' position to be opposed to such a measure. 16Benjamin Franklin, The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, 2 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1959), I, pp. 32,65. 
'7William Livingston and Others, The Independent Reflector, ed. M. M. Klein (Cambridge, Mass: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 56. 
"The Independent Reflector praised The Independent Whig for having gone 'farther towards 
shaming Tyranny and Priestcraft (two dismal Fantoms not over-apt to blush) with downright Banter, 
than could have been effected by austere Dogmas, or formal Deductions. lie has often displayed 
their Deformity with a Sarcasm, and struck Terror into a whole Hierarchy, by raising a single 
Twitter. ', The Independent Reflector, p. 345. Cato's Letters are also quoted at length on the subject 
of 'The Vanity of Birth and Titles; with the Absurdity of claiming Respect without Merit', The 
Independent Reflector, p. 365. 
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translations and commentaries on Sallust and Tacitus. 
19 Adams attributed the 
victory of Oliver Wolcott in the Connecticut gubernatorial election of 1817, in 
which the campaign issue was `whether freemen shall be tolerated in the 
free 
exercise of their religious and political rights', in part to the recent republication of 
The Independent Whig. `These Volumes' he wrote `have produced a Burst of 
Indignation against Priestcraft Bigotry and Intollerance, and in conjunction with 
other causes have produced the late Election. '2° The election of Wolcott as 
governor brought about the Constitutional Convention of 1818, Article VII of 
which provided for religions freedom. Josiah Quincy, friend and colleague of 
Adams, in his will bequeathed to his son `Algernon Sidney's works, John Locke's 
works, Lord Bacon's works, Gordon's Tacitus, and Cato's Letters' in the hope that 
`the spirit of liberty' might `rest' on the boy. 
21 
Despite the pervasiveness of revisionist received wisdom, the suggestion that 
Cato's Letters forward `liberal' principles is not an entirely novel one. Prior to the 
triumph of the revisionist school of thought, which ironically after the consignment 
of Locke to the role of bit-player saw Cato's Letters moved forward to centre stage 
in the new interpretation of America's Revolutionary ethos, Trenchard and 
Gordon's work had largely been ignored by scholars of American intellectual 
history. Caroline Robbins and D. L. Jacobson, writing before Cato's Letters 
became set in stone as a civic humanist text, are notable both for their part in 
"See The English Libertarian Heritage, p. lv. References to Adams' appreciation of Cato's Letters 
may be found in The Adana-Jefferson Letters, ed. L. J. Cappon, 2 vols., (Williamsburg: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1959), II, p. 510; and John Adams, The Works of John Adams, 
10 vols. (Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1851), II, p. 5; X, p. 202. 
20Adams-Jefferson Letters, II, p. 512. 
2'Josiah Quincy, Memoirs of Josiah Quincy, Jr., quoted in The English Libertarian Heritage, p. 
lviii. 
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rectifying the neglect shown towards Trenchard and Gordon and also for the 
emphasis they place on the libertarian aspects of their work. What they fail to 
recognise, however, is that crucial to any understanding of Trenchard and Gordon's 
work is their view of human nature. Contrary even to the opinion of most critics of 
the revisionist perspective, they were not enthusiastic believers in the socially and 
politically redemptive power of a resurrected civic virtue and it is by no means 
certain that they imbued the Revolutionary generation with such a zeal. Jacobson's 
view that they held an `optimistic view of the mass of mankind' is quite at odds 
with the dark, Hobbesian image of humanity that appears in Cato's Letters 
22 
In more recent years a small number of historians have concurred with Jacobson's 
representation of Trenchard and Gordon. 23 Yet it may be a testament to the weight 
of authority attributed to the revisionist analysis that even some of its most 
prominent opponents have tempered their criticism with an acceptance of the now 
conventional portrayal of Trenchard and Gordon. Issac Kramnick, whilst 
contesting the validity of the civic humanist paradigm in the context of the late 
eighteenth century, allows it the field when the debate turns to the early part of the 
22lbid., p. lviii. One survey of American historiography puts it even more strongly, saying of 
Trenchard and Gordon: `They believed that all men were naturally good and that citizens became 
restless only when oppressed. ' R. Shalhope, 'Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an 
Understanding of Republicanism In American Historiography', William and Mary Quarterly, 29 
(1972), 49-80, at 58. 23Hamoway, `Cato's Letters, John Locke and the Republican Paradigm', and McMahon, The 
Radical Whigs, have already been mentioned. Also noteworthy are Steven Dworetz, The 
Unvarnished Doctrine (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990); Thomas Pangle, The Spirit of 
Modern Republicanism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); and Paul A. Rahe, Republics 
Ancient and Modern, Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1992). Rahe, who rejects the 'republican synthesis', provides 
an impressive analysis of classical republicanism in its original context in order to assess whether 
the political thought of the American Revolutionary generation was actually classical. 
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century. 24 Even Steven Dworetz and Thomas Pangle, opponents of revisionism 
who are notable in that they do not side-step the Lockean and especially the 
Hobbesian strands in Trenchard and Gordon's thought, leave unaddressed the 
possibility that contemporary readers were no less astute and that the influence 
Cato's Letters exerted on American colonial minds may be seen in an Alexander 
Hamilton as well as a Thomas Jefferson. 25 
Another vocal critic of revisionism, Joyce Appleby, has attacked Pocock for his 
application of a narrow anthropologically based methodology that fails to 
acknowledge the invariable co-existence of a plurality of discourses within a 
complex, sophisticated society. 26 Her own instructive examination of the 
competing languages which characterised seventeenth century England has focused 
on that of the market economy. Economic literature of the period, she argues, set 
24See Issac Kramnick, 'Republican Revisionism Revisited', The American Historical Review, 87 
(1982), 629-664. 
25See The Unvarnished Doctrine and The Spirit of Modern Republicanism. Dworetz's otherwise 
excellent analysis somewhat overstates the extent of Trenchard and Gordon's unmodified adoption 
of Hobbes. He attempts to undermine Trenchard and Gordon's republican credentials by damning 
them by association with Hobbes. Yet Dutch, English and, later, British republicans all found a 
great deal of merit in Hobbes. As argued in chapter 3 of this thesis, while Trenchard and Gordon 
accepted Hobbes' egoistic psychology the political conclusions they drew from it were closer to the 
de la Court brothers than they were to the author of Leviathan. They, like other republican admirers 
of Hobbes, accepted the need for a strong sovereign body, whilst at the same time they disagreed 
with his preferred model of sovereignty. Moreover, it was Hobbes who relieved the subject of all 
obligation to the sovereign in the event that he ceased to enjoy protection of his person and 
property. Locke was more circumspect on the question of the circumstances under which a subject 
could legitimately withdraw his obedience. It is also incorrect to claim, as Dworetz does, that 
Trenchard and Gordon had a 'conservative dread of change'. They wanted change, a clean-up of 
government sponsored corruption and changes to legislation that discriminated against Dissenters, 
but not at the price of peace and security. 26See Joyce Appleby, 'Republicanism and Ideology', American Quarterly, 37 (1985), 461-473. 
Appleby's criticism is a valid one, although her accusation is not strictly accurate. Pocock has 
conceded the possibility, indeed probability, of the presence of a plurality of languages within a 
complex plural society. Nevertheless, he has at the same time, not least when more recently 
revisiting the subject, reinforced the notion of the supremacy of the civic humanist paradigm, see 
J. G. A. Pocock, Politics, Language and Time (London, Methuen & Co., 1972), chapter 4; and 
`Between Gog and Magog: The Republican Thesis and the Ideologia Americana', Journal of the 
History of Ideas, 48 (1987), 325-46. Moreover, the tolerance Pocock allows in theory to the idea of 
rival languages is often overlooked by those who have embraced civic humanism as a form of 
orthodoxy. 
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out principles for a growth in national wealth which assumed that market relations 
possessed an order based on the driving forces of human nature and that individual 
economic freedom furthered consistent commercial development. Whilst it seldom 
directly addressed political issues this literature presented a model of economic 
relations, structured on the idea that economic laws were analogous to physical 
laws, that had profound implications for theories of social order, sovereignty, 
individual freedom and rights and the relationship between natural and positive 
law. Transmitted to the American colonies, Appleby argues, this tradition of 
thought helped foster a competing ideology to that of classical republicanism. It 
conceived of human nature and the conditions of social stability in quite different 
terms and articulated a new social reality in which the self-seeking drive appeared 
more powerful than institutional efforts to mould men's actions. 
7 
However Appleby, following Kramnick, regards Trenchard and Gordon as classical 
republicans, who rejected material progress because it was not founded on virtue. 
28 
She fails to recognise that on the contrary they, like Mandeville, were in the same 
tradition as Dudley North, John Houghton, Nicholas Barbon and the other 
seventeenth century economic commentators she has chosen to champion. 29 
Trenchard and Gordon were `moderns' who celebrated material progress and 
viewed commercial society as a natural development arising out of man's nature as 
a creature of limitless desires. Gordon could almost be echoing Barbon, or indeed 
anticipating Smith, when he wrote that man was a creature of insatiable appetites 
27See Joyce Appleby, `The Social Origins of American Revolutionary Ideology', in Liberals, and 
Republicanism, in the Historical Imagination (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1992), 
pp. 161-87. 
2Blbid., p. 181. 
29It is somewhat surprising that Appleby fails to mention Mandeville at all. 
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and that the more he acquired the more he wanted. 
3° Yet far from condemning this 
trait in man, which meant that he could never feel truly satisfied, Gordon 
applauded it as a motor for progress, forwarding the course of civilisation: 
As soon as men are freed from the importunities of hunger and cold; the 
thoughts and desire of conveniency, plenty, ornament, and politeness, 
do 
presently succeed: and then follow after, in very quick progression, 
emulation, ambition, profusion, and the love of power: and all these, under 
proper regulations, contribute, to the happiness, wealth and security of 
societies. 31 
But Trenchard and Gordon went beyond merely linking psychological drives to 
productive activities. Unlike Barbon, North and Appleby's other free-marketeers, 
they were explicitly political writers and, drawing on the epistemological 
philosophy of Locke, they provided a rationale for individual rights based on man's 
limited capacity for knowledge. Since, they contended, no man or group of men 
can be infallible or have a monopoly on the truth, free exercise of the ballot, 
free 
speech, freedom of the press and freedom of conscience were all rights that could 
not, without injustice, be denied. The political ideas which Appleby finds implicit 
in the economic theory of the seventeenth century free-marketeers, and which she 
argues helped shape an American liberal ideology, are made explicit in the writings 
of Trenchard and Gordon. Moreover, Appleby fails to explain how the ideas 
expressed in the economic literature of seventeenth century England were 
conveyed to the American colonies of the eighteenth century and gained common 
30Here Gordon was, of course, also echoing Hobbes. See chapter 3 of this thesis. Appleby traces a 
trajectory from seventeenth century economists to Adam Smith. See Joyce Appleby, Capitalism 
and a New Social Order: The Republican Vision of the 1790s (New York: New York University 
Press, 1984), pp. 25-6. 31CL, I, no. 67, p. 473. Barbon wrote in similar vein: 'The Wants of the mind are infinite, Men 
naturally Aspires, and as his mind is elevated, his Senses grow more refined, and more capable of 
Delight; his Desires are inlarged, and his Wants increase with his Wishes, which is for every thing 
that is rare, can gratifie his Senses, adorn his body, and promote the Ease, Pleasure, and pomp of 
Life. ' and 'It is not Necessity that causeth the Consumption, Nature may be Satisfied with Little, but 
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currency. She provides no evidence that North, Houghton and Barbon, or earlier 
writers such as Mun and Misseldon, influenced the colonists. On the other hand, 
as already noted, there is ample evidence that Cato's Letters were widely read 
throughout all thirteen colonies and whilst this readership may have been little 
acquainted with the economic liberalism of Appleby's unsung heroes of 
seventeenth century England, it would have discovered the same free trade and 
anti-bullionist arguments forwarded by Trenchard and Gordon and, tied to these, a 
defence of political liberalism. 2 Trenchard even advanced an economic argument 
drawn from human nature to warn Britain against over-burdening her colonies with 
taxes and stripping them of their wealth. An argument, as already shown, which 
was taken by up American revolutionaries. The best policy, he argued, was not to 
use violence against burgeoning colonies, or to provoke them into setting 
themselves up as trade rivals, but to `imitate the example of merchants and 
shopkeepers' and take them into partnership. 33 
The enthusiastic endorsement of open commercial and financial markets one finds 
in Cato's Letters does not square with the revisionist identification of a 
paradigmatic attitude of ambivalence towards commerce and outright antipathy 
towards the financial framework which facilitated its growth. However, whilst 
revisionist historians have proved reluctant to acknowledge those aspects of Cato's 
Letters which suggest an alternative paradigm to that of civic humanism, modern 
day advocates of free market capitalism and limited government have embraced 
it is the wants of the Mind, Fashion, and desire of Novelties, and Things scarce, that causeth 
Trade. ', Nicholas Barbon, A Discourse of Trade (London, 1690), pp. 15,88. 32See CL, I, no. 64, pp. 442-50, 'Trade and Naval Power the Offspring of Civil Liberty only, and 
cannot subsist without it'; II, no. 87, pp. 626-37, 'Gold and Silver in a Country to be considered 
only as Commodities'. 
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Trenchard and Gordon's `Cato' as one of their own. The right-leaning, 
Washington-based Cato Institute, which takes its name from the Letters, sees in 
`Cato' a standard-bearer of economic liberalism and a defender of the rights of the 
individual against the encroachments of the state. The Institute's website 
introduces Cato's Letters as a work animated by a `Jeffersonian philosophy' that 
`combines an appreciation for entrepreneurship, the market process, and lower 
taxes with strict respect for civil liberties and skepticism about the benefits of both 
the welfare state and foreign military adventurism. ' 
On the evidence of the Letters themselves it is an evaluation which is hard to 
quarrel with. 34 If by `entrepreneurship' one means commercial activity, Trenchard 
and Gordon certainly expressed appreciation of its practice and of the market 
process. Although, while they endorsed free market principles that did not mean 
they were opposed to government involvement in the regulation of markets. They 
expected government to prevent the development of monopolies, which harmed 
trade, and to police the activities of the stock market, to ensure that a favoured few 
33 See CL, II, no. 106, pp. 747-753. 341t might be argued that Gordon's seeming endorsement of 'an agrarian law, or something like it' 
situates him firmly in the classical republican tradition. However, Gordon's statement has to be 
seen in context. This reference appears in a relatively earlier number of Cato's Letters (no. 35 of 
138), at a time when the full force of Trenchard and Gordon's anger was focused on those 
implicated in the South Sea Company scandal. Gordon was not advocating a redistribution of 
wealth when he invoked the idea of an agrarian law but calling for an investigation into the assets of 
those who by the fraudulent manipulation of South Sea Company shares had acquired wealth of an 
`immeasurably or surprizing great' magnitude. He claimed: 'I have always thought, that an enquiry 
into men's fortunes, especially monstrous fortunes raised out of the publick, like Milton's infernal 
palace, as it were in an instant, was of more importance to a nation, than some other enquiries which 
I have heard of. ' As the letter continues it becomes apparent that Gordon was defending the 
inviolability of private property not attacking it when he referred to an agrarian law. Those who had 
unlawfully profited by the South Sea Bubble had despoiled ordinary men of their property. In 
Gordon's view, they were no less robbers than if they had broken into men's houses and stolen their 
goods. This is made clear in the closing paragraph of the letter: 'For a conclusion: As the 
preservation of property is the source of national happiness; whoever violates property, or lessens or 
endangers it, common sense says, that he is an enemy to his country; and publick spirit says, that he 
should feel its vengeance. ', ibid., I, no. 35, pp. 253-4. 
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with friends in high places did not profit at the expense of the ruin of a vast number 
of small investors. Their insistence on the necessity for lower taxes was linked to 
their demand for the preservation of civil liberties, for men to be allowed the 
freedom to spend the money they had earned by their labour as they pleased and the 
freedom to speak and write as they pleased, as long as in doing so no one else's 
rights were infringed. They would certainly have been extremely sceptical about 
the benefits of the welfare state, judging by their vehement opposition to charity 
schools, which was in part based on economic grounds. Equally, their criticism of 
foreign military excursions was motivated by concern for the national debt. In the 
Preface to Cato's Letters Gordon says of Trenchard that one of the two things he 
had much at heart was `the keeping England out of foreign broils', the other being 
paying off the national debt. 35 Much is made by revisionists of the republican 
obsession with the national debt. Pocock has argued that public credit negatively 
coloured Tory and Old Whig perceptions of commerce and that it similarly gave 
rise, in his view, to Hume's ambivalence towards commercial society. Yet, like 
Hume, Trenchard believed that it was not commerce but war that fuelled the 
national debt and he was unequivocal in his praise of the former and condemnation 
of the latter. 36 
It is perhaps appropriate that `Cato' should have been adopted as the figurehead of 
a libertarian think-tank. In a letter on the nature of liberty, Gordon made it plain 
that the liberty he was extolling was liberty in the negative sense, liberty from 
35See ibid., I, pp. 75-6,79,130,157,445, II, 549,602,618-626,640,698. 36See Virtue, Commerce, and History, pp. 125-41. For flume's attitude towards public debt see 
Istvan Hont, 'The rhapsody of public debt: David flume and voluntary state bankruptcy', in 
Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain, ed. N. Phillipson, Q. Skinner (Cambridge: C. U. P., 
1993), 321-48. 
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government interference. Government, he argued, was `intended to protect men 
from the injuries of one another, and not to direct them in their own affairs, in 
which no one is interested but themselves'. A man should be allowed to conduct 
his own life in his own way, however badly he might fare, as long as he harmed no 
one but himself. Just because some men might fare very badly was no reason why 
all men should have restrictions placed on how they lived their lives: 
Idiots and lunaticks indeed, who cannot take care of themselves, must be 
taken care of by others: But whilst men have their five senses, I cannot see 
what the magistrate has to do with actions by which the society cannot be 
affected; and where he meddles with such, he meddles impertinently or 
tyrannically. Must the magistrate tie up every man's legs, because some 
men fall into ditches? Or, must he put out their eyes, because with them 
they see lying vanities? 37 
In terms that would gladden the hearts of modem day advocates of free market 
economics and arms-length government, Gordon railed against the injustice of a 
man who laboured for his own benefit and that of his family being forced to 
support those who were idle. Liberty was the freedom to spend one's money in the 
way one pleased and to pass on to one's children's the gains one had accumulated: 
Indeed liberty is the divine source of all human happiness. To possess, in 
security, the effects of our industry, is the most powerful and reasonable 
incitement to be industrious: And to be able to provide for our children, and 
to leave them all that we have, is the best motive to beget them ... The 
privileges of thinking, saying, and doing what we please, and of growing as 
rich as we can, without any other restriction, than that by all this we hurt 
not the publick, nor one another, are the glorious privileges of liberty, and 
its effects, to live in freedom, plenty, and safety. '38 
37CL, I, no. 67, p. 428. 38Ibid., I, no. 63, p. 436. Also: 'By liberty, I understand ... [man's] right to enjoy the 
fruit of his 
labour, art, and industry, as far as by it he hurts not the society, or any members of it by taking from 
any member, or by hindering him from enjoying what he himself enjoys. The fruits of a man's 
honest industry are the just rewards of it, ascertained to him by natural and eternal equity, as is title 
to use them in the manner which he thinks fit: And thus, with the above limitations, every man is 
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Gordon may sound like a nineteenth or twentieth century western liberal but 
obviously he was no such thing. Neither though was he the economic reactionary 
and political idealist, and inspiration for American oppositionists, which 
proponents of the civic humanist paradigm would portray him as. 
It is part of the revisionist interpretation of the early national period of American 
history to present the opposition between Jeffersonian Republicans and Hamilton 
over the latter's management of the public debt as a replication of the war waged 
against Walpole's supposed political and financial corruption. Americans at the 
turn of the century, it is argued, had imbibed the classical republican language of 
Trenchard and Gordon and other English opposition writers and were therefore 
cued to recognise key developments, such as a growth in the national debt, as 
stages in a ministerial conspiracy to subvert the constitution and overthrow 
republican government. Forrest McDonald has perhaps gone further than most 
revisionists in claiming that the ideology of Jeffersonian Republicanism was 
derived largely from the oppositionist tradition of eighteenth century England: 
The Jeffersonian Republicans regarded this scheme of things as utterly 
wicked, even as the English Opposition had regarded Walpole's system. 
Indeed, though the Jeffersonians borrowed some of their ideas from James 
Harrington and other seventeenth-century writers and some from John 
Locke, their ideology was borrowed in toto from such Oppositionists as 
Charles Davenant, John Trenchard, Thomas Gordon, James Burgh, and 
most especially Henry St. John, First Viscount Bolingbroke ... The 
Republicans adjusted the ideology to fit the circumstances, to fit the U. S. 
Constitution and the "ministry" of Alexander Hamilton rather than the 
British Constitution and the ministry of Robert Walpole; but that was all, 
and astonishingly little adjustment was necessary. 
39 
sole lord and arbiter of his own private actions and property. A character of which no man living 
can divest him but by usurpation, or his own consent', ibid., I, no. 63, p. 436. 
39Forrest McDonald, The Presidency of Thomas Jefferson (Lawrence, Kansas: The University Press 
of Kansas, 1976), p. 19. 
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McDonald argues that these opposition writers condemned and sought to undo the 
financial revolution, together with the political corruption it had spawned. In its 
place they proposed the restoration of an uncorrupted, golden age of English 
history, when `life was rural, relationships were personal, the gentry ruled as a 
natural aristocracy, the main corpus of the citizenry was an honest yeomanry [and] 
commerce and craft-manufacturing existed only as handmaidens to agriculture'. 
Jeffersonians, in McDonald's view, were the ideological descendents of these 
`reactionaries' who in like fashion resisted the emergence of the modem world 40 
Lance Banning has criticised Joyce Appleby and Isaac Kramnick for suggesting 
that revisionists have claimed that Jeffersonianism and English opposition thought 
were identical, when all they have argued is that a strong influence was exerted by 
the anti-Walpoleans. He has insisted that McDonald's view is an exceptional one 
and that it is deliberately provocative. Yet his own writing does little to dispel the 
false impression that Hamilton's opponents adopted wholesale English opposition 
ideology and merely rebranded it for domestic consumption: 
[I]ntellectually, the Republicans of the 1790s were the "country" party of 
the United States. Their quarrel with Federalism was much more 
systematically ideological than has been seen. It rested on a complete and 
consistent Americanization of English opposition thought. 4' 
And indeed Pocock has been scarcely less restrained in the parallel he draws 
between American and English opposition thought, arguing as he has that `[t]o a 
quite remarkable degree, the great debate on [Hamilton's] policies in the 1790s was 
a replay of Court-Country debates seventy and a hundred years earlier. '42 
40Ibid., pp. 161-2. 
4 "Republican Ideology and the Triumph of the Constitution, 1789 to 1793', 172-3. 42'Virtue and Commerce in the Eighteenth Century', 119-13,131; also see Machiavellian Moment, 
p. 529. J. M. Murrin has argued in similar vein: 'To an almost incredible degree, American events 
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Banning's contention is that if some revisionists appear to have pushed the 
resemblance between English and American opposition thought too far, this has 
been in order to redress the omissions of previous scholarship. However, even if 
this is the case, in doing so the pendulum seems to have swung too far in the 
opposite direction, diminishing the Lockean and liberal elements of Revolutionary 
and Constitutional era thought. Appleby's analysis would come as a welcome 
corrective did she not veer too far back to the pre-revisionist position. Banning 
appears to offer a middle way between revisionist and counter-revisionist 
interpretations, rightfully dismissing crude all or nothing distinctions between 
liberal and classical republican positions and allowing both a place in American 
opposition thought. Yet what then remains is an argument over how big a place 
each occupied and it is clear that for Banning's communitarian vision of 
contemporary society it is important that America's classical republican heritage 
should occupy a central place. 43 
after 1789 mimicked or even repeated English developments of a century before ... 
The division 
between Whig and Tory in Britain closely parallels the split between Federalists and Republicans in 
the United States, with Hamilton assuming the role of Junto Whigs or Walpole, and Jefferson 
serving as Tory or 'Country' gentry ... 
Indeed virtually all of England's central issues reappeared in 
America once Hamilton and his admirers launched their own financial revolution in the 1790s. ', 
'The Great Inversion, Or Court Versus Country: A Comparison of the Revolution Settlements in 
England (1688-1721) and America (1776-1816), in Three British Revolutions: 1641,1688,1776, 
ed. J. G. A. Pocock (Princeton: PUP, 1980), 368-453, at 407. 43 Banning contends: `One of the most important consequences of the modem reinterpretation of 
Revolutionary republicanism has been the understanding that the Revolutionaries left to their 
successors a lasting and profound commitment to values and ideas that were not part of a liberal 
consensus, transmitting to their heirs a more complex political tradition whose rediscovery permits 
important reinterpretations of American developments and conflicts from the War of 1812 to 
Watergate. ', 'Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited: Liberal and Classical Ideas in the New American 
Republic', William and Mary Quarterly, 43 (1986), 3-19, at 13. In a subsequent essay Banning 
admits that early advocates of the republican interpretation were 'guilty of incautious language. ' 
The language he now uses himself is more temperate: `I am seeking to suggest that Revolutionary 
thought - in 1787 as in 1776 - is best conceived of as an early modem blend of liberal and 
neoclassical ideas, that a coherent mixture of the two traditions was in fact its most distinctive feature. ', `The Republican Interpretation: Retrospect and Prospect', pp. 108-9. Another historian, Daniel T. Rodgers, is wryly amused by such `concessions to polyglotism' but in his view `muddle is 
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It is less clear, however, that it merits such a place. Undoubtedly there is a 
classical republican dimension to Jeffersonianism but there is perhaps more that is 
liberal. There is nothing half-hearted in Jefferson's own enthusiasm for commerce 
and free-trade, as is made plain when in writing to John Adams he declared `I think 
all the world would gain by setting commerce at perfect Liberty'. 
4 Nor is there 
anything nostalgic in his attitude to the modem world and developments in science, 
technology and government. Responding to a letter from Adams, fulsome in its 
praise of the benefits of modernity, Jefferson seconded his friend's sentiments: `I 
agree with you in all it's eulogies on the 18`h century. It certainly witnessed the 
sciences and arts, manners and morals, advanced to a higher degree than the world 
had ever before seen. '45 
Banning suggests that the irreducible difference between liberal and republican 
interpretations of Jeffersonian ideology lies in an understanding of the way in 
which they related the public and private spheres. American Revolutionaries and 
Jeffersonian Republicans, he argues, were sufficiently classical in their thought to 
believe the spirit of individualism to be incompatible with liberty. 46 Yet Jefferson 
was under no illusions that men could be expected to surrender their private 
interests to those of the state. As he wrote to Monroe in 1782: `This would be 
not a satisfactory conclusion. ', `Republicanism: the Career of a Concept', The Journal of American 
History, 79 (1992), 11-38, at 38. "Jefferson to Adams, 31 July 1785, Adams-Jefferson Letters, p. 7. The same sentiment is expressed 
in Jefferson's Notes on Virginia (London, 1882), p. 318: `Our interest will be to throw open the 
doors of commerce, and to knock off all its shackles, giving perfect freedom to all persons for the 
vent of whatever they may chuse to bring into our parts, and asking the same in theirs. ' 4sJefferson to Adams, 11 January 1816, Adams-Jefferson Letters, p. 458. Adams had earlier written 
to Jefferson: `We may say that the eighteenth century, notwithstanding all its Errors and Vices has 
been, of all that are past, the most honorable to human Nature. Knowledge and Virtues were 
increased and diffused, Arts Sciences useful to Men, ameliorating their condition, were improved, 
more than in any former equal Period. ', Adams to Jefferson, 13 November 1815, p. 456. 46'Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited', 17-18. 
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slavery, and not that liberty which the bill of rights has made inviolable, and for the 
preservation of which our government has been changed. '47 While Jefferson's view 
of mankind was not so dark as that of Trenchard and Gordon he, like they, 
recognised the limits of human nature. And, like them, he placed his confidence in 
man's self-interest, rather than his capacity for civic virtue, as the means of 
securing liberty and the public good. If liberalism implies a belief that men in 
serving their private, legitimate, interests will at the same time serve the public 
interest, Jefferson, and indeed Trenchard and Gordon, may be counted liberals. 
They believed the general good would emerge if the state respected the rights of all 
and most individuals attended to little else than improving their private lives and 
voting their self-interest, rightly understood. To consult the public interest a man 
needed to merely consult his private interest, which meant, after protection of his 
person, protection of his property: 
It is certain, that the whole people, who are the publick, are the best judges 
whether things go ill or well with the publick. It is true, that they cannot all 
of them see distant dangers, nor watch the motions, and guess the designs, 
of neighbouring states: But every cobbler can judge as well as a statesman, 
whether he can fit peaceably in his stall, whether he is paid for his work, 
whether the market, where he buys his victuals, be well provided, and 
whether a dragon, or a parish-officer, comes to him for his taxes, if he pay 
any. 48 
Trenchard and Gordon did not believe ordinary men were any more capable of 
virtue than great men, it was rather that they saw them as less able, through lack of 
opportunity, to give full rein to their ambition and desire for power. This, of 
course, at first sight sounds very like the Anti-Federalist distrust of `great men' and 
their opposition to what they saw as the aristocratic form of government proposed 
47 Quoted in The Creation of the American Republic, p. 610. 48 CL, I, no. 13, p. 103. 
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by the Federalists. Yet Trenchard and Gordon were not anxious to make 
government any more democratic. Indeed they were frequently disparaging of the 
`mob'. The Anti-Federalists may have wanted to devolve greater power to the 
ordinary man but this was not the aim of Trenchard and Gordon. They were 
essentially content with the political status quo and wished not to alter the levers of 
power but to ensure that the few who wielded that power were, by the operation of 
constitutional checks, prevented from abusing it. 
9 Most Federalists thought as 
they did. 
What Federalists feared was that the majority would tyrannise over the minority 
and they found this fear reflected in Cato's Letters. Anti-Federalists acknowledged 
the possibility that government based on the will of the majority could result in 
unjust deprivations of individual liberty, and addressed it in championing a Bill of 
Rights, but Federalists were particularly exercised by the threat of popular rule 
prevailing at the expense of minority interests. Trenchard and Gordon, 
philosophical and religious freethinkers, were alert to the danger of allowing 
popular opinion, as opposed to the common good, to dominate. It was never their 
belief that individual interests should be sacrificed to meet the interests of the 
people, which is said to be the essence of republicanism. To place the public 
interest before a short-term, immediate, private interest was often a means of 
securing a long-term, greater, interest for oneself. However, to be forced to 
`sacrifice' one's individual interests in the interest of the majority was a form of 
tyranny: 
49That is not to say the Anti-Federalists did not want a system of checks and balances but that they 
believed the form proposed by the Federalists did not address their fears. 
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It is a mistaken notion in government, that the interest of the majority is 
only to be consulted, since in society every man has a right to every man's 
assistance in the enjoyment and defence of his private property; otherwise 
the greater number may sell the lesser, and divide their estates amongst 
themselves; and so, instead of a society, where all peaceable men are 
protected, become a conspiracy of the many against the minority. With as 
much equity may one man wantonly dispose of all, and violence may be 
sanctified by mere power. so 
The tyranny of the majority in matters of religion was particularly objectionable to 
Trenchard and Gordon. It was the triumph of popular opinion over the common 
good, which they believed was best served by toleration. Anti-Federalists, while in 
favour of protection of liberty of conscience, in practice tended to mean toleration 
of Christian or only Protestant sects. 51 For this reason Cato's Letters and The 
Independent Whig would have found a readier audience among Federalists than 
Anti-Federalists for their impassioned pleas for religious tolerance and calls for 
repeal of the Test Acts, together with all legislation that discriminated on the 
grounds of religion. The framers of the Constitution, as suspicious of the 
ambitions of the clergy as of politicians, rejected the idea of establishing religion as 
the foundation of civil institutions. Anti-Federalists, on the other hand, were 
generally more optimistic about the ability of religion to make men less selfish and 
more public-spirited. They were critical of the Constitution's failure to promote 
Christian values and of the absence from it of any religious test for office-holding, 
an omission which appeared intended to further diminish the public significance of 
religious faith. 
50 CL, I, no. 62, p. 427. S'See The Complete Anti-Federalist, I, p. 23. 
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To draw parallels between the Federalists and Trenchard and Gordon, of course, 
runs counter to the prevailing view, which draws an analogy between the authors of 
Cato's Letters and the Anti-Federalists. Both are classified as `Country' 
combatants locked in struggle against `Court' politics and values, championing 
public virtue as the essential prerequisite for good government. This, however, is 
based on a mis-reading of Trenchard and Gordon and if, as Wood argues, the basic 
division separating Anti-Federalists from Federalists was one of contrasting views 
of human nature, Cato 's Letters would have had perhaps greater resonance for the 
Federalists than for the Anti-Federalists. 
Yet what underwrote the political thinking of both Federalists and Anti-Federalists 
was a marked pessimism about human nature. Trenchard and Gordon reflected 
both sides of this pessimism. Suspicious of the power of the many they could be 
read with approval by Federalists and suspicious of the power of the few they could 
equally be read with approval by Anti-Federalists. Ultimately though what 
distinguishes the two parties, and makes Cato's Letters more of a Federalist text, is 
the Anti-Federalists' belief in the restorative power of participatory politics. The 
Federalists harboured few such illusions and shared Trenchard and Gordon's lack 
of confidence in the efficacy of religion and education in infusing true virtue. And 
while the Anti-Federalists placed their trust in moral reform and a regeneration of 
civic virtue as a means of turning back what they saw as a tide of corruption, the 
Federalists followed Trenchard and Gordon in looking to a system of mechanical 
devices and penal deterrents as the one durable way of safeguarding liberty. They 
did not expect these institutional mechanisms would make men virtuous, rather 
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they believed that by opposing one set of interests against another dangerous 
factions could be neutralised. 
Federalists as different as John Adams and Alexander Hamilton found themselves 
in accord with Trenchard and Gordon in seeing the problem of the preservation of a 
modem republic resolved in Hobbesian rather than classical principles. Gerald 
Stourzh has pointed to Hamilton's unacknowledged debt to Hobbes. He has 
argued that Hobbes' identification of self-preservation as the basis of all reasoning 
on social and political matters was responsible for the development of the political 
doctrine of the radical selfishness of man and that this philosophy was of 
paramount significance for Hamilton's thought. 52 Hamilton's ideas, according to 
Stourzh, also show unmistakably the influence of Hume, whom he followed 
closely in his estimation of human nature. 53 It could be said, however, that he 
resembles Trenchard and Gordon in his thought no less closely. And what has not 
been noted is the extent to which Hamilton's pragmatic approach to politics also 
chimed with that of the authors of Cato's Letters. Like him they attacked the 
central premise of classical republicanism, that a republic could not survive 
without civic virtue, and argued instead that it was not possible to persuade people 
to act in a disinterested way and that it was ridiculous to seek models of behaviour 
in ancient Greece or Rome. The idea that men who had a sense of common interest 
would preside over the government of the various states, Hamilton insisted, 
betrayed `an ignorance of the true springs by which human conduct is actuated' and 
belied the `original inducements and the establishment of civil power. ' 
52See Gerald Stourzh, Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1970). 
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Government had been instituted only `Because the passions of men will not 
conform to the dictates of reason and justice without constraint. '54 
Trenchard and Gordon, like Hamilton, believed that man's selfishness rather than 
his virtue was a sounder, more dependable principle on which to build a republic. 
It allowed politics to be reduced to a science. The shape of civil society could be 
brought under man's control by a knowledge of the laws of human behaviour, 
which were based on physical laws of cause and effect. 55 Hamilton may have been 
echoing Hume when he is reported to have remarked that the science of policy was 
the knowledge of human nature but he also echoed Gordon: 
[H]e who knows little of human nature, will never know much of the affairs 
of the world, which every where derive their motion and situation from the 
humours and passions of men. 56 
Men, Gordon accepted, could not be new-made in a pattern of virtue. Governors 
had to work with the material available but once they understood its properties they 
could mould it in the public interest. The passions rather than reason governed 
men so it was the passions which had to be addressed, through desire for reward or 
acclaim or fear of punishment they could be brought to do what they would not do 
when directed by reason: 
Men have long found, from the weakness and depravity of themselves and 
one another, that most men will act for interest against duty, as often as they 
dare. So that to engage them to their duty, interest must be linked to the 
observance of it, and danger to the breach of it. 57 
53Ibid., pp. 71,77,78-9. 54 The Federalist, no. 15, p. 149. 55See chapter 3 of this thesis. 
56CL, I, no. 31, p. 221. 
57Ibid., I, no. 60, p. 417. 
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Hamilton agreed, declaring that men must be taken as they were, that they could 
not be expected to serve the public interest unless their passions were engaged and 
that to place any reliance on pure patriotism was a misguided policy. 
58 Men's 
selfish passions could not be suppressed but they could be directed to serve the 
public good. He believed, as did Trenchard and Gordon, that interest and not 
virtue was the mainspring of government. It is paradoxical, therefore, that Pocock 
should contend that Stourzh's study reveals Hamilton to be a thinker in the direct 
Court tradition and at the same time insist that Trenchard and Gordon were 
members of an opposing tradition. 59 
It has already been argued that Trenchard and Gordon were not opposed to 
England's financial revolution - they were untroubled by the idea of credit and 
were supportive of the Bank of England. Therefore, to present their criticism of the 
South Sea Company scandal as a mirroring of American opposition to Hamilton's 
plans for a national bank and management of the public debt is misleading. Some 
of the rhetoric may sound similar but to claim the ideological divisions were clear- 
cut and remained the same across a continent and across more than half a century is 
to read back into Cato's Letters a meaning they never possessed. Even the issue of 
standing armies, which Hamilton supported and Trenchard and Gordon opposed, is 
not as simple as first appears. Revisionists, following Bailyn, have tended to see 
the American Revolutionary generation as working within an ideological 
framework established by English oppositionists in the first decades of the 
eighteenth century, one dominated by the fear of a Walpolean conspiracy to subvert 
"Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government, p. 84. 
39`Virtue and Commerce in the Eighteenth Century', 130. 
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the constitution. In colonial America this fear translated into fear of 
encroachments by the British Crown on American liberty and later to fear of 
Hamiltonian attempts to undermine the constitution. Yet what is not recognised is 
that Trenchard and Gordon were more fearful of a Jacobite conspiracy than any 
plottings of Walpole's ministry and were ready, therefore, to compromise on issues 
such as maintaining a standing army when they believed the nation to be in danger. 
They would have shared Hamilton's belief in the need for a strong government in 
the face of external threat. `Safety from external danger', Hamilton declared, `is the 
most powerful director of national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will, 
after a time, give way to its dictates. 260 Like Hamilton, Trenchard and Gordon 
realised that to preserve a nation's liberty in the face of a foreign threat it was 
sometimes necessary for government to violate some of those very liberties which 
it was meant to maintain. 
Where Hamilton differed from Trenchard and Gordon, however, was in his belief 
that some men could, by the exercise of reason, rise above the compulsions of 
appetite to which all men were subject. While Anti-Federalists tended to place 
their trust in the virtue of ordinary men, High Federalists like Hamilton placed their 
trust in the virtue of a natural aristocracy. In this respect, Trenchard and Gordon 
were closer to Federalists such as John Adams and James Madison, believing it 
dangerous to trust any man or body of men with unchecked power. They would 
certainly have agreed with Madison's pessimistic pronouncement on mankind: 
`But what is government itself but the greatest reflection on human nature? If men 
60The Federalist, no. 8, p. 114. 
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were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern, neither 
external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. '61 
Adams has been characterised as one of the American thinkers most steeped in the 
tradition of classical politics. Pocock has claimed his Defence of the Constitutions 
of the United States of America is `perhaps the last major work of political theory 
written within the unmodified tradition of classical republicanism'. 
62 On reading 
the Defence, however, what one is struck by is its rejection of the ideals of classical 
republicanism and an embracing of all things modem: 
The arts and sciences, in general, during the three or four last centuries, 
have had a regular course of progressive improvement. The inventions in 
mechanic arts, the discoveries in natural philosophy, navigation, and 
commerce, and the advancement of civilization and humanity, have 
occasioned changes in the condition of the world, and the human character, 
which would have astonished the most refined nations of antiquity ... 
Even 
in the theory and practice of government, in all the simple monarchies 
considerable improvements have been made. The checks and balances of 
republican governments have been in some degree adopted at the courts of 
princes. By the erection of various tribunals, to register the laws, and 
exercise the judicial power - by indulging the petitions and remonstrances 
of subjects, until by habit they are regarded as rights -a control has been 
established over ministers of state, and the royal councils, which in some 
degree, approaches the spirit of republics. Property is generally secure, and 
personal liberty seldom invaded. The press has great influence, when where 
it is not expressly tolerated; and the public opinion must be respected by a 
minister, or his place becomes insecure. Commerce begins to thrive; and if 
religious toleration were established personal liberty a little more protected, 
by giving an absolute right to demand a public trial in a certain reasonable 
time, and the states were invested with a few more privileges, or rather 
restored to some that have been taken away, those governments would be 
brought to as great a degree of perfection, they would approach as near to 
the character of governments of law and not of men, as their nature will 
probably admit of. 63 
61Ibid., no. 51, pp. 319-20. 
62Machiavellian Moment, p. 526. 63The Works of John Adams, IV, p. 283. He expresses similar sentiments in a letter to Jefferson: 
`To return to the Romans, I never could discover that they possessed much Virtue, or real Liberty 
there. Patricians were in general griping Usurers and Tyrannical Creditors in all ages. Pride, 
Strength and Courage were all the Virtues that composed their National Characters. ', Adams to 
Jefferson, 21 December 1819, Adams-Jefferson Letters, I, p. 551. Adams was more optimistic 
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Gordon Wood has argued that Adams was so bound by the values and tenets of 
classical political thought that he missed the intellectual significance of the 
Constitution. The novelty of the new system was that it rested on a separation of 
government functions, all detached from yet responsible to and controlled by the 
people, with the executive, judiciary and legislature all checking and balancing 
each other to prevent any one power from asserting itself too far. Adams was left 
behind by this new thinking, Wood contends, because he clung fast to the classical 
theory of a mixed polity of balanced social estates. 64 To argue thus, however, 
would seem to assume that the theory retained the same meaning for Adams as it 
had done for the ancients, which would appear questionable. The idea of mixed 
government had long become confused with the idea of the separation of 
government branches and the idea of human nature on which this hybrid notion 
was premised was no longer necessarily a classical one. Christian or Hobbesian 
conceptions of human nature - portraying man as wicked or weak and 
irrational - 
offered new justifications for the principle of mixed government. When Adams 
spoke of mixed government he spoke of it both as a balance of social estates and as 
a separation of government functions. The premise on which he based his analysis, 
however, was a belief in the virtue of institutions to constrain and direct men's 
passions rather than faith in the intrinsic virtue of mankind. `The best republics 
will be virtuous, and have been so' he declared, `but we may hazard a conjecture, 
that the virtues have been the effect of the well ordered constitution, rather than the 
about the power of republican government to instil virtue in the nation prior to independence but 
these hopes quickly evaporated after 1776. 
64See The Creation of the American Republic, pp. 567-92. 
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cause. ' Such a constitution, he argued, should establish a proper balance between 
the legislative, executive and judicial components of government. 65 
Adams, like Trenchard and Gordon, grounded his political thinking on both a 
theological and a scientific understanding of human nature, rather than a classical 
one. It has already been argued that Trenchard and Gordon's analysis of what 
motivated man was shaped by the sensationist philosophy of Hobbes and Locke 
and by the moral philosophy of Jansenist writers. 66 Adams was able to turn to 
Hume and Calvinism for an image of man ruled by self-interest rather than by 
reason and to see participation in government not as ennobling and as the means of 
achieving the greatest moral fulfilment but as a reflection on man's inability to 
master himself. 67 If he needed confirmation that this was indeed the true state of 
the human condition, he could draw on Trenchard and Gordon, whose work he 
knew and admired. Like them he believed man's dominant passion was self-love 
and that mankind was incapable of truly disinterested conduct. As early as 1762, 
he argued that for men to claim that their actions were motivated by virtue or by 
reason was merely to indulge in one of the greatest expressions of self-love, self- 
delusion. 68 Great men were no more to be trusted to act in accordance with the 
dictates of virtue or reason than other men and their superior attributes, Adams 
argued, made them an even greater danger than ordinary men. His solution was to 
throw them into a second assembly so that the danger could be contained, in 
emulation of the English constitution which he praised for the excellence of its 
65Adams to Jefferson, 31 July 1785, Adams-Jefferson Letters, I, p. 167. 
66See chapters 3 and 6 of this thesis. 
67For a re-evaluation of the Calvinist strands in the thought of Adams and other Federalists see J. P. 
Diggins, The Lost Soul ofAmerican Politics (New York: Basic Books, 1984). 68See `On Delusion', The Works of John Adams, p. 437. 
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balance as `the most stupendous fabric of human invention'. 69 He shared 
Trenchard and Gordon's belief that man was by nature a creature of unlimited and 
inextinguishable passions but that these very passions could be of `indispensable 
importance' in a modem republic. It was vain to hope for a republic built on virtue 
but, as Trenchard argued, by directing men's passions the same effect, liberty, 
could be achieved: 
There has been always such a constant and certain fund of corruption and 
malignity in human nature, that it has been rare to find that man, whose 
views and happiness did not center in the gratification of his appetites, and 
worst appetites, his luxury, his pride, his avarice, and lust of power; and 
who considered any publick trust reposed in him, with any other view, than 
as the means to satiate such unruly and dangerous desires! And this has 
been most eminently true of great men, and those who aspired to dominion 
... The appetites therefore of men, especially of great men, are carefully to 
be observed and stayed, or else they will never stay themselves ... The 
servants of society, that is to say, its magistrates, did almost universally 
service it by seizing it, selling it, or plundering it; especially when they 
were left by the society unlimited as to their duty and wages ... 
But the 
power and sovereignty of magistrates in free countries was so qualified, and 
so divided into different channels, and committed to the direction of so 
many different men, with different interests and views, that the majority of 
them could seldom or never find their account in betraying their trust in 
fundamental instances. Their emulation, envy, fear, or interest, always 
made them spies and checks upon one another. 70 
The great difficulty with revisionist thinking is that it fails to consider that while 
eighteenth century England and America continued to use the language of classical 
republicanism, the ideas expressed by that language may have acquired new 
meaning and status in the process of coming into dialogue with the languages of 
civil jurisprudence and moral epistemology. It fails to recognise that in America 
even before 1787, or at whatever later date revisionists choose to fix on as 
signalling the end of an era in which a structured universe of classical thought 
69'Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America', The Works of John 
Adams, p. 358. 
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served as the intellectual medium through which Americans perceived the political 
world, classical republican concepts such as civic virtue had been undermined, and 
in the process transformed, by what might be called a `liberal' idea of liberty. Even 
before Independence the notion that the purpose of government was to protect 
private liberty and individual rights rather than to seek to make men virtuous was 
not a novel one, it was well known to all readers of Cato's Letters. As already 
shown, in newspapers and in private correspondence the Letters were cited in 
defence of those rights. Trenchard and Gordon's analysis of human nature as 
inherently self-interested was drawn on directly as an argument in favour of 
colonial self-determination and it was implicit in Federalist arguments for a federal 
Constitution. When the American Revolutionaries opposed to the British Crown 
and later the opponents of Hamiltonian financial policies adopted the language of 
denunciation used in Cato's Letters to attack Court corruption, it does not mean 
their thinking, any more than that of Trenchard and Gordon, was dominated by 
classical republican ideas of virtue and liberty. 7' To argue thus, however, is not to 
suggest that the American Revolutionary generation used republican rhetoric in a 
cynical fashion, to legitimise economic interests by cloaking them in the language 
of virtue. It is merely to reiterate that for eighteenth century America, and England, 
ideas of positive and negative liberty could exist side by side. The co-existence of 
both ideas of liberty in men's minds, however, means that the classical republican 
70CL, I, no. 60, p. 416. 71As J. P. Diggins has argued, there is a difference between `a rhetoric of accusation and a 
requirement of affirmation, between suspecting others of conspiring against liberty and virtue and 
being called upon to uphold virtue itself... Reacting to fear of "power", "tyranny" and "conspiracy" 
is perfectly compatible with the traditional pattern of interest politics and self-preservation in the 
Hobbesian and Lockean sense. But to act for reasons of "virtue" implies, in the classical sense, the 
capacity to subordinate immediate personal interests to the "General Welfare. "', The Lost Soul of 
American Politics, p. 22. 
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paradigm could never have occupied the pre-eminent position ascribed to it by 
early revisionists. " 
72Despite the degree of consensus that has developed between scholars on either side of the 
republicanism-liberalism debate in the last decade, it is difficult not to see it, at least in part, as an 
exercise in `papering over the cracks'. This is hardly surprising - the debate had become 
increasingly vitriolic during the 1980s. As Alan Gibson points out in a recent retrospective essay, 
many scholars had begun to find it `sterile, unproductive and even nauseating'. Those scholars, 
however, who have continued to explore the intellectual origins of the American Founding, Gibson 
claims, have formed a consensus `around the conciliatory and catholic but also diffuse claims that 
the political thought of the Founders is best understood as an amalgam of liberalism, republicanism, 
and perhaps other traditions of political thought. ' This is all very well but when one examines the 
positions taken by these scholars one wonders just how far forward the debate has actually 
advanced. Undeniably scholars on either side of the republican-liberal debate have conceded some 
ground. They could scarcely have done otherwise. Common ground always existed between the 
two camps but as lines became more entrenched during the 1980s this fact was lost sight of. Now 
however, according to Gibson, in place of the old republican-liberal debate a new 'multiple 
traditions approach' has developed. One of these approaches is the 'Neo-Lockean Synthesis'. 
Among its proponents are J. David Greenstone and Michael Zuckert. Greenstone, Gibson explains, 
'has emphasized the presence of both republicanism and liberalism within the political thought of 
the Founders, but has also argued that this diversity can itself be embraced within a broader 
consensus of liberalism. ' Studies by Zuckert similarly 'reinforce this understanding of Lockean 
liberalism as the core of the political thought of the American Founding, while simultaneously 
showing how other species of political thought were assimilated into it. ' 
Another approach identified by Gibson is that which he calls 'liberal republicanism'. Advocates of 
this approach include Ralph Ketcham, Drew McCoy, Garrett Ward Sheldon and, especially, Lance 
Banning. These scholars recognise, Gibson says, that liberalism and republicanism were both 
present and important in the American Founding. They differ from Neo-Lockeans, however, in 
contending that eighteenth century Americans 'still understood republicanism as a set of beliefs 
about the importance of public liberty, virtue and the public good. These concepts, they emphasize, 
had great longevity; and if these concepts were not strictly classical in the way they were conceived 
by the Founders, then they nevertheless retained aspects of their original classical meaning. In 
short, because this group includes many of the scholars who formerly espoused the "republican 
synthesis", they tend to stress the persistence of classical republicanism concepts in the face of the 
advent of modernity and, in Ketcham's words, to view the Revolution, and perhaps even more the 
Constitution, as shaped, uniquely and creatively, by the tension between a still-vigorous classical 
republican outlook and the new, modem, democratic liberalism". ' See Alan Gibson, 'Ancients, 
Modems and Americans: The Republican-Liberalism Debate Revisited', History of Political 
Thought, 21 (2000), 261-307, at 261,261-2,266,267,275. 
The 'multiple traditions approach' softens the differences between scholars but clearly it does not 
eliminate them. A truce may have been called but questions remain to be answered. One such 
question is the role played by Trenchard and Gordon in shaping the thought of the American 
Revolutionary generation. It is the contention of this thesis that in respect of Cato's Letters for too 
long the emphasis has been placed on the civic humanist aspect of Trenchard and Gordon's work. 
This thesis has sought to prove that the overwhelming evidence suggests that Trenchard and Gordon 
should be regarded as modem, as opposed to classical, republicans and it is perhaps predominantly 
in this guise that they appeared to the American Founders. 
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